According to a Bloomberg report, Russia sources well over 90 percent of goods sanctioned by the West from China. Overall, trade with China is therefore a rather one-sided affair: while China is Russia's largest trading partner, Russia accounts for just four percent of China's international trade. China is Russia’s most important supporter in the Ukraine war—even though Xi consistently emphasizes Beijing’s alleged neutrality. Shortly before Putin’s visit to China, it emerged that this support was reaching a new level. According to reports by the news agency Reuters citing European intelligence services, China trained approximately 200 Russian soldiers in late 2025, some of whom were subsequently deployed to Ukraine. The training involved the use of drones across several Chinese regions; conversely, Chinese soldiers have been visiting Russian troops since 2024. Internal Russian military reports document four such training sessions in late 2025. According to these reports, the soldiers trained at various Chinese military academies in areas including the combined use of mortars and reconnaissance drones, the interception of hostile aircraft using anti-drone guns, and techniques involving explosives and mine-laying. While Chinese support for Russia in the drone sector is not as visible as, for instance, Iranian shipments of Shahed kamikaze drones or artillery ammunition and ballistic missiles from North Korea, Russia’s extensive drone warfare against Ukraine would nonetheless be impossible without China. Russia receives vast quantities of lithium-polymer batteries as well as many other components and resources used to manufacture not only drones but also other weapon systems for the war. Semiconductors, microelectronics, precision tools—without such supplies, Putin would be unable to keep his defense industry running. There is also space cooperation between China and Russia, a partnership that is likewise shifting in Beijing’s favor. While Russia’s space sector has been weakened by structural problems and sanctions since 2014, China is massively expanding its capabilities in satellites, launch systems, and space infrastructure. Consequently, Moscow is becoming more involved in Chinese-led projects—such as the integration of the BeiDou and GLONASS navigation systems or the planned ILRS lunar base. In the military sphere, cooperation is likely to grow primarily in the areas of reconnaissance, cyber operations, logistics, and satellite communications, as well as early-warning and missile defense systems. In this context, China benefits from Russian expertise regarding the detection of intercontinental ballistic missiles.
