In their early months, both wars were fueled by a novel military strategy that rose to prominence after the 1991 Persian Gulf war. It posited that by simultaneously attacking with precision weapons on multiple fronts, the U.S. military could paralyze its enemy and achieve a swift, low-casualty victory. As the Iraq and Afghanistan wars dragged on, the military’s faith in this new approach began to wane. By 2007, a new theory of warfare — summed up in the Army’s counterinsurgency doctrine — took hold. The strategy preached that too much firepower, poorly applied, would only produce more enemies. “Sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is,” the new doctrine counseled. Since the cease-fire first took effect, Iran has been able to restore or reconstitute much of its ability to project power, two senior U.S. officials said. That includes Iran’s ballistic missiles and missile launch sites, armed droned launch sites and other underground facilities. The air power lesson Trump must understand is that military action must be tied to clearly defined political objectives and sustained until the desired effects are achieved,” General Deptula said. “Sporadic retaliation followed by pauses, shifting demands or premature declarations of victory gives Iran opportunities to absorb the blows, adapt and wait Washington out.” https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/17/us/politics/trump-iran-war-afghanistan-iraq.html?smid=nytcore-android-share
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