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emancipationthailand

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Posts posted by emancipationthailand

  1. [snip]

    Throughout past 70 years, beside suppressing civil protests via tanks and machine guns (1973, 1976, 1992) and assisting in national disasters, I haven't heard much of the military's achievements. I thought the army had been humiliated in battles and in the three most southern provices quite often?

    I doubt that spending massive PR funding would count as achievement. (ISOC's MOSO)

    Also, so Thailand is willing to pull this stunt with a possible aim to make the US happy, but refused to extradite the international terrorist Victor Bout? Strange ......

  2. Since the topic caught relatively nice attention, if the readers suspect if there's a propaganda to discredit the effort to catch this international terrorist in Thailand, Please google on Ullrich Wolfgang's case with Thailand years ago. My previous post was totally censor. .......... There aren't even any explanations ......

    Since i believe nobody saw my rep ~

    Ullrich Wolfgang + Democrat + Sanan ^^ got 1

    Loophole could keep Thailand from deporting Wolfgang Ullrich

    No extradition treaty with Germany

    Wolfgang Ullrich remains in Thai prison, but it is unknown how much longer that will be the case.

    Ullrich’s present court case convened at 9.00 a.m. on 17 January 2000, with his lawyers questioning the Foreign Affairs Office prosecutor’s case against the 55 year old German defendant.

    The criminal case was registered on 15 December 1999, accusing the defendant and others of collectively misappropriating donated funds in Germany for personal use. The extortion includes membership dues and other funds from people who donated to the German Wildlife Preservation Assistance Association and the European Continent Preservation Assistance Association.

    Ullrich had his lawyer deny the charges and requested the court consider the fact that Thailand and Germany do not have an extradition treaty, purportedly due to the fact Germany is not interested in acquiring such treaties with what Ullrich’s lawyers termed “under-developed countries”.

    In addition, the Thai government is being asked to consider not sending Ullrich back to Germany, using the matter as reason for the two countries to come to terms to create a criminal extradition treaty.

    Ullrich’s lawyer also denies the prosecution’s charges, stating that the prosecutor has a lack of supporting evidence. Ullrich’s lawyer also suggested charges are brought against the prosecutor, and requested the defendant, who has already been questioned through an interpreter, be released.

    The prosecution petitioned the court to postpone deciding the case due to the absence of witnesses from the Foreign Ministry, who are currently engaged in other urgent matters preventing their presence at the trial.

    Ullrich’s lawyer specified further that the defendant has already been held in custody for too long, declaring a postponement is not warranted.

    At that point the court adjourned and is scheduled to re-convene at 9.00 a.m. on 3 February 2000.

    http://www.pattayamail.com/338/news.htm

  3. Here deserves zero years in jail

    The minute he sets foot in Thailand he should be executed !!!

    Ummm. I found this directly related past discussion here.

    http://www.thaivisa.com/forum/Death-Threat...li-t125573.html

    Also, related to the above. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benigno_Aquino,_Jr.

    The funny thing is that i took the much beloved (in this forum) Democrat Party to be portray as Ferdinand Marcos, due to the FIDF' case (Lehman Brothers and Goldman Sachs) Again, i am thoroughly regret that this had accidentally came across my mind, as the court case isn't close yet.

  4. Modified after got deleted by the mod twice in a row.

    As a thai, i insisted that you all need to have this fundamental understanding. >>> Concluding with Taksin's issues, the top issues the Thai people wants see truth justices brought used to be and still somewhat relatively the same;

    1. People 'behind' the late terrorisms in the three most southern provinces.

    2. Democrat Party's intended mishandlings of FIDF and its shady deals with Lehman Brothers and Goldman Sachs.

    3. Sonthi Limthongul's ASTV

    4. Military's gunned down the civil demonstrations in 1973, 1976 and 1992. (All involved army dictators were awarded, protected, and praised by most of the Thailand elites)

    early reference http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Thailand_since_1973

    5. ............

    6. The ousting of the beloved EX-PM Predee panomyong by his elite oppositions.

  5. I know that most posts have focused on Thaksin's dubious activities. I do think though that is important to understand why Thaksin is so popular amongst so many - it did much to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor especially in the North and North East. I am not saying that Thaksin is a crusader for the poor, it was probably pure political expediency. You can perhaps understand though why people would prefer to be governed by him rather than an OE, Oxford educated member of the ruling elite.

    Here is the gini coefficient...

    1312065827_db2d4fee6d_o.jpg

    This measures income distribution - a fall representing a more equal distribution of income. It fell in all regions 2000-2004 apart from Bangkok where it remained the same (source World Bank Report 2005). As a general rule gini coefficients increase as a country grows.

    Look also how rural incomes rose relative to those in Bangkok between 2000 and 2004....

    1312948574_1eb1cab53a_o.jpg

    Thaksin's period in office also massively reduced the number living below the poverty line...

    1311445274_3e5dba4cdc.jpg

    Look at the North East where the percentage halved in the space of 4 years while it had only fallen 30% in the previous ten.

    (I realize the stats are a bit dodgy - Thaksin didnt come to power to 2001 and was in power after 2004. Unfortunately I couldnt find the stats for those exact dates.)

    There is a sort of 'myth' about Thaksin that 'he is a crook that the poor are too stupid to realize'. The theory amongst the poor is this 'Thaksin was the first politician to deliberately skew policies for the benefit of the poor, clearly this was not in the interest of the rich power elite so he was removed.'

    I have some sympathy with both views. But people who want to get all moralistic about Thaksin and the deaths of 2000 innocents are better off turning their attentions to Iraq. There are 30m people who see a man committed to improving their lives (actually he merely wants their vote) he was kicked out by a military coup. Prosecution and imprisonment would be very socially divisive.

    If not for the accused political motive, the poverty alleviation is based on Thailand's commitment on MDG. (millenium development goals) http://poverty.nesdb.go.th/Edocument/Eng_Paper/Pov_MDG.pdf

  6. I am very sorry if my postings may had been disrupting the total domination at this forum, Jingthing and his powerful allies.

    I am deeply regret to get this exclusive warning, which i insist posting here should benefits a few folks whom don't wish to be branded as 'being very biased' here.

    "Again I have to ask you to tone down your political comment. ThaiVisa is happy to allow political discussion, but that does not include using this forum for your very biased support for one side." Thank you for your friendly warning Dr. Pat Phong.

  7. All red shirts think

    :)

    Since when does a mob of true believers think?

    For farangs that still didn't realized this, your mode of thoughts is almost 1-year outdated, which is quite ancient considering the current situation.

    Please tell us your personal opinion about this so called CURRENT mode of thought. Just describing another mode of thought as outdated is MEANINGLESS. More info please, OK, if you are capable of doing so ...

    I mean IN YOUR OWN WORDS, not a link to a 10,000 word cut and paste article ...

    Nah, for your own benefit, i insist that farangs must experience it themselves. ^^

    Please continue to be your happy self. : )

  8. I realize that feelings about Thaksin run high. Some object to the deaths of 3000 drug dealers in principal while other point that a couple of hundred were innocent. Pro Thaksin supporters justify the hard line and probably believe that many 1000s of lives have been saved by the crackdown even if it resulted in the deaths of a few hundred. Pro-Thaksin supporters look to the redistirbution of income which was unparalleled in SE Asia while anti Thaksin supporters believe that someone who sold his company for US$2bn and paid not tax has no moral authority to run any country.

    It just goes on, other Thai PMs ordered the shooting of protesters and were not jailed and other Thai PMs were involved in the majority of drug smuggling within the country.

    The worst problem with Thaksin is that he created a huge divisive and destructive divide within the country. If he is ignored and gradually forgotten that divide will eventually erode which is in everyones best interests. If he is brought back to this country and tried through an unelected government (assuming you believe votes should not be restricted to say intelligent people with an Oxford/ Cambridge degree) it will only re-ignite past differences.

    I know anti-Thaksin people claim moral precedence over what they consider a corrupt and immoral man but they should at least realize that the only reason he is not in power is that they have abused a democratic system which they hold so dearly.

    Let him fade away for the good of everyone.

    "The worst problem with Thaksin is that he created a huge divisive and destructive divide within the country" >>>> All red shirts think it's rather Sonthi Limthongkul, the owner of Manager Groups and a few oversea publications, and Suthichai Yun the owner of the Nation Group. (Yup this very forum) The two personal enemies of Taksin are the ones who started it all.

  9. The efforts had been done and the POVs here had been monitored by some of the most popular political boards in Thailand. Thanks for showing FIERCE opinions from the yellow/Democrat camp. We values these reflects coming from farangs in Democrat dominated regions in Thailand.

    Now, let's see what will hold in the future from now on.

    5 5 5 5 5

    For farangs that still didn't realized this, your mode of thoughts is almost 1-year outdated, which is quite ancient considering the current situation.

    I don't see any expressions of YOUR PERSONAL HARDSHIPS/SUFFERINGS affected from the late political crisis at all, absolutely.

  10. so says the "forums number 2 poster"

    Merely stating an easily provable fact.... but that's something I realize you don't seem to care much about. :)

    But by all means, please continue... because the farcical impersonations are humorous... it's become a case of "can you top this" for all these false claims from assorted fakers.

    My own uncle "Pataranawat" is one of the 9 judge of the Supreme Court

    Another contestant joins the competition...

    I'll take this opportunity then.

    http://www.thaivisa.com/forum/Readings-Pol...-T-t286729.html

  11. Out of those very few cases that got Taksin nailed, the Ratchada Land's Case is only case which isn't resulted from skipping bails. My own uncle "Pataranawat" is one of the 9 judge of the Supreme Court to ruled against Taksin and he's known to have deep personal grudge against Taksin, be it at work (he somewhat had mentioned it) and when's in family gathering. BTW, he has been advancing extremely quickly since these past 3 - 4 years.

    His son is about to be married into one of the highest of the '3' truth elite families with deep connections with Thailand's judiciary pillar of the three main pillars of Thailand as well.

    Related link http://www.thaijusticereform.com/index.php...45&Itemid=1

    Also, about skipping bails, since Taksin realized after the ruling of the Ratchada case that he would never get a fair trial unless he'll be able to pledge 'extreme regret' before the 'invisible hand' and get accepted, Once done, then he'll be able to come back to Thailand in peace. ......... Of course, many red shirts know about what's go on too. ALL THESE CROOKS TRYING TO NAILED TAKSIN!

  12. The new constitution approved in August 2007 was more democratic than the initial version issued by the drafting committee in that it called for an elected rather than an appointed prime minister and did not provide for the establishment of an emergency council with discretionary powers to dismiss the prime minister. However, it did contain a number of provisions—clearly designed in response to ousted prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s overreach while in office and the dominance of his TRT party—that left Thailand less democratic than under the 1997 constitution. In addition to establishing a two-term limit for the premiership and lowering the threshold for launching a no-confidence vote against the prime minister (from two-fifths to one-fifth) and cabinet ministers (from one-fourth to one-sixth), the new constitution reduced the role of elected lawmakers. The Senate was cut from 200 elected members to 150 members—76 elected and 74 appointed. Moreover, the means of appointment somewhat compromises legislative and judicial independence: a committee of seven judges selected by the Senate, along with independent government bodies, would appoint half the Senate. For the House of Representatives, the new constitution altered the system of proportional representation to lessen the voting power of the northern and northeastern provinces, where support for Thaksin remains strong: while 100 members were previously elected according to their parties’ shares of the national vote, 80 members are now elected according to party performance in eight groups of provinces with 10 representatives each. The remaining 400 members of the lower house are elected in 157 multiseat constituencies.

    Thailand’s head of state, xxxx xxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx, has little responsibility in day-to-day politics but retains tremendous moral and symbolic influence, particularly in times of national or constitutional crisis. In early December 2007, hundreds of thousands gathered in Bangkok and campaign activities were suspended to celebrate the 80th birthday of the world’s longest-reigning xxxxxxxx.

    While the December elections returned Thailand to democratic rule, the CNS maintained tight control over the process and deliberately maneuvered to influence the outcome. Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont appointed himself to head the Interior Ministry, which supervises elections, and then appointed CNS leader Sonthi as deputy prime minister when his term as army commander expired in September. Surayud also placed Sonthi in charge of the committee responsible for preventing voter fraud. At least three investigations were brought against PPP candidates between the elections and the end of the year.

    Martial law remained in force in 34 provinces through October and in 25 through the rest of 2007, limiting campaign activities. The election commission imposed a host of restrictions in October that disadvantaged smaller, newer parties by limiting their ability to promote their plans and platforms. Candidates were barred from holding public forums unless they were specifically organized by the commission itself, and media outlets were prohibited from hosting candidates from one party without including candidates from all parties. Evidence of a CNS plan to “sabotage” the PPP, specifically employing the state-run broadcast media, was published online after it was discovered.

    Prior to the 2006 coup, Thailand’s multiparty democracy was dominated by Thaksin’s populist TRT party, which drew important support from rural voters. Under Thaksin, the government generally showed less patience for the basic procedures of democratic consultation and debate. The coup suspended all party activity through June 2007, when the ban was finally lifted. The CNS-backed Constitutional Tribunal’s April 2007 ruling against the TRT effectively dissolved the country’s largest political force and prevented its leadership from contesting the upcoming elections. The continued ban on the formation of new parties served to obstruct the reorganization of the TRT, but its members managed to regroup as the PPP, a defunct older party. The DP, the country’s oldest political party, was left intact by the tribunal’s ruling. With its strong middle-class support, particularly in Bangkok, it was the main opposition force before the coup and following the December 2007 elections. Meanwhile, despite clear campaign disadvantages, the PPP won 233 lower house seats in the elections and joined with three smaller parties—the Thai Unity Party, the Middle Way Party, and the Royalist People’s Party—to form a majority coalition by year’s end.

    Anecdotal evidence suggests that official corruption is widespread, with bureaucrats and law enforcement officials accepting bribes in exchange for routine services. Corruption ranked among Thais’ top frustrations with the Thaksin government and was cited as part of the military’s justification for the coup. The main complaints arose from the strong nexus between politics and big business, particularly the Thaksin family’s ownership of significant national assets. After seizing power in September 2006, the CNS reinstated the county’s anticorruption commission, which had been dormant for more than a year, and established the Asset Examination Committee (AEC), a body with the power to seize assets from Thaksin and other former officials. While it was criticized for a slow start and was driven by clear political motives, the AEC filed two suits against Thaksin in 2007 and froze 21 of his and his family members’ bank accounts—containing roughly 53 billion baht ($US1.5 billion)—in June. In late November, shortly before the elections, the AEC indicted Thaksin and 46 others, mostly former cabinet officials, for launching a controversial two- and three-digit lottery in 2003, accusing them of violating the 1974 Government Lottery Act and the 1948 Treasury Reserves Act. All 47 were asked to pay significant sums to the government for lost revenue. A few corruption allegations were made against Prime Minister Surayud, and in September and October, five members of the interim cabinet resigned after being cited by the National Counter-Corruption Commission for holding stakes in companies exceeding 5 percent. That was an apparent violation of the new constitution, which took effect in September. Thailand was ranked at 84 out of 180 countries surveyed in Transparency International’s 2007 Corruption Perceptions Index.

    The new constitution restored and even extended strong legal protections for freedom of expression that had been eliminated by the September 2006 coup. Yet media freedom remained significantly restricted for the better part of 2007 due to the passage of harsh new legislation and the manipulation of state-run media to influence voters. In a positive move, the draconian 1941 Printing and Publishing Act, which reserved the government’s right to shut down media outlets, was replaced with the less restrictive Publishing Registration Act in late August 2007. A new Computer Crime Act, however, came into effect in July, threatening significant prison terms for the publication of false information deemed to endanger the public or national security. That law was first invoked against a blogger in August, but the charges were dropped in October. The penal code continues to include harsh defamation legislation. Although the use of libel suits to silence government critics was more frequent under Thaksin, the tactic was employed against journalists who insulted CNS officials in 2007. A Bangkok court sentenced two talk-show hosts to two years in prison in April for saying that the deputy Bangkok governor had taken bribes on two occasions.

    The country’s print media remained largely unaffected by military rule and continued to cover controversial developments, including the dissolution of the TRT and the drafting of the new constitution. However, the CNS significantly obstructed the state-run broadcasting sector and online media. In January 2007, it invoked Military Order No. 10, issued in September 2006, which urged media cooperation in promoting “peace and national unity.” Television and radio executives were convened and asked to prevent their outlets from being used as platforms for Thaksin’s return. Television broadcasts of Thaksin were blocked, and community radio stations were temporarily closed down for airing interviews with the ousted leader. State-run media were barred from broadcasting calls for a “no” vote in the constitutional referendum, and state outlets were similarly restricted ahead of the December elections. Moreover, in March the CNS tried to prevent the launch of People’s TV (PTV), which supported the PPP, by denying it the internet access it needed. The station managed to begin operations, but the authorities immediately blocked its broadcasts. Also in March, the Public Relations Department took over Thailand’s only independent, private broadcast television station, iTV, which was formerly run by a Thaksin-owned company. Officials claimed that it had illegally changed its operating concession with the former prime minister’s office and thus owed significant fines. Websites that were considered a threat to the military regime were blocked, and the video-sharing site YouTube was temporarily banned for carrying a video deemed insulting to the xxxx.

    The interim constitution did not specifically protect freedom of religion, but Thais of all faiths have traditionally worshipped freely in this predominantly Buddhist society. The new Thai constitution explicitly prohibits discrimination against a person on the grounds of "a difference in religious belief,” yet religious freedom declined markedly in 2007 as a result of mounting violence in the southern provinces. The fact that the chairman of the CNS was a Thai Muslim initially raised hopes for progress toward a resolution of the insurgency. The military government pledged to improve justice, education, and socioeconomic conditions in the south, but bombings, assassinations, and arson all dramatically increased following the coup, with attacks occurring daily. The victims included Buddhist monks and, increasingly, Buddhist teachers; 64 teachers were assassinated between January 2004 and February 2007. An August 2007 report by Human Rights Watch found that ethnic Malay Muslims who collaborated with the Thai government were also targeted, including religious leaders or parents who opposed the insurgency or obstructed rebel recruitment.

    A coup-related ban on political activity and gatherings was lifted in December 2006, but freedoms of assembly and association were not protected by the interim constitution, and martial law restricted these rights in much of the country in 2007. Several peaceful protests by the DAAD drew thousands in early 2007, however, voicing support for PTV, opposition to the CNS, and calling for the head of the Privy Council to step down. Sonthi urged the restoration of martial law throughout the country in response, but the prime minister allowed the protests to proceed. The government prepared security forces for major protests after the Constitutional Tribunal’s decision to dissolve the TRT, but the expected demonstrations did not materialize. The new constitution officially restored the rights to assembly and association later that year, but martial law continued in certain provinces.

    Thailand has an extremely vibrant nongovernmental organization (NGO) community, with groups representing farmers, laborers, women, students, and human rights interests. However, according to the U.S. State Department’s 2007 human rights report, NGOs that dealt with sensitive political issues or obstructed government-backed development projects faced harassment. Human rights groups focused on the volatile southern provinces reportedly met with intimidation by both sides in the conflict. Private associations are legally required to register with the government, but the rule is not observed in practice.

    Thai trade unions are independent, though fewer than 4 percent of the workforce is unionized. More than 50 percent of state-enterprise workers are unionized, however. According to the to the U.S. State Department’s 2007 Human Rights report, low rates of labor organization can be attributed to the fact that unions are not permitted in the sizable agricultural and informal sectors, and to efforts by the government and the private sector to diminish union cohesion. Labor laws allowing certain workers to join unions, collective bargaining, and protections against forced labor were unchanged by the 2006 coup, but they remained poorly enforced. Exploitation of migrant workers from Burma, Cambodia, and Laos was an ongoing problem, as was child and sweatshop labor.

    Judicial independence was eliminated when the coup leaders dissolved the Constitutional Court and transferred its role and cases to a new Constitutional Tribunal. While the interim constitution specified that judicial independence would be upheld, international human rights groups cited the judiciary as one of the institutions most concretely affected by the coup. All appointed judges could be removed at any time, and with the nullification of the 1997 constitution, Thai citizens lost habeas corpus rights. The Constitutional Tribunal’s April 2007 decision to effectively dissolve the TRT party was widely perceived to be politically driven. The new permanent constitution restored judicial independence and reestablished an independent constitutional court. A separate military court adjudicates criminal and civil cases involving members of the military, as well as cases brought under martial law. Sharia (Islamic law) courts hear certain types of cases pertaining to Muslims.

    Pretrial detention—often up to 84 days in criminal cases—is a serious problem, and trials frequently take years to complete. Prison conditions are dire, with inmates and detainees facing shackling and abuse by police and military personnel. State officials are rarely prosecuted for such acts. According to an October 2007 International Crisis Group report, a range of paramilitary forces and civilian militias operating alongside the military and police are impeding efforts to defeat the insurgency in the south; despite its reputation for human rights abuses and corruption, the “ranger” paramilitary force has been tripled by the army since the violence erupted in 2004. Reports of extrajudicial killings and arbitrary arrests by security forces in the south continued in 2007. Some progress was made in the investigation of the 2004 murder of Somchai Neelaphaijit, a Muslim lawyer who had been campaigning against martial law in the south and defending five Muslims tortured by police, though the case remained unresolved at year’s end. A police investigation of December 31, 2006, bomb blasts in Bangkok was launched in January, but no one was ultimately held accountable. Separately, the Justice Ministry and police force formed panels in 2007 to investigate at least 1,300 killings stemming from Thaksin’s 2003 “War on Drugs” campaign.

    The interim legislature approved a new Internal Security Act in the final days before the December 2007 elections, allowing the establishment of an Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) in times of perceived national crisis. The original draft proposed in June was rejected for going too far to retain military control after the restoration of elected government. The second version, introduced in October, called for the prime minister to serve as the ISOC’s head and the army chief to serve as deputy director, but it nevertheless allowed the government to use emergency powers—including authority to suspend the media, search and detain without warrants, and establish curfews—without declaring a state of emergency. The measure was widely criticized by watchdog groups as a threat to basic civil liberties.

    Many of the estimated one million members of hill tribes have never been fully integrated into society. Half of hill-tribe members reportedly lack citizenship, which renders them ineligible to vote, own land, attend state schools, or be protected under labor laws. They are required to carry identification cards, their movement is restricted, and they continue to face forced eviction and relocation. Separately, an estimated 140,000 Burmese refugees live in camps along the Burmese border.

    Rape, domestic abuse, HIV/AIDS, prostitution, and the trafficking of women and children all present critical challenges. Thai government records indicate that the number of domestic abuse cases per day has multiplied since 2002. According to the U.S. State Department, the Thai police reported 5,269 cases of rape nationwide from September 2006 through October 2007. Rape is illegal, and there are a range of penalties for sexual assault. Some 200,000 to 300,000 Thai women and children work as prostitutes, according to NGO estimates, and sex tourism remains a problem. Authorities prosecute relatively few traffickers, and many police, soldiers, local officials, and immigration officers reportedly are involved in trafficking or take bribes to ignore it. More than 1 percent of adult Thais are infected with HIV/AIDS; aggressive prevention and treatment policies, especially a program launched in 2004 to provide HIV-positive people with antiretroviral drugs, have reduced both the number of new HIV/AIDS cases and the number of deaths from the disease.

    Fin ~

  13. The 2008 report got representation from both the yellow shirts and the red shirts. Don't make early judgments though, coz to understand about political problems in Thailand, you may need to search for this kind of reports extended back for 70 years.

    http://freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=...3&year=2008

    referred from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Representative_democracy (Notice the representation of Thailand in the world democracy map in the page)

    Freedom in the World - Thailand (2008)

    Political Rights Score: 6 *

    Civil Liberties Score: 4 *

    Status: Partly Free

    Status Change Explanation

    Thailand’s political rights rating improved from 7 to 6, and its status improved from Not Free to Partly Free, because of the resumption of limited political activity and the holding of legislative elections by year’s end.

    Overview

    The Council for National Security (CNS)—the military-led authority installed after Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was ousted in a September 2006 coup—charted a carefully controlled return to democracy in 2007. It maintained martial law in nearly half of the country’s provinces for much of the year, effectively dissolved Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai party, and imposed a host of restrictions on his political supporters after they regrouped as the People’s Power Party (PPP). A new constitution was approved by referendum in August. Despite the CNS’s efforts, however, the PPP won the December 23 elections and formed a ruling coalition at year’s end. Also during 2007, the CNS manipulated the state-run broadcast media in a bid to influence votes, and religious freedom declined as a result of heightened violence in the south.

    Known as Siam until 1939, Thailand is the only Southeast Asian country that was never colonized by a European power. Beginning with a 1932 coup that transformed the kingdom into a constitutional monarchy, the army ruled periodically over the next six decades. The military more recently seized power in 1991, but Thailand returned to civilian rule the following year, when the country’s revered xxxxxx, xxxx xxxxxx xxxxxxxx, convinced the military to appoint a civilian prime minister.

    Thailand’s export-led economy experienced strong growth in the decade prior to 1997, when it was dragged down by the Asian financial crisis. Amid street protests by middle-class Thais in Bangkok against corruption and economic mismanagement, the parliament voted no confidence in Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh and replaced him with Democrat Party (DP) leader Chuan Leekpai, a former prime minister with a clean reputation. The parliament also approved a reformist constitution, which created independent election and anticorruption bodies and introduced the direct election of the Senate.

    Criticizing the government for favoring the urban middle class over ordinary Thais, Thaksin Shinawatra, a former deputy prime minister who built his fortune in telecommunications, unseated Chuan in the January 2001 elections. His Thai Rak Thai (TRT, or Thais Love Thais) party won 248 of the lower house’s 500 seats despite a December 2000 ruling by the new National Counter-Corruption Commission that Thaksin had falsified wealth-disclosure statements while serving as a cabinet minister in 1997. He was cleared of the charges in a controversial move by the Constitutional Court in August 2001.

    Thaksin’s government won praise from many Thais for introducing programs to help small businesses and the poor. Low interest rates and populist spending programs fueled a consumption-driven economic growth spurt. Yet many of Thaksin’s moves undercut the reformist spirit of the country’s new constitution; the prime minister was even accused of subverting the charter itself. The constitution required the prime minister and cabinet members to divest themselves of all business interests, but many officials simply transferred their holdings to family members. Thaksin and his associates also allegedly abused their power for personal gain. Moreover, seeking to portray Thailand as hospitable for foreign investors and tourists, the government clamped down on negative news, denied the presence of terrorists in the country, and maintained that Thailand was safe from the deadly avian influenza sweeping Asia. However, by February 2004, officials had confirmed numerous human flu cases.

    The eruption of violence that year in Thailand’s four southernmost provinces, home to most of the country’s four million Muslims, and the government’s hard-line response prompted further discontent with Thaksin. The government declared martial law and introduced restrictive security laws in most of Narathiwat, Pattani, and Yala provinces in July 2005, and the measures were extended in duration and scope in October of that year and January 2006. Many Thais, particularly those residing in the south, feared that the government’s drastic actions would only fuel the insurgency and aid recruitment for the international terrorist groups Jemaah Islamiyah and al-Qaeda, both of which had previous links to Thailand. More than 2,600 people have been killed since the insurgency began in January 2004.

    The February 2005 parliamentary elections marked a second landslide for the TRT party, which captured 377 of 500 seats in the lower house and formed a government without coalition partners. However, rising inflation and interest rates, mounting fatalities from bird flu, corruption, the government’s general disregard for the constitution, and its heavy-handed approach to the insurgency all combined to fuel significant anti-Thaksin sentiment by December 2005, particularly in Bangkok and the south.

    The political crisis of 2006 began in January with the Thaksin family’s highly controversial sale of its Shin Corporation telecommunications firm to Temasek Holdings, the investment arm of Singapore’s government. The move set off a wave of anti-Thaksin protests in the capital, prompting the prime minister to call snap elections for early April. While the TRT secured a majority of the vote, the balloting was perceived to be illegitimate due to a boycott by all three opposition parties. Thaksin promised to step down for the sake of “national unity,” but a political impasse developed when unfilled seats prevented the House of Representatives from convening, and new elections were scheduled for October 15.

    A military coup on September 19 preempted the vote, ousting Thaksin from office and installing a junta led by General Sonthi Boonyaratglin. The constitution was abrogated, parliament was dissolved, and the Constitutional Court was replaced with an appointed military tribunal. A number of restrictions were imposed on the media and freedom of association and assembly. The coup leaders’ Council for National Security (CNS) established an interim civilian government within weeks, with former army commander Surayud Chulanont as prime minister. An interim constitution promulgated on October 1 outlined a process for drafting a new permanent constitution over the next year, but the temporary charter was criticized for its omission of many democratic protections.

    While the coup was carried out peacefully and initially enjoyed significant public and royal support, the credibility and legitimacy of the CNS government was undermined in 2007 by its slow progress in restoring democracy, a major dip in the Thai stock market, lagging efforts to hold Thaksin accountable for corruption, and the deteriorating security situation in the south. A poll indicated that as of February 2007, more than 50 percent of Thais had lost faith in the CNS’s ability to resolve political problems. By June, the Democratic Alliance Against the Dictatorship (DAAD), a coalition of groups opposed to the coup and the CNS government, was leading daily nonviolent protests of up to 10,000 people.

    Meanwhile, the CNS took steps to prevent Thaksin and his supporters from returning to power. In late May, the CNS-appointed Constitutional Tribunal found the TRT guilty of paying off smaller parties in the April 2006 elections, but it cleared the DP—the main opposition party prior to the coup—of any electoral irregularities. The ruling effectively dissolved the TRT, specifically prohibiting Thaksin and 111 other party leaders from formally participating in politics for the next five years.

    A ban on political activity was lifted in June to allow parties to prepare for elections, which were set to be held before year’s end. A ban preventing new political parties from forming remained in place. Former TRT members, including 270 former TRT lawmakers, circumvented the ban by regrouping under the formerly defunct People’s Power Party (PPP), with Samak Sundaravej as party leader. Samak leaned further to the right than Thaksin, but was known for strongly opposing the coup. By October, a host of smaller parties were maneuvering to form coalitions with the PPP or the DP to improve their electoral prospects.

    Voters approved a new constitution in an August 19 referendum, reflecting a general desire to end the CNS government and hold elections rather than actual support for the charter. The referendum results, with 57 in favor and 41 percent opposed, also showed a significant protest vote and notable societal divisions. Some 62 percent of voters in the northeast, where support for Thaksin and the TRT was strongest, voted against the constitution, while 65 percent of those in central Thailand, where support for Thaksin was much weaker, voted in favor. The charter secured 86 percent of the vote in the southern provinces. The final version of the new constitution was an improvement on the initial draft, but it included a number of provisions that left Thailand less democratic than under the abrogated 1997 constitution.

    Viewing the substantial vote against the constitution as an indication of support for the PPP-led coalition, the CNS went to great lengths to prevent a PPP victory in the upcoming December 23 elections. It maintained tight control over the electoral process through a series of strategic appointments, its election commission imposed a host of campaign restrictions designed to hinder newer, smaller parties, and evidence of a CNS plan to “sabotage” the PPP campaign was discovered. Moreover, martial law was maintained in 34—and later 25—of the country’s 76 provinces, significantly limiting campaign activities in the affected areas.

    In a sign of strong public discontent with the military-led government, the PPP nevertheless secured the largest share of the December vote, winning 233 out of 480 contested seats. The DP placed second with 165 seats and, as expected, won in Bangkok and the south. Samak, the PPP leader, announced on December 31 that with support from three smaller parties, it could muster 254 seats and form a coalition government. The election commission meanwhile launched investigations into fraud claims against three PPP candidates who had won seats in the northeast.

    Separately, religious freedom declined during the year as violence escalated in the southern provinces, with insurgents increasingly targeting Buddhist teachers and schools. Thaksin remained in self-imposed exile at year’s end.

    <H3 class=header_3>Political Rights and Civil Liberties </H3>Thailand is not an electoral democracy. Prior to the September 2006 military coup, the 1997 constitution mandated a parliamentary system with a bicameral legislature, including a House of Representatives with 500 members elected for four-year terms, and a Senate with 200 members elected for six-year terms. The head of the party or coalition that held a majority in parliament became prime minister. The interim constitution promulgated on October 1, 2006, replaced the bicameral legislature with a unicameral National Assembly of 250 members, all appointed by the xxxx, which remained in place through the end of 2007. The charter also gave CNS chairman Sonthi Boonyaratglin the authority to appoint and remove the prime minister at any time. The CNS had final say over the composition of the 100-member Constitutional Drafting Committee and barred anyone who had been affiliated with a political party in the previous two years. All current and former TRT members were thus excluded from the drafting process. The CNS retained the right to select any previous constitution and revise it for use if the new draft was rejected by referendum voters.

  14. Citing ..... Hmm ... I'm sure that this piece of news's aim is not for the presentation of the public's anger, but rather trying to seriously discredited the PPP govt, as the Nation already joined the efforts with the 'invisible hands'. ("The Thai public must begin to ask itself what sort of gullible, ignorant fools the powers-that-be take it for. What have we done to deserve this contempt and deceit?") .... I'm sure a lots of Thai didn't think such the extreme strong lashing at the PPP is out of Nation's good will and sincerity to the country. ... Anyway, i'm only remembered that this actually hurt the chicken exports to EU, but didn't affect the Thai people that much. (It's just one of the non-tariff trade barrier tactics by EU, which Taksin's oppositions tried very hard to take this opportunity to discredited the Govt back then)

    Thai Credibility Shattered by Deceit

    The Nation, 7 February 2004

    Stung by lies told by Thai leaders over the bird-flu epidemic, the EU will find it difficult to trust Thailand again

    The Thai leaders must have the courage to apologise to David Byrne, Commissioner for Health and Consumer Protection of the EU, after being caught red-handed lying to him about the existence of bird flu. Byrne has been portrayed as a fool by both the European media and his colleagues because he believed the words of Thailand's leaders. Certainly, he should have questioned them before being taken in, but then who would have thought that the Thai leaders would be so bold as to attempt to cover up an epidemic? Byrne will apparently have to immerse himself in the local political culture before ever doing business with Thailand again.

    A telex from the outgoing Thai Ambassador to the European Commission Surapong Posayanonda detailed a conversation between him and Martin Power, the head of Byrne's cabinet. It revealed a culture of deceit under which mistakes made by Thai leaders were covered up by subordinates. The envoy, who is a pleasant and decent diplomat, had to do just that. And it proved to be too much for him, so he quit, effective in April.

    As the telex showed, Power used strong language to express his disgust over the lack of credibility of the Thai leaders, who told his boss that there was no evidence of bird flu even though at that time it had been established that the disease existed. Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and Agriculture Minister Somsak Thepsuthin, who met with Byrne and briefed him on the bird flu, should have been more candid and told the truth. But what incentive did they have to do so? They have foisted deceptive schemes on the Thai public so many times already. To date, no one has been held responsible for the epidemic and failed cover-up.

    The Thai people should realise by now that the government's handling of the bird-flu outbreak was really a systematic, large-scale cover-up. The Thai leaders also cynically used Byrne's words, based on their own lies, to lend credibility to their cover-up attempt and to spread the lie to the world that Thailand had no bird flu.

    The words of the Thai leaders at that time had no creditability anyway. Byrne just happened to be the first foreign leader to visit Thailand, and he was used mercilessly. This is the first time that the government has been caught in such a diplomatic fiasco. The European Commission lost face and therefore it had to be frank with Thailand. Future EU-Thai relations are now at stake and will be under constant close scrutiny.

    Since last month's international meeting on preventing bird flu, the government has become more confident. It believes that the country's image has improved a bit. Since then, the government has welcomed foreign experts and assistance to help contain the epidemic. In normal times, Thaksin might have rejected the idea of accepting foreign assistance as unpatriotic.

    After all, he has declared repeatedly that Thailand is an independent nation, capable not just of standing on its own feet, but also of becoming a donor country, reaching out to help poorer neighbours, well on its way to joining the ranks of the coveted First World club.

    It is a good lesson for all of us to note that when the government starts to make a habit of taking people for granted to help it tell lies, something is amiss.

    The Thai public must begin to ask itself what sort of gullible, ignorant fools the powers-that-be take it for. What have we done to deserve this contempt and deceit?

  15. Of course your argument implies:

    Farangs can't get info from other well spoken bi-lingual Thais,

    and that some other Thais never disagree with ~YOU.

    Hard to believe is, Thai's disagreeing with your reddened mind-set?

    Hmmm.... Being on Samui, a major political base city for the Democrat Party in Thailand, i can't blame you for falling for the Democrat's camp. (5 5 5 5 5 Nowsaday, a lot of Yellow shirts are fighting with the back-stabbing Democrat's camp)

    Respect that ~ LOL

  16. Its ridiculous to blame any government or government department for the spread of this Flu. There is no effective antidote, strategy or system that can stop its spread. Luckily it is a mild Flu, unlike Type A. It will run it course with or without attempted interventions.

    I see the farangs's mind sets here. Back when WHO announced that the 2009 flu reach level 6 (Pandemic), you couldn't understand/didn't hear directly, the exactly comments in Thai language on TV from people from the Democrat Govt.

    5 5 5 5 5

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