New pipeline to bypass hormuz

The Gulf states are considering expanding their oil pipelines beyond the Strait of Hormuz in a bid to bypass dependence on the crucial Persian Gulf waterway for exports, The Financial Times reported on Thursday morning.

One of the main options examined reportedly includes a trade route that would connect the Arabian peninsula with the Mediterranean through the port of Haifa.

https://www.jpost.com/business-and-innovation/energy-and-infrastructure/article-89193

Puts Israel in control of the oil, eh. Any better than Iran???

This should have been built a long time ago.

9 hours ago, 3NUMBAS said:

New pipeline to bypass hormuz

The Gulf states are considering expanding their oil pipelines beyond the Strait of Hormuz in a bid to bypass dependence on the crucial Persian Gulf waterway for exports, The Financial Times reported on Thursday morning.

One of the main options examined reportedly includes a trade route that would connect the Arabian peninsula with the Mediterranean through the port of Haifa.

https://www.jpost.com/business-and-innovation/energy-and-infrastructure/article-89193

Iran already has an alternative route, via the Caspian, in case anyone thinks they can choke off Iranian oil, merely by closing Hormuz, while theirs goes via the projected pipeline to the Med.

Naturally both routes will be vulnerable to attack by the appropriate air delivered munitions and other methods of disruption/destruction.

A pipeline from the Gulf to Haifa sounds, at first glance, like a way to bypass the vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz—but in reality it replaces one concentrated risk with a long chain of distributed ones, and that typically increases the number of failure points rather than reduces them.

Start with geography and scale. Shipping through the Strait of Hormuz involves a narrow but relatively short transit corridor. A pipeline to Haifa, by contrast, would stretch hundreds—likely over a thousand—kilometres across multiple terrains and jurisdictions. Every kilometre of pipe, pumping station, valve, and control node becomes a potential point of disruption. Instead of defending a maritime chokepoint, you now have to secure an extended linear asset that cannot be easily concentrated or shielded.

Second, pipelines are inherently fixed and exposed. Oil tankers can reroute, delay, or disperse in response to threats. A buried or above-ground pipeline cannot move; its route is predictable and permanent. That makes it highly susceptible to sabotage, especially in regions where non-state actors operate. A single well-placed attack on a pumping station or a segment of pipe can halt flow entirely, whereas maritime traffic can often continue around isolated incidents unless the chokepoint itself is fully blocked.

Third, political fragmentation multiplies risk. A Gulf-to-Haifa pipeline would almost certainly cross or depend on cooperation from multiple states in a politically volatile region. Each country introduces regulatory, security, and diplomatic failure points—changes in government, conflict, or even temporary unrest can interrupt operations. By contrast, maritime transit through the Strait of Hormuz is governed by international norms of passage; while tense, it is a shared global artery with strong incentives for multiple powers to keep it open.

Fourth, maintenance and technical reliability add further vulnerability. Pipelines require constant monitoring for leaks, corrosion, pressure imbalances, and mechanical failure. These are not hypothetical risks—they are routine operational challenges. Each sensor, control system, and maintenance crew introduces additional points where failure, error, or even cyber interference can disrupt flow. Tanker transport, while not risk-free, distributes these technical risks across individual vessels rather than concentrating them into a single continuous system.

Finally, redundancy works differently. The Strait represents a single chokepoint, but global shipping fleets provide flexibility: if one tanker is lost or delayed, others can compensate. A pipeline, however, is a single integrated system—if a key segment fails, throughput drops sharply or stops altogether unless costly parallel pipelines exist. In effect, the pipeline creates a “string of chokepoints” rather than eliminating one.

So the core argument is this: moving oil by sea through a narrow but internationally protected corridor concentrates risk in one place, but also allows flexibility and collective protection. A pipeline to Haifa disperses that risk across a long, fixed, and politically complex route—multiplying the number of physical, technical, and geopolitical failure points.

A good real-world case that’s often cited in this context is the Iraq–Turkey pipeline system terminating at Ceyhan, built to move oil from northern Iraq to the Mediterranean as an alternative to maritime routes through the Gulf.

At first glance, this looked like a strategic upgrade. Instead of relying on tankers transiting the Strait of Hormuz, Iraq could export directly via pipeline to Ceyhan—shorter route, fewer shipping risks, and theoretically more control.

After 2003, the pipeline running through northern Iraq became one of the most frequently attacked pieces of energy infrastructure in the world. Insurgent groups repeatedly bombed sections of the line.

The pipeline depends on cooperation between Iraq, including the Kurdish region and Turkey. Disputes over revenue sharing, legal authority, and export rights repeatedly led to shutdowns. At times, flows were halted not by physical damage, but by court rulings or political standoffs—failure points that simply don’t exist in the same way with open maritime transport.

When the pipeline was damaged, repairs took days or weeks, during which exports dropped to zero. There were multiple periods where exports through this route were suspended for extended stretches.

The pipeline became a single critical artery. When it went down, a huge portion of northern Iraqi export capacity disappeared overnight. In contrast, maritime export systems distribute risk across many vessels and ports.

In 2023, exports via the pipeline were halted following an arbitration ruling against Turkey over unauthorized exports from Iraqi Kurdistan. This wasn’t a physical failure, it was a legal on, but it had the same effect: oil stopped flowing. That’s a uniquely pipeline-type vulnerability tied to cross-border infrastructure.

If a pipeline, a pipeline to Port Said is probably preferable. Its far more likely that Egypt and Saudi Arabia will remain strategically aligned. But Israel? 97% of Saudis believe all ties to Israel should be cut. 40% support Hamas. 84% are opposed to establishment of Israel. 87% think they can beat Israel in a fight.

Its probably cheaper to come to a deal with Iran.

That the (nominally) Muslim Gulf states are even considering what amounts to a huge level of corporation with Israel is going to offend many, many people's delicate anti-Israel sensibilities.

Awesome! 🍿

I wonder why they can't run a pipeline across that pointy bit that sticks out in the straits. Say from Abu Dhabi, UAE to Muscat in Oman. Maybe geographical or political reasons, but looking on a map, that seems an obvious way to avoid the strait.

The gulf states need to focus on the short to midterm challenge of not collapsing while this illegal Israeli/US war rages.

1 hour ago, tai4de2 said:

That the (nominally) Muslim Gulf states are even considering what amounts to a huge level of corporation with Israel is going to offend many, many people's delicate anti-Israel sensibilities.

Awesome! 🍿

Yes. It also underlines just how much the countries of the Gulf feel about Palestine -- they don't give a rat's patootey about them and their land claims. They have to make a show of support for their Muslim brothers, but have not been accommodating to refugees.

This is an in the family matter, let them deal with their own.

The idea is certainly not bad, but how do you want to protect such a pipeline? She is extremely vulnerable.
Just think of the gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea, which were destroyed even under water.

But apart from that: of course, gigantic port facilities, which do not currently exist, would also have to be built to refuel the oil freighters. A huge infrastructure would be necessary, which would also be easily attackable again.

Interestingly, the Israeli newspapers are the one's talking up the paywalled FT article. The article is about Saudi Arabia considering a pipeline....... Its pure <deleted> stirring by the FT journalists.

What they are actually considering is expansion of the existing East-West Pipeline, which goes nowhere near Israel, and/or upgrading the Fujairah route.

I suspect the OP, because he does this a lot, hasn't even read the Financial Times article.

The full reference to Haifa:

One option is the revival of US-led plans for an ambitious corridor that would run from India through the Gulf and then to Europe, called IMEC, one Gulf official said, although part of this project originally included a politically tricky pipeline that ran to the Israeli port of Haifa. 

Yossi Abu, the chief executive of Israeli company NewMed Energy, said he was confident that pipelines to the Mediterranean Sea would be built, whether they terminated at Israeli or Egyptian ports. “People need to control their own destinies, with their friends,” he said. “You need oil pipelines, railway connectivity, throughout the region, onshore, without giving others bottlenecks to choke us.” 

Thats is. that's the whole <deleted> basis of the Jerusalem Post article. The word of an Israeli bloke. The Arabs aren't going be building pipelines across Israel. Israel won't recognise Palestine. Ergo Saudi Arabia won't recognise Israel, and there is no <deleted> way that Saudi Arabia is going to hock its financial future to a country it doesn't recognise.

8 hours ago, BerndD said:

The idea is certainly not bad, but how do you want to protect such a pipeline? She is extremely vulnerable.
Just think of the gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea, which were destroyed even under water.

But apart from that: of course, gigantic port facilities, which do not currently exist, would also have to be built to refuel the oil freighters. A huge infrastructure would be necessary, which would also be easily attackable again.

The IMEC idea, which kind of came from India, in 2023 was full of problems, which haven't gone away. Plus they wanted to involve Chinese owned ports.......

8 hours ago, bendejo said:

Yes. It also underlines just how much the countries of the Gulf feel about Palestine -- they don't give a rat's patootey about them and their land claims. They have to make a show of support for their Muslim brothers, but have not been accommodating to refugees.

This is an in the family matter, let them deal with their own.

You're reading too much into an article you haven't read. They likely don't really care that much about the Palestinians, but they care even less about the Israelis. Pretty much the entire street in Arabia agrees with Iran's views on Israel in survey after survey.

Up until 1989, the Gulf Arabs did a lot for the Palestinians. Every Gulf state hosted a PLO mission, every night, you would have show after show about the PLO on TV. They brought loads of weapons for the Palestinians, stoked it. That changed in 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait. Palestinians, who pretty much did all the important jobs in Kuwait, such as providing nurses and doctors, flipped a coin over which Sunni Arabs to back, either the one with one of the biggest militaries in the world, or the ones who promptly south fled in fleets of Cadillacs and Rolls Royces.

Meet the new boss
Same as the old boss

In 1989, I never expected 950,000 coalition troops to be amassed in the Saudi desert. Remember, prior to this, the most recent experience of combat the Americans had was invading a Caribbean holiday resort.

I don't entirely blame the Kuwaiti Palestinians from making the wrong choice (and many Palestinians did join the Kuwaiti resistance), and Iraq wasn't really offering a fair choice, support us or die horribly. Hobson's choice really. But post Iraq War, once the Arabs knew they had American guns to push their foreign agenda, attitudes changed.

19 hours ago, Enoon said:

Iran already has an alternative route, via the Caspian, in case anyone thinks they can choke off Iranian oil, merely by closing Hormuz, while theirs goes via the projected pipeline to the Med.

Naturally both routes will be vulnerable to attack by the appropriate air delivered munitions and other methods of disruption/destruction.

Umh, I don't wish to be pedantic but the Caspian Sea doesn't "go anywhere"