Anatta

[sabaijai]

To elaborate futher on the anatta question chownah raised in the regret thread, I thought I'd start a separate thread on the topic.

I found a good article on www.dhammadana.org just now that goes to the heart of the common misconception that anatta means simply 'non self' or 'no ego'. Aside from the lengthy debate on what 'non self/no self' itself means (I think there's a thread on that here somewhere), this article does a nice job of expanding the defintion from the Western perspective.

The article is in English, but has the disadvantage, for those who don't speak French, of bringing French into the argument. My French is rudimentary at best, but the idea of 'reflexivity' in French (also Spanish, and I presume Italian?) does help illuminate the concept a bit.

Anatta

An excerpt:

The translation of the word anatta

"anatta" is therefore the conjunction of two particles: the privative particle and the particle designating the idea of "reflexivity", of reciprocity. If we wished to find an appropriate French word in order to synthesize anatta, we could say: "absence d'un soi" ("absence of a self"), "absence d'une nature propre" ("absence of a self-inherent nature").

Very often, the word anatta, in literature, is translated by "le non-soi" ("non-self") or "le non-้go" ("non-ego"). This translation is quite inconvenient. Even if, in its wider or deducted meaning, the idea of anatta suggests the absence of an ego, a self or soul, the word anatta in itself doesn't mean "absence of an ego", "absence of a self" or "absence of a soul". There are other words designating this in Pali language. In English, we are compelled to use a word like "not self" or "none self" because British, have, in their vocabulary, a word designating the reflexive particle that is "self". For instance, "myself" means "moi-m๊me", "himself" means "lui-m๊me".

We can therefore likewise trace back, in Pali language, the adding of the particle "self" for designating "soi-m๊me" ("oneself"). That's why British have legitimately translated the word anatta by "not self" or "none self".

The problem lies in the fact that, when we started to translate into French, we mostly translated from English sources. Therefore, naturally, French academic circles, who, for most of them, didn't understand well the teachings of the Enlightened one, have translated "not self" by "non soi". This is a mistake that unfortunately leads to a misunderstanding on the behalf of the majority of French readers.

Our views being already expressed, we can however claim that in Sanskrit language, the word "anatman" can indeed convey the idea of "absence of a self", "absence of a soul", "absence of an ego". But we deal with a Sanskrit word and not with a Pali one. Indeed, backing up with this Sanskrit word, translators took the abusive liberty to render into French the word "anatta" by "non soi", "non ้go" or "non โme".

There are some interesting introductory remarks in the article about the Buddha's supposed refusal to use Sanskrit terms. Don't know what the evidence is for that but it's an intriguing notion.

One of the main points of the essay is the reminder that anatta applies to everything:

The absence of "in itself"

Anatta, that is the absence of "in itself", applicable to everything, every idea, every characteristic and virtually all mental or material phenomena. From this starting point, we can, naturally, give details and explanations so as to understand that in such and such cases, such and such field, in this manner, should the anatta doctrine be expressed or perceived. The standard description that you probably already heard of lies, for instance, in saying: Let's take a cart. This cart undergoes the law of anatta. We cannot claim that a cart exists in a true sense. Indeed, if we take it to pieces and we spread it out on the ground, we can no longer claim that this is a cart. However, all its pieces are spread before us.

This is what I meant in referring to regret (and every other emotion) as anatta. If you take it apart there's no essence there, just a bundle of feelings and bodily sensations. It goes beyond the mere notion that it doesn't belong to self because everything is non-self, it says that nothing has an inherent nature, thus all conditioned phenomena are inon-substantial, non-essential.

At least that's how I've been taught. There are lots of ways to approach the doctrine of anatta, and this is just one.

It's a lengthy essay. Anatta Part 2 begins with the heading "A world devoid of substance".

[chownah]

Sabaijai,

I've never heard anything like that before. I'm wondering how widespread this view is held. I'm not wanting to flame here but there are some assertions made by the author that are contrary to what I have read....for instance I believe that no one knows what language the Buddha taught in...someplaces suggest that since he grew up in a royal family (before his enlightenment) that he was well educated and probably was fluent in several languages and that perhaps he taught in more than one. Anyway....do you have any other references that put forth this same definition for anatta?

Quick edit: I'm mostly Theravadin so perhaps the definitions and interpretations that I have run across are more restricted than the ones you have seen.

Below I have pasted a definition for anatta from a web site. I think that it is the generally accepted definition...perhaps I'll look around some more and see if I can find something better:

The Link:

http://what-buddha-said.net/library/Buddhi...nary/dic3_a.htm

Some of the text, there is more:

anattā: 'not-self', non-ego, egolessness, impersonality, is the last of the three characteristics of existence (ti-lakkhana, q.v.) The anattā doctrine teaches that neither within the bodily and mental phenomena of existence, nor outside of them, can be found anything that in the ultimate sense could be regarded as a self-existing real ego-entity, soul or any other abiding substance. This is the central doctrine of Buddhism, without understanding which a real knowledge of Buddhism is altogether impossible. It is the only really specific Buddhist doctrine, with which the entire Structure of the Buddhist teaching stands or falls. All the remaining Buddhist doctrines may, more or less, be found in other philosophic systems and religions, but the anattā-doctrine has been clearly and unreservedly taught only by the Buddha, wherefore the Buddha is known as the anattā-vādi, or 'Teacher of Impersonality'. Whosoever has not penetrated this impersonality of all existence, and does not comprehend that in reality there exists only this continually self-consuming process of arising and passing bodily and mental phenomena, and that there is no separate ego-entity within or without this process, he will not be able to understand Buddhism, i.e. the teaching of the 4 Noble Truths (sacca, q.v.), in the right light. He will think that it is his ego, his personality, that experiences suffering, his personality that performs good and evil actions and will be reborn according to these actions, his personality that will enter into Nibbāna, his personality that walks on the Eightfold Path. Thus it is said in Vis.M XVI:

"Mere suffering exists, no sufferer is found;

The deeds are, but no doer of the deeds is there;

Nibbāna is, but not the man that enters it;

The path is, but no traveler on it is seen."

Edited March 2, 2006 by chownah

[chownah]

I went out to a Theravada Buddhist forum and posted the link, explained that I had never heard of this, and asked for comments....I'll let you know what happens.

[sabaijai]

Chownah, www.dhammadana.org is a Theravada Buddhist website. If you take the time to read it you'll see the idea is substantiated with quotes from the Tipitaka. It's not an unorthodox view at all, because if it were I wouldn't be very interested! I've heard the anatta translated as insubstantiality or something similar by Thai, Burmese, Lao and Western teachers. When I first did a minor in Buddhist studies at university, the head of the Buddhist studies program at that time, Dr Padmanabh Jaini, taught anatta from similar angles, as did others in the program

More importantly do you see a problem with defining anatta this way? Do you believe things have an inherent nature?

By the way it is generally accepted by historians that because of his place of origin, the Buddha taught in Magadhi (assuming he existed, of course).

Magadhi wiki

Magadhi vs Pali

The earliest known scriptures belonging to the various Hinayana schools of early Indian Buddhism are known as the Nikaya (their counterparts being the Sanskrit Agama sutra), preserved in the Pali (literally, "holy scripture") language. Pali is a dialect of Indic Prakrit, and a form of the ancient Paishachi language. The historical Buddha most likely spoke Magadhi, which was translated in to Paishachi, and then later developed into Pali. So, according to the Hinayana Buddhists (with the Theravada school in Southeast Asia being the only extant Hinayana school), Pali is the closest language to that which was originally spoken by Sakyamuni Buddha. The scriptures of the Northern Hinayana schools were preserved in Sanskrit and Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit, written in a Northern Brahmi script. The later Mahayana sutras were also written in Sanskrit and Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit.

history of Pali

Anatta (Pali, Sanskrit, anatman, "no-self") is a fundamental precept in Buddhism that since there is no subsistent reality to be found in or underlying appearances, there cannot be a subsistent self or soul in the human appearance. This is in sharp contrast to Hinduism where the comprehension of the terms atman and jiva gives a fundamental understanding of the human predicament and how to escape it. If all is subject to dukkha (transient and the grief that arises from trying to find the non-transient within it) then human appearance is no exception. The human is constituted by five aggregates, skandha, which flow together and give rise to the impression of identity and persistence through time. Thus even if there is "no soul," there is that which has the nature of having that nature. There were major disputes concerning the best candidates for constituting such an impression…but agreement in general was reached that no soul resides within the human body, so to speak, like a driver of a bus, and gets out at the end of the journey. There is only the aggregation of components, which is caused by the previous moment and causes the next. Thus while there is momentarily some one person who is rightly identified as the Dalai Lama, there is no person who is always the Dalai Lama.

In Mahayana Buddhism this term was extended to apply to all appearance that arises from Sunyata, and is therefore devoid, empty of self. A.G.H.

Source:

Bowker, John, The Oxford Dictionary of World Religions, New York, Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 63-64

From a Thai website:

Buddhism plays a very significant role in the daily life of the Thai peo

ple. Since about 95% of the people in the kingdom of Thailand are Buddhists, Buddhism inevitably involves almost every occasion such as birthdays, marriages, moving to a new house, funerals, opening business offices and buying new vehicles etc.

Even though no concrete evidence can be found as to when and where Buddhism was actually established in Thailand, it is presumed that Buddhism was first brought to the country during the 3rd century B.C. when Theravada Buddhist missionaries led by Venerable Sona and Uttara were dispatched by the Buddhist Indian emperor Asoke and visited Suwannaphum or the present Nakhon Pathom. Once it was introduced, Buddhism became widely accepted and gained a permanent ground in the peninsula.

Briefly speaking, the Buddhist doctrine stresses the three principal aspects of existence:

dukkha = suffering

anicca = impermanence, and

anatta = non-substantiality

from a page on vipassana

One begins by observing the natural breath to concentrate the mind. With a sharpened awareness one proceeds to observe the changing nature of body-mind and experiences the universal truths of Impermanence (anicca), suffering (dukkha) and non-substantiality (anatta), at the level of sensations.

And a Google search for 'anatta' and 'non-substantiality'. (around 280 citations here) or one for 'anatta' and 'insubstantiality' (another 616).

The three signata refer to the three essential marks or characteristics of all "compounded" things, animate or inanimate, microscopic or macroscopic. Because of the universality of their applicability they could be considered as having the force of universal laws. These characteristics are impermanence (anicca), unsatisfactoriness (dukkha), and insubstantiality (anatta). As these translations of the basic Pâli terms are only approximate, a further elaboration of these basic concepts of the Dhamma is necessary. from Buddhism Today

Naturally the most elementary, introductory definition will remain non-self so that's what you'll most often see in abbreviated texts. But when you analyse the Tipitaka further (and better yet, put it to the test, in practice, as prescribed by the Buddha), you realise the teaching means that nothing has self - not just people are no-self and things don't belong to anyone, but even things have no-self, no inherent nature.

[chownah]

Sabaijai,

This is great. Long before I formally studied Buddhism I had developed the view that "things" have no consistent identity and that seeing "things" a function of arbitrary views based on limited information and subject to change over time. When I started studying Buddhism (Less than a year) it seemed that this idea was never mentioned but I didn't worry about that because it seemed to be sort of implied in everything that was taught. I always ran into the idea that anatta meant not-self, meaning that I could not find MY self in relation to anything.....but now it seems that anatta has a much more general meaning which is that "things" in general do not have any consistent, concrete, fixed identity....and that I am just one example of the "things" so I do not have any consistent, concrete, or fixed identity.

This is great...it all fits together better now. I'm not sure if I like the words "non-substantial" or "insubstantial" to describe this but this is probably just a word preference or maybe I'll just need to think about it more or use these words in my thinking more.

Thanks for posting all the links. Now what I need to do is that the next time I read some scripture with the concept of anatta I need to rethink the meanings based on this broader understanding.....I think it will be interesting.

Thanks again,

Chownah

[sabaijai]

I know what you mean about the taste of that word, non-substantiality. It's hard to find a translation that really says it all.

I'm quite used to that one, but another one that still seems strange to me is 'infelicity' for dukkha. Also dis-ease, unsatisfactoriness, it goes on and on, that one. 'Suffering' doesn't quite get it either. The etymology is that dukkha literally means the opposite of happiness so you might just as well call it 'unhappiness'. Dig a little deeper and, according to a prof I once had, it means a wheel that doesn't roll smoothly. So in that sense it has the meaning of 'bumpy ride', which I rather like. 'Life is a bumpy ride.'

[deadman]

I'm not too sure of the relevency of my understanding here, but i'll expalin it anyway. As I understand it, the Buddha never made the ontological statement that there is no self. The one place where the Buddha was asked point blank whether or not there was a self (by Vacchagotta the wanderer) he refused to answer, remaining silent. When Ananda later asked why, he said that to hold either that there is a self or that there is no self, is to adopt an extreme form of wrong view.

Why did the Buddha not answer this question? On the Path it is as important to ask the right questions as it is to get the right answers. He divides questions into four classes:

1. those that deserve a catagorical answer (straight yes or no)

2. those that deserve a counter question

3. those that require an analytical answer, defining and qualifying the terms of the question

4. and those that should be put aside

The last class of questions consist of those that don't lead to the end of dukkha. Hence the very question of whether there is a self or not, is misguided to begin with.

It seems that anyone trying to qualify the not-self interpretation by saying the Buddha denied the existence of an eternal self or a seperate self, gives an analytical answer to a question that should be put aside. No matter how you define the line between 'self' and 'other', the notion of self involves an element of self-identification and clinging, and hence suffering and stress.

In essence, the question of whether there is a self or not, is less relevant than determining what are the conditions that give rise to the erroneous belief that there is a doer seperate from his actions, and consequently, the conditions that give rise to erasing this belief. Hence the anatta teaching is not an ontological doctine of no-self, but a strategy for shedding suffering by understanding the conditions that support it. Though the difference is subtle, it is fundamental. (I should say that my understanding here draws primarily on an essay by Thannissaro Bhikkhu.)

Of course thats not to say it's a complete waste of time theorising about etymology ect. It's just that for me personally, this direction doesn't work. Reading quotes like those above tends to only confuse me, how much more so to those just starting out on the Path I can only guess.

with metta

dm

ps.

khun sabaijai, on another thread you posted information about local Dhamma gatherings here in BKK, would it be possible to copy this, and add it to the pinned notice about meditation temples? As I think this will be a recurring enquiry. Possibly change the heading to something like: 'meditation temples and local dhamma gatherings'.

[chownah]

I went out to a Theravada Buddhist forum and posted the link, explained that I had never heard of this, and asked for comments....I'll let you know what happens.

Here's what happened....it seems that there are two different views on this. One group has the view that the term "anatta" refers to a person's individual self only and one group has the view that it refers not only to a person's individual self but also to all objects and things.

If I understand the two arguements correctly, the difference seems to stem from differences between the Suttas and the Abhidhamma. Evidentally the Abhidhamma indicates that anatta applies to objects and persons while the Suttas can be easily interpretted to mean that it refers only to persons.....I'm no expert in this, I'm just reporting what seems to be the case.

I find myself in a peculiar situation...I don't study the Abhidhamma because it seems to me that the Suttas are a more accurate depiction of what the Buddha himself taught...but....my belief that objects and things have no identity in and of themselves is supported by the Abhidhamma but not the Suttas....oh well. If I had everything sorted out perfectly then I guess I'd be alot farther along the path.

Probably the most important thing is that so far everyone that commented on this issue seems to be of the opinion that deadman expressed in his post....the most important thing is how to develop the skill to avoid the mistaken belief that there is a doer that exists aside from the action being done...

[camerata]

Perhaps it's a matter of more emphasis being placed on not-self in relation to people, since the denial of a self/soul is what sets Buddhism apart from other religions. The fact that other things are not-self is probably not such a big deal in comparison.

That's the way it seems from a couple of books I flipped through. Buddhadasa describes anatta as "the fact that all things, without exception and including nibbana, are not-self and lack any essence or substance that could properly be regarded as a "self."

Gunaratana says "the Buddha taught that the things and beings of this world are selfless or soulless precisely because they are always changing. We and everything around us are not static, permanent entities."

Walpola points out that the Dhammapada has a verse containing the line, "All dhammas are without self." "This means, according to the Theravada teaching, that there is no self either in the individual (puggala) or in dhammas." He goes on to say that Mahayana has exactly the same view.

Actually, if everything is anicca, it's difficult to see how anything could not be anatta.

[deadman]

It's kind of a strange line of thought, but if people think themselves to have a 'self' when they actually don't, then perhaps those objects we usually assume have no sense of self, also have a sense of self: car, toaster, television, the packet of strawberry flavoured condoms in the top draw ect. ect.

Given that all dhammas are composed of the same four elements, it's perhaps not such an farfetched notion. I've read a lot a literature that would appear to support such a seemingly absurd proposition. The biologist Lyall Watson wrote an excellent book called 'the nature of things' that certainly gave me a lot of food for thought (not to say that his methodology was 'scientific' in the narrowest sense).

[sabaijai]

ps.

khun sabaijai, on another thread you posted information about local Dhamma gatherings here in BKK, would it be possible to copy this, and add it to the pinned notice about meditation temples? As I think this will be a recurring enquiry. Possibly change the heading to something like: 'meditation temples and local dhamma gatherings'.

Do you mean the Dhamma Study Group in Thonburi? I'll add that right away. Otherwise send me a link to that thread and I'll add that content as well.

Welcome the to Buddhist forum branch, by the way.