As Indonesian significance rises, the myth of ASEAN centrality is revealed

[ASEAN NOW Content Team]

 

Since 2014, the concept of "ASEAN Centrality" has grown increasingly prevalent in every official document produced by the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta.

Dr. Mely Caballero of Nanyang University in Singapore, an expert on ASEAN, points out that the ten member states that generally represent Southeast Asia have all officially embraced the concept, as have extra-regional countries such as China, the United States, Japan, South Korea, and others.

 

The term "ASEAN Centrality" was first associated with the two Master Plans on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC), the first of which was published in 2010 and the second in 2025.

MPAC Connectivity 2025, with its focus on sustainable infrastructure, digital innovation, seamless logistics, regulatory excellence, and people mobility, would undoubtedly help to strengthen and advance the development of a single ASEAN Community by 2025, as agreed by all member states.
However, it is hampered in its purpose by erroneous assumptions about the organization's perceived prominence in the region.

 

The problem with "ASEAN Centrality" is that those who invoke it, whether ASEAN leaders or the organization's ten conversation partners, are guilty of three sins: ignorance, ahistoricism, and cynicism.

 

Ignorance not bliss

 

To begin with, they are completely unaware of the political hyperbole surrounding ASEAN's connection initiatives.
Because ASEAN is a "flexible" organisation that was purposefully meant to be such, mouthing cliches like "ASEAN Centrality" has had no negative consequences.

Whether they are in ASEAN as genuine member states or just as the ten Dialogue Partners, ASEAN's Dialogue Partners have been exceptionally obnoxious and irresponsible.

 

Rewriting history

 

Second, they are unaware of the roots of the term "ASEAN Centrality."

Some ASEAN members, who have long prided themselves on non-intervention and non-interference, have suddenly accepted the unsophisticated scholarship of track II diplomacy experts like Amitav Acharya, or possibly his students, as gospel.

The "ASEAN Way," "the Asian Way," "The Asian Pacific Way," and even Bilahari Kausian's concept of the "Pacific Impulse" have all been revered in their legions of books and articles.

 

Because they have prided themselves on decades of non-intervention and want to find a label for their difficult-to-pin-down diplomatic style, leaders in the region are particularly open to these half-baked hypotheses.
It's no surprise that even "experts" on the subject struggle to come up with clear definitions of the ASEAN Way, given that flexibility has always been at the heart of diplomacy since antiquity.

When even weaker thinkers, such as ASEAN Secretariat secretary generals, are added to the mix, the motley gang becomes an echo chamber, repeating each other's cliches.

 

The charade appears to continue because they don't seem to take "ASEAN Centrality" seriously, much less make policy changes to remedy their ahistorical perspective.

 

Cynical endorsement

 

The Trump administration declassified the US Indo-Pacific Strategy before leaving office on January 10, 2020, even before Vice President Joe Biden weighed in.

The United States would respect "ASEAN Centrality," according to the last section of the Indo-Pacific Strategy.

Why?

 

The short and simple reason is that the "ASEAN Concept" is too foggy and ambiguous.
However, due to a complete disregard for strategic clarity, possibly the most ambiguous phrase in the region's political language has even found its way into the lexicon of former President Trump's U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy, despite the fact that he declassified it 30 years ahead of schedule.

Some academics contend that the concept of "ASEAN Centrality" is nonsensical, even though it is strongly ingrained in the brains of the region's 700 million inhabitants.
It's impossible to say what percentage of ASEAN citizens truly understand ASEAN, let alone "ASEAN Centrality."

 

To be sure, all track II circuit conversations have avoided famous yet critical intellectuals like Nicholas Khoo, Michael Smith, and David Martin Jones for the simple crime of declaring ASEAN Studies to be comparable to "Aseantology" - an unsupported sort of academic voodoo.

Dissenting voices are silenced because ASEAN member states do not want to appear any less powerful than they are, despite the fact that each is weak.
Unless all ten member states agree to support each other militarily, the majority of them will remain minor actors on the global arena.