Thailand says tsunami warning system remains operational

For those interested, the US government's National Data Buoy Center maintains a web site providing tsunami monitoring data from an international network of real‑time stations (https://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/).

Two of these stations are operated by Thailand:

Station ID 23401 - Bay of Bengal, 600 NM WNW of Phuket.

Currently operating.

Station ID 23461 - Andaman Sea, 180 NM NW of Phuket.

Currently not operating.

Jetsat’s reassurance that buoys are only one part of the warning system needs context.

While earthquake data, sea‑level stations, and international feeds are indeed part of the network, all of these sources were present in 2004, yet the Indian Ocean tsunami still claimed over 250,000 lives!

The point is simple: DART buoys (only introduced after the 2004 event) are now the most reliable real‑time confirmation tool. They measure and transmit deep‑ocean pressure changes before waves reach land.

Without them, authorities are left inferring risk rather than directly detecting it.

Consequently, it is vital that Thailand’s buoys are properly maintained and kept operational. Otherwise Jetsat's “multi‑source” reassurance means Thailand risks relying on inference when what is needed is direct, real‑time confirmation!

"Thailand's tsunami warning system remains fully operational despite some monitoring buoys failing to transmit data, Deputy Interior Minister Jetsat Thaiset said on 16 August."

Is it just me, or is not this statement self-contradictory? How can a system be fully operational, if some components fail to transmit data?

11 hours ago, JimHuaHin said:

"Thailand's tsunami warning system remains fully operational despite some monitoring buoys failing to transmit data, Deputy Interior Minister Jetsat Thaiset said on 16 August."

Is it just me, or is not this statement self-contradictory? How can a system be fully operational, if some components fail to transmit data?

I don't have access to the design and operational requirements for this system, but in non-related systems I have worked on it is common for a design to have built-in redundancy. So, if one thing fails the system's operational design requirements can still be met. So this person saying the system is still fully operational may very well be true, albeit with reduced redundancy - the service the system is providing is fully operational. But I do understand why people get concerned - it's understandable public perception.

One quick example. Most major airports have coverage from multiple radars; if one fails then others are already there to provide the coverage required for the airport to keep at full capacity (fully operational). Public perception example - there used to be a big radar in the middle of Heathrow in London. When the aerial was stopped for maintenance the airport used to get a lot of phone calls asking if the airport was still open. So much of a pain did that become that when that radar was being decommissioned they deliberately left the aerial turning!