The main problem is the same as in 2014; insufficient diagnostic capacity in the region. Ebola infection is treatable if detected early; the patient needs to be placed in intensive care. To detect 20,000 cases of Ebola, you need to have conducted about 53,000 tests; assume 60% of specimens are negative, and a single confirmatory test for each presumptive positive. And thats just testing symptomatic patients. But the symptoms are quite non-specific, "flu like". If you were moving to find all the cases, then you need to plan for screening tests, so instead of 50,000+ tests, its more like 400,000 tests in a region to identify all the cases. The DRC can only carry out 6 tests per hour......To detect 20,000 symptomatic cases would take 368 days. The patient will be dead long before the lab test was done. Ebola takes 6-10 days to kill you, without treatment. The earlier you are diagnosed, the better. Relying purely on symptoms to detect cases means effectively the only response is quarantine and dying rooms, and then hope the outbreak burns itself out. But that approach, as shown previously, is enormously costly in medical staff; you can't just abandon the dying patient. Nurses want to nurse. So testing needs to scale from 144 a day to more than 50,000 a day. There are few commercially available tests for Ebola; when I last checked, there were 17 on the market, and only 3 of those were US FDA approved. What that means is its likely that only 3, maybe 5 tests have actually been tested with "live" virus. FDA approval means submission of testing data. In Europe, and the UK, for CE or UKCA marking, all the manufacturer needs to show is they designed and produced that test in line with the general principles outlined in ISO-13485. Generally member states then conduct their own technical assessments to determine if they want those tests to be included in their public healthcare systems. The regulations are changing, to be more similar to the US, but this is still being rolled out. In the 2014 outbreak, the Americans had to get their military-spec test FDA approved, so were forced to submit data showing testing on synthetic virus, inactivated virus and active virus. The costs of such testing are extremely high. Effectively any manufacturer would need to pay for testing via a government lab that has the right containment facilities AND which has access to cultured Ebola virus. That means one lab in the US, one lab in UK one in France, one in Germany, one in Sweden, at least for Western companies. Yes, it is possible to develop a test without direct access to the virus, because sequence is available online. The main type of test is PCR, which means replicating a strand of DNA or RNA that is specific to your target, to a level such that the replicated material can be chemically detected (usually by fluorescence). To replicate that strand, you need instructions, effectively, or primers, for the replicating enzymes where to start and where to finish. After about 40 rounds of copying, enough can be detected. Go beyond that, and mistakes start creeping in (the enzymes are basically the same as whats in out bodies, and these enzymes make mistakes. Most mistakes are inconsequential, but sometimes they result in cancer. The more that our DNA has to be repaired, the more chance there is of a mistake and thus a cancer). But the companies that make tests can't just go out and buy Ebola virus. I'm not even sure its available commercially inactivated. The US government has a programme to supply inactivated threat material to select labs. The UK government, not so much. In 12 years, things haven't really moved on so much, in terms of tests. Since 2014, we do have at least rapid tests; these aren't as sensitive as PCR. We all used them, I think, at some point during the COVID pandemic. In principle, COVID should have helped countries build capacity in PCR testing. In the UK, we had the Lighthouse Labs; essentially warehouses packed out with the liquid handling robots and equipments to do virus PCR testing at scale, and the concept was copied by the US and Europe. What happened after? It all got binned. The warehouses were returned to warehousing. The staff dispersed around the biotech industry. WHO report on 2021 COVID testing capacity across Africa. Much of this will be rapid testing, but its a useful snapshot about how well, relatively, each country is: https://www.afro.who.int/COVID-19-SPRP-2021-Progress-Report/testing-laboratory-capacity Things improved a bit afterward, but once the Pandemic was declared "over", everyone took their foot off the gas. If I was to layer on testing capacity per 1000 people, things would then, I think, look very start. Nigeria, South Africa, Ethiopia, Kenya, Cameroon seem in pretty good shape. In general, interestingly, the Francophone countries seem to be in better shape than others, which I wonder might be due to France's relationships with them. But the heart sinks when you look at Liberia, Congo, DRC, EQG, CAR, which is where these horrendous filoviruses seem to mostly come from. The EQG should be much better, because this is a country where the dictatorial but paternalistic government has become mega rich. Ebola cases in Uganda, but I have more confidence they can detect cases, based on COVID testing capacity (you use it as a proxy for the molecular diagnostics capacity). The first Ebola strain was the Zaire strain......
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