Key Power Players In Deep South: Thailand

[webfact]

Key power players in deep South

The Nation

BANGKOK: -- Humiliated by a failed secret peace initiative and a spike in violence by Malay Muslim separatists, the Pheu Thai government has gone back to the drawing board. Hard-pressed by the public to come up with immediate solutions to the conflict, policy-makers and security personnel got together today to look for answers, Don Pathan writes.

(click for larger image)

Army:

Fourth Army commander Lt Gen Udomchai Thammasarorat has been struggling to create an impression that he is still in control of the situation. But his fall from grace can be traced back to the January 2011 raid on an army outpost in Narathiwat's Rangae district when a dozen separatists launched a daring raid and made off with about 60 weapons. Udomchai never recovered fully and began a massive crackdown on smugglers and crime syndicates to try to regain credibility. But he was hit with a spike in insurgent attacks from late last year that culminated in this week's meeting with the prime minister and all relevant agencies. Udomchai, in his capacity as chief of the Fourth Army Area, is also head of Region Four Internal Security Operation Command (Isoc). While Isoc is a multi-agency outfit that does not lessen criticism of the Army, whose people remain at the helm of security operation and planning in the restive region. In other words, Udomchai is the first in the long line of people who stand to take the blame if and when something goes wrong.

Army chief Gen Prayuth Chan-ocha, who continues to grapple with the bitter political divide in Bangkok, has also been confronted with the idea of talking to the separatists. Officially, the army is against negotiations. But mid-ranking and senior army officers have been talking to leaders of longstanding separatist movements for years. Their discussions don't appear to have had much impact on policy, much less on the course of the insurgency on the ground. The same attitude holds today. The Army chief doesn't mind if his people talk to the separatists but it can't be official, as the military needs "deniability" should such information become public. But while the army wants to take the lead in overseeing security in the deep South, Prayuth has been hard pressed to come up with a better analysis or explanation for the spike in violence.

Thawee Sodsong, secretary-general of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC), continues to be Pheu Thai Party's point man in the deep South, heading an initiative to bridge the "trust gap" between the Malays of Patani and the Thai state through rehabilitation programs that pretty much amount to cash handouts to victims of violence and development money for various projects in the region. With the blessing of Thaksin Shinawatra and his sister, Yingluck, the prime minister, Thawee has been given a mandate to talk to the separatist groups. He recruited former Wadah faction lawmakers and leading public figures in the deep South, and dispatched them abroad to talk to leaders of the long-standing separatist movements. But the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C), the group with best working relations with militants on the ground, continue to keep Thawee and representatives at arm's length. They have refused to deal with the Thaksin camp and instead continue with their violent campaign to discredit the government and the military. On March 31 a triple car-bomb attack rocked downtown Yala before a car-bomb erupted in a hotel basement in Hat Yai. These came two weeks after a secret meeting between Thaksin and about 16 separatist leaders (minus the BRN-C) in Kuala Lumpur, and left Thawee and his secret team back at the drawing board, trying to figure out their next step.

Yingluck's inner circle:

Secretary-general to the Prime Minister Suranand Vejjajiva, Defence Minister Sukampol Suwannathat, and deputy PMs Chalerm Yoobamrung and Yuthasak Sasriprapa, are not exactly a dream team when it comes to security (or anything for that matter). Two of the three may be retired military personnel but that doesn't make Yingluck's task easier, as the Army continues to fumble. The military has dismissed the idea of putting some of the deep South under curfew, arguing that would disturb the locals' way of life. But news that Chalerm has been brought into the inner circle for the deep South has been greeted with scepticism from various quarters, including academics and activists. The burden will be on Suranand to put a good spin on these moves for PM Yingluck before she discusses this with the public. How well she articulates these points remains to be seen but given her record of avoiding sensitive issues, one can be sure little exciting or innovative will come out of Government House. Like the army, the policy-makers are finding themselves in a more difficult position to come up with better explanations for the spike in violence. For the time being, policy-makers, and soldiers, continue to voice the official line that the insurgents are drug-crazed youths who embrace a false teaching of Islam. But playing the religious card has not produced the desired outcome, as the militants appear to enjoy support of the local Malay Muslim population.

National Security Council:

Over recent years the NSC took initiatives to make peace process in the deep South more inclusive. In its latest five-year plan the NSC called on the government to consider establishing a "safe zone" where dialogue between the authorities and militant separatists could take place. That's another way of telling the government to seriously think about negotiating with the separatists. Current NSC boss, the former national police chief, Gen Wichean Potephosree, landed in the post because the government couldn't find a place for him elsewhere. He is expected to go along with Pheu Thai's action plan for the south. But the agency's ability to influence policy has plunged because of the current government's scant regard for the outfit after the humiliating transfer of former chief Tawil Pliensri. Another setback for the agency came after the government transferred NSC Deputy Sec-Gen Somkiat Boonchu to an inactive post. Somkiat had been the main NSC person in the south and one who advocated stronger political and diplomatic approaches, as opposed to military means, to cut conflict in the region.

Police:

Incoming Pol General Adul Sangsingkaew: Adul has a strong track record of working well with the military and is considered to be a clean, hardworking bureaucrat. But like good intention, hard work does not necessarily translate into fruitful results. The recently appointed national police chief is expected to continue his long-standing position that the police and military should come under one command. In other words, the police should come under the military for tactical reasons. But a shared command does not mean the police will be exempt from normal police duties.

-- The Nation 2012-08-08

[SuneeTH]

Isn't Thaksin mean the Great South?

[isaanbrit]

Note: no mention of the insurgents. That is why it can't be classified as armed conflict, because there's only one side to the fight

[SouthernMan3]

Note: no mention of the insurgents. That is why it can't be classified as armed conflict, because there's only one side to the fight

Interesting observation.

[rubl]

Thawee Sodsong, secretary-general of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC), continues to be Pheu Thai Party's point man in the deep South, heading an initiative to bridge the "trust gap" between the Malays of Patani and the Thai state through rehabilitation programs that pretty much amount to cash handouts to victims of violence and development money for various projects in the region. With the blessing of Thaksin Shinawatra and his sister, Yingluck, the prime minister, Thawee has been given a mandate to talk to the separatist groups. He recruited former Wadah faction lawmakers and leading public figures in the deep South, and dispatched them abroad to talk to leaders of the long-standing separatist movements. But the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C), the group with best working relations with militants on the ground, continue to keep Thawee and representatives at arm's length. They have refused to deal with the Thaksin camp and instead continue with their violent campaign to discredit the government and the military. On March 31 a triple car-bomb attack rocked downtown Yala before a car-bomb erupted in a hotel basement in Hat Yai. These came two weeks after a secret meeting between Thaksin and about 16 separatist leaders (minus the BRN-C) in Kuala Lumpur, and left Thawee and his secret team back at the drawing board, trying to figure out their next step.

This must be wrong. I have it from a reliable source, a member who's name start with a 'p' that no such secret meeting took place. Even k. Thaksin forcefully denied saying "who am I to do such?"