Map of violence could open a path to peace in Thailand's deep South

[webfact]

Map of violence could open a path to peace in deep South
Don Pathan
Special to The Nation


A bomb-disposal squad at work in Narithiwat in February. The authorities blame the latest wave of tit-for-tat killings in the deep South on blood feuds between local Muslim families, something strongly denied by both Muslim residents and the insurgents.

Both sides want to create a channel of communication to verify which attacks are insurgency-related and which are criminal

BANGKOK: -- Mapping violence in Thailand's southernmost provinces, where a decade-old wave of insurgency has claimed more than 5,000 lives, is not easy, especially when there is no identifiable group claiming responsibility for the attacks and no neutral body to verify those claims.

As a result, the two warring factions have been left to unilaterally observe unwritten ground rules: no direct attacks against civilians - though "unavoidable collateral damage" is "acceptable".

Meanwhile the security apparatus, and the pro-government death squads working for "rogue" units, are not supposed to target religious leaders and imams, no matter how close they are to local militant cells. Insurgents reciprocate by excluding Buddhist monks, temples and Chinese religious shrines, as well as public schools and teachers, from their hit list.

Not long after the current wave of insurgency went into full swing in January 2004, insurgents decapitated and castrated soldiers after gunning them down. The idea was to make a contemptuous gesture to the local commanders, nothing more.

Sources in the separatist movements said such acts were a far cry from the actions of South Asian or Middle Eastern jihadists, who often videotape the beheading-execution of their victims and post the clips on the Internet.

As for the insurgents in Thailand's Malay-speaking South, it took some time for the religious element within the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) and other circles to convince the militants to end such practices.

Ironic as it may seem, a nationalist conflict in Thailand's Malay-speaking South is citing Islamic rules of war to end the practice of decapitation and mutilation, while self-proclaimed holy warriors in South Asia and the Middle East have no qualms about beheading their enemies to make a political statement.

The ground rules in Thailand's insurgency also extend to prohibiting arson attacks on public schools, the bastion of state-constructed narrative that local Malays dismissed as an assault on their historical and cultural identity.

But because there is little unity among Thai security agencies, and the fact that the command-and-control on the BRN side is still somewhat fluid, while other longstanding separatist groups also have militants in the field, abiding by the ground rule is easier said than done.

Too often, emotion gets the better of combatants on both sides, generating a vicious cycle of tit-for-tat killings.

The attack in February this year on a family in Narathiwat's Bacho district that ended in the killing of three brothers by two Paramilitary Rangers is a case in point. Authorities insisted that the two Rangers had acted on their own, seeking revenge against a suspect who had entered into a plea bargain with the authorities in exchange for their dropping legal action against him. Authorities said the man whose three sons were killed was affiliated with a local insurgent cell and that he had ordered a hit on a Rangers' family member some time ago.

Neither Muslim residents nor the insurgents bought the explanation, refusing to believe that the two rangers had acted without permission from above.

There were reports of a third assailant - a Buddhist member of the armed forces - but his identity was not revealed. According to government sources, the third attacker's identity had to be kept out of the public gaze because it would have raised unwanted questions and undermined the official line - that the killing of the boys was part of a blood feud between local Muslims and something the authorities had nothing to do with.

At about the same time, another series of tit-for-tat killings between Muslim residents and Muslim security officials was taking place in Yala's Bannang Sata. The killing spree escalated and the "collateral damage" spread as family members - parents, children and toddlers - from both sides were targeted.

Insurgents hit back with a two-day bomb blitz in Yala, including a car bomb that started a fire that burned down an entire block of wooden shophouses in the heart of the city's busy business district.

They also extended the "warning" attacks to Hat Yai, an area that is supposed to be off-limits but is targeted as a pressure point whenever the insurgents deem that the Thai side has violated the ground rules.

The last time insurgents hit Hat Yai was in March 30, 2012, two weeks after fugitive former premier Thaksin Shinawatra met with 16 separatist leaders in his attempt to kick-start a peace process. The same day also saw a triple car bomb in Yala's busy Ruammit Street that resulted in at least 13 deaths and more than 130 injuries. Both the Thai Army and the insurgents billed the attacks as a slap in the face for Thaksin. It was a way for the BRN and the insurgents affiliated with their movement to show their disapproval of his intervention.

A similar spike in violence came later that year in November following the shooting death of a young and influential imam, Abdullateh Todir, in Yala's Yaha district, reportedly assassinated by a pro-government death squad. The "spike" - not so much in terms of the number of attacks but more their brutal nature and the fact that the targets were supposed to be off-limits - lasted for six weeks. Three Buddhist teachers were shot dead and three public schools torched during that period. A pro-government death squad hit back with a gangland-style shooting at a teashop full of Muslims on December 11, 2012 in Narathiwat's Rangae district, killing four, including an 11-month-old baby girl.

One of the biggest concerns for security agencies is the possibility that the insurgency violence could be expanded to areas outside the Malay-speaking region. Hat Yai is technically off-limits, but an attack against the city signals a strategic violation of the ground rules by the insurgents.

Phuket and Bangkok, on the other hand, are supposed to be totally off the radar screen. That psychological threshold was violated on December 22, 2013 when Phuket police discovered a massive bomb with a blast radius of 500 metres inside a stolen pickup truck parked inside the station's lot. The vehicle was stolen from Pattani's Sai Buri in May 2012, so how long it had been parked at the Phuket police station is anybody's guess.

Separatist sources said the bomb plot deliberately targeted Phuket. The idea, they said, was to send a stern warning to the authorities of what the movement is capable of.

Bangkok's Ramkhamhaeng Soi 43/1 was hit in May 2013 by a Malay Muslim cell, but the official line is that the attack was part of a local dispute.

Meanwhile, Thai security forces are saying they want to set up a back channel of communication with the insurgents, especially those in direct contact with combatants, to function as a sort of clearing house to verify which attacks are part of the conflict and which are criminal in nature.

Sources in the BRN say they welcome the idea, as it could clear up misunderstandings over who is doing what. But if security forces are planning to use the channel to spread the same half-truths they dish out to the public, the BRN will not be interested in talking to them.

Both warring sides say they are interested in seeing this back channel evolve into something bigger and better. But taking this first initial step won't be easy, as it requires each side to take a big leap of faith towards trust and confidence in the other.

Don Pathan is a security and development consultant based in Yala. He is also a member of the Patani Forum (www.pataniforum.com).


-- The Nation 2014-05-26

[chooka]

which attacks are insurgency-related and which are criminal.

Personally I would say they are all criminal

[impulse]

which attacks are insurgency-related and which are criminal.

Personally I would say they are all criminal

Lump them all together, and you'll never find a solution.

[michaelscottfan]

It was a synchronized attack against 15 locations and a military patrol boat. What the <deleted> do you think it was?

I mean Christ, "Criminal"? As if this is like a bank robber? The Nation posts some stupid articles but this is one for the wall.

[BSJ]

Insurgents are criminals, plain and simple.

[noitom]

How many banks were robbed in the last ten years? Other clear press reports state that the death toll is over 6,000. This article seeks to minimize extent of terror , killing, and injuries.

[Seastallion]

Insurgents are criminals, plain and simple.

Indeed, but for the purposes of the subject at hand, it is useful to distinguish between insurgency related acts of violence and non-insurgency acts of violence.

Semantics. Comprehension of the context is useful.

[thumper101]

All these attacks serve to do is to bolster hatred and determination in the very people they are trying to force their ideals onto, and all that is happening is that they are building up even more resistance to what they want to achieve and it will never get them any forward movement.

They are just trapped in a loop of murder for no gain, and they refuse to walk away from it.

If this spreads countrywide as a certain man in Dubai would like, then it will turn Thailand into a ghost town.

[UbonRatch]

Basic, initial question:

Any chance of a copy of the map, so I know where NOT to go on my kind and delightful excusions?

Edit: Oops, a comma needed between 'Basic' and 'initial', as they are two following adjectives. My bad. Apologies.

So much going on with this huge (non-existent, and for the good of all of Thai people) coup, I forgot simple grammar rules.

Edited May 26, 2014 by UbonRatch

[squarethecircle]

"The same day also saw a triple car bomb in Yala's busy Ruammit Street that resulted in at least 13 deaths and more than 130 injuries. Both the Thai Army and the insurgents billed the attacks as a slap in the face for Thaksin. It was a way for the BRN and the insurgents affiliated with their movement to show their disapproval of his intervention."

So they plant a car bomb in a civilian area to show they "mean business", but the author does not consider them criminals and instead tries to establish sympathy for them. ???

[Seastallion]

"The same day also saw a triple car bomb in Yala's busy Ruammit Street that resulted in at least 13 deaths and more than 130 injuries. Both the Thai Army and the insurgents billed the attacks as a slap in the face for Thaksin. It was a way for the BRN and the insurgents affiliated with their movement to show their disapproval of his intervention."

So they plant a car bomb in a civilian area to show they "mean business", but the author does not consider them criminals and instead tries to establish sympathy for them. ???

No. Do you not read the comments before you post...post #7 for instance? Did you not read the article in it's entirety and comprehend what it was all about?

Think of it as the authorities and the insurgents (and the author) are making a distinction between.......oh...never mind, just read post 7 and if you still have trouble understanding, post again that I must be a sympathiser of the insurgents. Then, if I can't explain it in simpler terms, maybe someone else can.

[piersbeckett]

All these attacks serve to do is to bolster hatred and determination in the very people they are trying to force their ideals onto, and all that is happening is that they are building up even more resistance to what they want to achieve and it will never get them any forward movement.

They are just trapped in a loop of murder for no gain, and they refuse to walk away from it.

If this spreads countrywide as a certain man in Dubai would like, then it will turn Thailand into a ghost town.

I think it's a turf war in the deep south similar to that of Northern Ireland which may never be solved; the best one might hope for is a compromise solution which nobody is really happy with and is expensive to maintain but less people get killed or injured than would be the case without it and 'leaders' get a bit of the power they desperately crave; the 'map of violence' being seen by some as a tool that may be used towards this end.

I don't think the Thai military would tolerate insurgence spreading further than they consider (in the military sense) containable nor do I believe that the spreading of insurgence would be in the 'man in Dubai's' interest as I guess the insurgents down south are too dangerous to use as pawns and, in any case, I doubt the military would be happy under the ultimate control of Mr.T. if he was successful in regaining power.

[15Peter20]

A couple of days after the army takes over and all of a sudden peace could break out in the Deep South. Farmers are getting paid, businesses welcome the coup and red terrorists are being caught. The economy can bounce back and tourists are manfully living with the curfew.

Tomorrow's headline - New Evidence Suggests Santa Claus Was Thai (his real name was Santapol Closiri and he was actually an early Siamese emissary sent to Europe but got blown to Greenland in a storm, where he settled and built up a successful sleigh-building business using wood carving skills he'd learnt as a child in what is now northern Thailand).

Come on people. You are reading news which conforms to a set of edicts. Please bear this in mind before spouting off in whatever direction.

Edited May 26, 2014 by 15Peter20

[surangw]

or it will show the terrorists which areas need more "attention"

[folium]

which attacks are insurgency-related and which are criminal.

Personally I would say they are all criminal

Lump them all together, and you'll never find a solution.

This is actually a very illuminating article, even if it is only half-true.

It underlines the half-arsed shambles that masquerades as a counter-insurgency operation in the south, and underscores why it has been utterly unsuccessful and in many ways has accentuated rather than resolved the conflict. The cluster-truck of the southern Thai counter-insurgency is widely recognized globally amongst professional military organizations as a poster child of how not to go about it, notwithstanding or perhaps because of a zero accountability political/legal environment.

BTW distinguishing between insurgent activity and criminal activity is essential, as the latter will exploit the situation created by the former if there is poor accounting and tracking of activities. Obviously all acts are fundamentally "criminal" in nature, but you do not want to waste military assets on what in N. Ireland was described (tongue firmly in cheek) as ODC, ordinary decent criminality. That's a police job, if of course they have any interest in undertaking basic policing functions.

[squarethecircle]

"Think of it as the authorities and the insurgents (and the author) are making a distinction between......"

Ok i get what Folium says. A murder over, say, turf for smuggling operations would be under the police's domain, but a murder of, say, a monk going about daily alms, would call for military response. The author clearly aims to establish sympathy for the "insurgents" by trying to make them sound more humane than ME-style terrorists. There is a clear pattern of racial and ethnic cleansing down there, and it is disgusting for the Nation, a Thai newspaper, to publish this. Plenty of groups around the world (like blacks in US and SA, and Indians in Malaysia) have fought official discrimination w/o resorting to murder. Either the Malay~Muslims of S Thai are suffering extreme oppression that justifies the murder (like blowing up a truck of SS soldiers rounding up Jews might be justified) (and they are not suffering such persecution) or what they are doing constitutes war crimes and demands an appropriate response. Another thing he misses: how much do Malaysian authorities know about who's behind the situation in 3 souyhern provinces?