Saudi Arabia Seeks To Stay Out Of Iran Conflict

Saudi Arabia has largely tried to keep out of the conflict between the United States and Iran that began on 28 February. But after attacks attributed to multiple Iranian-aligned groups from different directions, Riyadh has moved to respond directly, including by carrying out joint strikes with the US.

This week, Saudi forces conducted strikes alongside US forces against Iranian proxy militias in Iraq that the kingdom says have been firing drones at Saudi Arabia. The measures underline a growing dilemma for Riyadh: whether to continue escalating as deterrence, or to seek ways to reduce attacks, potentially through inducements or other forms of pressure on adversaries.

Parties And Areas Of Attack

The regional conflict has broadened over five months, drawing in Iran and a network of allied or aligned groups. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) backs several actors, including the Houthis in Yemen and Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Forces.

The Houthis took control of Yemen in 2014 and have also been involved in attacks beyond their territory. In Iraq, the Popular Mobilisation Forces have been accused of carrying out about 30 drone strikes on Saudi Arabia, prompting Saudi and US retaliatory action.

In Lebanon, Hezbollah remains a significant force but is currently described as staying low.

On the other side, the United States has been conducting operations through its Central Command (Centcom), alongside varying contributions from Gulf Arab states and Jordan. Israel is described as a close US ally, but not an active participant in the fighting.

Iran’s recent campaign of drone and missile attacks has been concentrated on Jordan, Kuwait and Bahrain. It has also targeted commercial shipping attempting to pass through the Strait of Hormuz, while seeking to enforce new routing rules.

The addition of Iraqi militias and the Houthis—on top of longer-running confrontations—reflects how, without a durable US-Iran peace arrangement, the region risks becoming increasingly enmeshed in a wider war.

Why Riyadh Is Trying Not To Get Pulled In

Saudi caution is tied to the kingdom’s domestic transformation agenda led by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. “Vision 2030” is intended to reduce dependence on oil revenues by building new industries and jobs for large numbers of young people entering the labour market.

Attracting foreign investment is central to the plan, as is the development of infrastructure such as data centres. Riyadh argues that the strategy becomes harder to sustain if the kingdom faces a long-term pattern of threats, including drones launched from the Houthis across its southern border and ballistic missiles fired directly by Iran.

Saudi planners also point to earlier experience of vulnerability. In September 2019, drones linked to an Iranian proxy militia in Iraq hit two of the kingdom’s most important oil facilities—Abqaiq and Khurais. The attack disrupted about half of Saudi oil exports for several days, serving as a warning about how exposed critical national infrastructure can be to cross-border strikes.

Monday’s satellite images, the article notes, showed the Abqaiq facility being struck again by drones launched by Iranian proxy militias in Iraq.

Oil Routes And Pressure From Multiple Fronts

Energy and shipping routes are a further driver of Saudi restraint. Iran retaliated against US and Israeli attacks in February by effectively restricting passage through the Strait of Hormuz, a shipping channel that accounts for about 20% of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas.

Saudi Arabia responded by pushing oil volumes through its east-west pipeline to its Red Sea export terminal at Yanbu, reaching around five million barrels per day. From there, oil shipments were loaded onto tankers bound for markets in Asia via the Arabian Sea.

However, attacks on Yemen have added another layer of risk. On 13 July, Saudi Arabia bombed Sanaa airport, with the strike described as carried out by Yemen’s Saudi-supported government and aimed at preventing an Iranian plane from landing. The Houthis retaliated by attacking Saudi airports at Abha and Jizan.

More recently, the Houthis have also attacked shipping in the Red Sea, increasing the danger for vessels attempting to pass through the narrow Bab El Mandeb strait at the southern end of the sea. That threatens to choke oil exports to Asia and shifts pressure from the Gulf to Saudi maritime routes.

Saudi Arabia has previously spent years trying to force the Houthis into submission but failed. The war in Yemen was described as one of the worst humanitarian disasters, and in 2022 Saudi Arabia agreed to an uneasy truce with the Houthis, with reports of payoffs. Now, Riyadh faces the prospect of renewed drone and missile pressure from the south at the same time as attacks from Iraq to the north—developments not envisaged under “Vision 2030”.

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30 July 2026

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