Thai editorial: Opportunity knocking on NCPO's door

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EDITORIAL
Opportunity knocking on NCPO's door
The Nation

Political meddling has always foiled chances for peace in the deep South - but the junta can now take a leap toward ending the insurgency

BANGKOK: -- The National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) is being bombarded by advice on all sorts of issues, but hardly anyone is talking about the conflict in the southernmost provinces, where a decade-old insurgency has claimed more than 5,000 lives.

Plainly, this sub-national conflict is not at the top of the NCPO list of priorities. Nevertheless, an opportunity to aid peace efforts in the deep South is knocking at the door of the junta, which is working with a clean slate, without having to worry about opposition parties, Parliament and so on.

To seize that opportunity, an advisory committee should be created and tasked with selecting a team to work on a solution for the region and perhaps initiate a peace process with the rebels.

The last peace talks, launched on February 28, 2012, in Kuala Lumpur and facilitated by Malaysia, have been ditched by the current military regime because the Army and key government ministries were being held at arm's length from the process.

Meanwhile no one yet knows how the current crop of leaders in Bangkok will tackle the southern conflict and whether Kuala Lumpur will continue to mediate efforts toward peace. Adding to difficulties is that the self-proclaimed representatives of the separatists, the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) led by Hasan Taib, threw in the towel late last year. So now Bangkok will have to find other groups or factions willing to talk peace - should it want to go that route.

The process should start somewhere, regardless of whether the so-called rebels at the table have much sway over armed insurgents actually doing the fighting.

The junta can also learn from the mistakes of the Yingluck Shinawatra government, which kept the peace initiative so close to its chest that many key government agencies were taken by surprise when the talks were announced.

The NCPO needs to make its initiative as inclusive as possible - at least during the planning stage - and select the best-available team to lead the process. In contrast, Yingluck's key people were bureaucrats with close links to her and her brother.

While loyalty and experience are important, the NCPO should understand that prospective team members deemed "problematic" by the rebels or mediator should be kept out of the talks.

The NCPO could also exploit the lessons of past initiatives, and take up recommendations from the 2005-06 National Reconciliation Commission on peace in the South headed by Anand Panyarachun, or examine the ways in which the post-2006-coup government of General Surayud Chulanont addressed the insurgency.

Surayud apologised publicly for the 2004 Tak Bai massacre and other atrocities committed by the state against the Malays of Patani. But the majority of the country and its bureaucrats remained largely indifferent to the plight and different historical narrative of the Patani Malays, so nothing constructive ever developed from that apology.

Surayud also sought help from neighbouring countries and the international community, and permitted Switzerland-based professional mediators to work with the National Security Council.

But he didn't see eye to eye with the people who appointed him, partly because the military-assigned government's priority was not the South, but ridding politics and the bureaucracy of Thaksin Shinawatra's influence.

Surayud, on the other hand, wanted to employ non-military means to bring about permanent peace in this restive, historically contested region.

His successors have faced a great deal of criticism for their decision to seize power with last month's coup. But the junta can now redeem itself and justify that move by grasping the opportunity to push through constructive reforms and initiatives in areas where they are needed. One place crying out for such help is the conflict-hit deep South.


-- The Nation 2014-06-13

[Daniel Boon]

I am prepared to jump in on this ....

Maslow had a theory of a hierarchy of needs; water, food and a place to call home.

The UN (United Nations) stated the the number of refugees worldwide exceeded 20 million (2012 - conservative I believe)

The single biggest issue these days is the 'cost of living' and while self-sufficiency is at odds with the existing economic paradigm, it is the most important that people be able to feed them.

[social security payments have been described as 'providing the less fortunate with the fruits of your labour as least as possible, but sufficient so as not to have the less fortunate (be placed in a situation) where they take the fruits of your labour']

Thailand has a large proportion of the population living on un-deeded land and not if but when land-owners (government or private) decide to exercise that ownership, a serfdom will evolve; however, there will always be those who do not want to live in servitude, and are prepared to fight for it.

So if the NCPO were to consider facilitating home/land ownership and implement strategies (such as U-PODS) to educate a greater self-sufficiency, then it would address water, food and home security issues.

[rickirs]

I don't see how revisiting previous administration efforts towards resolving the insurgency in the South is condusive to the current national reconciliation process. What is important is how Thailand goes forward in dealing with resolving the insurgency issue.

To recap previous efforts:

1) The strategy of the army and police forces using force to stop the insurgency was backed by Prime Minister Thaksin Shinatwatra to secure Thai soverneignty.

2) In March 2005 the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) was created to recommend steps to end the conflict through a political process requiring cooperation of insurgents. NRC seriously considered a special autonomy status within Thailand's constitution but that change in Thailand's sovereignty required a Thai government which clearly and credibly prefered a co-operative solution over violence.

3) Thaksin ignored the NRC in order to maintain his image as a hard liner and to prevent any loss of Thai sovereignty.

4) The Yingluck government did not back the army and police use of force against the insurgents as a means to resolution, but never set out any concrete proposals, such as greater regional autonomy in the southern three affected provinces. The resulting status quo preserved the conflict.

What is needed now is to continue the shift from of a military solution to a political solution such as having a "special administrative arrangement" for governance of the affected provences as its centerpiece, much in the same fashion as the Philippines recently accomplished after 40 years of conflict with insurgent Islamists. NCPO has the opportunity to achieve peace in the South but deliberate and cooperative policies need to take the stage.

[xminator]

The most effective thing the Junta will be able to do is use the emergency laws to try stop any news coming out of the south. Its the same people and the same mindset that sparked the current situation that is running the show. Sorry for taking such a dark view on the future of the south, and its not really any thai leaders fault, there is external factors that is keeping this conflict alive with no hope of resolution. Much like the rest of the world where islamists have the numbers to run the show.

[lomatopo]

Useless editorial meant to disparage the Voldemort administrations' obvious short-falls in the troubled South, hype the previous Junta's (failed) efforts and as its one, single recommendation;

"...an advisory committee should be created and tasked with selecting a team to work on a solution"

Form a committee to select a team, to come up with ideas that might be used. Brilliant.

Seriously, Thais despise outside help/influence (send cash only), and these types of conflicts are rarely resolved without outside assistance, so this new committee, if formed, will be less than useless.

Besides, the Military Junta is too busy putting down pesky citizens in the other seventy-two provinces to deal with this issue. Hand out all the cash, give free World Cup and leave this messy stuff for the next real political administration to deal with.

Edited June 13, 2014 by lomatopo

[belg]

why no door to door house sweeps overthere and put everybody with guns, bomb making facilities & drugs into custody ... the army has enough people to do it village by village, no ?

[lomatopo]

why no door to door house sweeps overthere and put everybody with guns, bomb making facilities & drugs into custody ... the army has enough people to do it village by village, no ?

Yup. It's euphemistically referred to as "pacification". They did it in the South before, in the 1970's with the CSOC, but doubt they have the stomach for it now. Very nasty times, partly responsible for the issues today, but maybe easier to blame it on the Shinawatras.

[Mudcrab]

There seems to be many people who have been moved into inactive roles recently. This could be a good opportunity to "offer" them an active role. Go South Young (old/corrupt) Man.

Might be a win-win situation .