The government actively monitors social media and private communications with limited, if any, oversight. A complex set of policies aims to control online communication, but the country does not have a legal framework that establishes accountability and transparency mechanisms for government surveillance.
Sections 18(1) to 18(3) of the CCA allow the government to access user-related or traffic data without a court order and to compel ISPs to decode programmed data.134
Government agencies possess a variety of surveillance technologies. In July 2022, an investigation from Citizen Lab, iLaw, and Digital Reach identified at least 30 Thai human rights defenders, prodemocracy protestors, and monarchy-reform activists whose devices were infected with Pegasus spyware.135 The investigation was prompted after Thai politicians, activists, and academics received emails from Apple in November 2021 notifying them that “state-sponsored attackers” may have targeted their iPhones.136 Following this, the MDES minister admitted that some Thai government departments have been using Pegasus spyware for “national security” and to combat drug trafficking.
https://freedomhouse.org/country/thailand/freedom-net/2024#C