Thai Special Forces

[Limbo]

And what about the Red Barets, also called The Tomatoes, of the Icelandic army.

They move under the ground and can pop up from any geyser. Their faces are very red (it is really hot down there), that's why they are called The Tomatoes. The colour of their barets has nothing to do with this nickname, but it matches quite well.

So if you look out of the window tomorrow morning and you see suddenly a geyser in your garden, be aware, a Tomatoe might jump out and liberate you.

[Pies]

The "Revised Common Recruit Syllabus" introduced in 1999 for the Royal Marines is (still) 30 weeks long.....and sometimes it felt longer!

[350torana]

I am curious about the Royal Thai Police Commandoes? are they a special forces? I know strictly not militiary, but they are often on the front line.

Anyways, some other not mentioned special forces, SAS..Aussie and Kiwi and the Rhodesian Scouts . Pity the scouts never got thier hands on Mugabwe before he came to power

[Johpa]

In the early 1980s your Thai guys would have probably been working with Thai-speaking ethnic (mostly Christian) Karen and a few Shan mercs ... legalized bandits doing a payback job in return for the Thai government letting their people flood over the border to escape slaughter by the Burmese.

I haven't heard of Laota since he was arrested last year on suspicion of involvement in the Wa amphetamine trade and a couple of drug-related murders. Is he still alive ?

I was living with Karen at the time, still am so to speak, and rest assured the guys I encountered were neither Karen nor Shan but Thai guys, mostly from Isaan, and mostly guys who would probably not be missed by anybody.

As of a few months ago Laota was still incarcerated. It looks like he used up all his nine lives this time. His fortunes had been waning since his business associate decided to retire to Rangoon and sell out to the Wa. My wife is good friends with his older sons and she was always treated with respect by Laota and I had a few drinks with him over the years and actually got quite pissed with him just hanging out at the side of the road a few years ago. But his long time involvement in the drug trade and his rather violent reputation to those who crossed him made him one of the more loathsome figures up north for many a year. So although he was always kind to my wife and me, I am not sorry to see him taken away.

[thaiwing]

THAILAND:

Royal Thai Army 1st Special Forces (Airborne) Division:

* 1,2,3,4 Special Forces (Airborne) Group

* PsyOps Battalion

* LRRP Company

Royal Thai Navy SEALS

Royal Thai Navy UDT

Royal Thai Marine Corps Amphibious Recon Btn's

Special Unit of the Royal Thai Air Force [designation ?]

you count em....

some might find this of interest.....Special Forces in Thailand's Troubled South

As a major non-NATO ally, supporter of the U.S. war on terror, powerful force in the Southeast Asian region, and partner in over $20 billion in annual two-way trade with the U.S., the Kingdom of Thailand today faces a militant Islamic insurgency that has the potential to devastate regional stability and U.S. foreign policy. The solution to Thailand's southern insurgency lies in a better understanding of the disenfranchised Muslim culture and its legitimate requirements for attention and development from the Thai government in Bangkok. It is in America's interest to implement all the elements of national power to better help our ally. A change in policy regarding the employment of the U.S. military in support of Thailand's insurgency is one step in the right direction. While improved military and police activities in the Thai south are only one of many tools required to fix the problem, they are nonetheless important and effective.

In March 2004, Thailand's national police chief and the southern regional army commander were fired for failing to control the growing unrest in the Muslim-dominated south. The Thai government was again reacting to increased domestic pressure to address the problem of Muslim unrest within the country's borders. Midway through 2004, over 200 people have been killed this year alone in southern Thailand. There is more than ever a greater need for improved police and military reform in the troubled south. In an April 2004 Bangkok University poll of over 1,000 Muslims, the Thai military came first as the state agency causing the most problems for the southern people, followed by the police, local administrative organizations, and finally village headmen. Effective police and military capabilities in the region can help identify legitimate Muslim grievances that the Thai government should address, and at the same time identify insurgent and terrorist activities being conducted by militant portions of the population.

Both U.S. and Thai intelligence and law enforcement agencies coordinate and work together continuously to locate, identify, capture, and prosecute terrorists and terrorist-sponsoring cells in the kingdom. Their surveillance in urban areas has been noteworthy: these agencies have tracked and monitored the activities of militant Islamic front companies, NGOs, and transnational terrorist leaders like Mohammed Mansour Jabarah and Hambali.

It is in the southern rural villages, however, among the indigenous populations, that Thailand could benefit most from the assistance of counterinsurgency experts from the U.S. Army's Special Forces (SF), or Green Berets. In Thailand today, SF currently work on an almost-continuous basis to train, advise, and assist the Thai military and Border Patrol Police during Cobra Gold exercises, Joint and Combined Exchange Training (JCET), Counter-Drug training, Counter-Terrorism training, and other small-unit operations in support of U.S.-Thai security interests.

SF is specially organized, trained, and equipped for counterinsurgency operations. In fact, SF is the only force in the U.S. military trained to conduct counterinsurgency in the remote environments that the terrorists call home, with little or no external support. These specially trained teams also have the ability to assist local populations by administering medicine, constructing schools, and initiating other civic action projects to help legitimize and communicate the Thai government's genuine intentions to help develop and secure the south.

An advisory role for SF in Thailand involves neither a permanent nor a large-scale military campaign strategy like those found in the Middle East today. In southern Thailand, for example, SF could effectively be used to train local police and military personnel in counterinsurgency operations. This instruction includes everything from tactical operations to military-police-civilian interoperability to human rights training. Such instruction allows the authorities to become more efficient, government infrastructure is improved, development initiatives can be enacted, and violence is mitigated. As the southern police and military gain the trust of the local population, the people become more comfortable providing the Thai authorities with information about insurgents who are planning and executing violent actions.

Ultimately, the Thai government would be able to allocate more resources to development rather than continuous military and police actions. The real winner in this situation is the local population in the south, the majority of which do not support the violence. The key to counterinsurgency is understanding the population and its motivations to either support or reject violence. Once the population is understood, progress can be made. Counterinsurgency is not effective when it only involves military and police action aimed at arresting insurgents. Such tactics are extremely ineffective and rarely eliminate the true motivation for violence among the population.

At this time, U.S. Special Forces do not conduct training in the three southernmost Thai provinces of Yala, Narathiwat, and Pattani, where active insurgency flourishes today. The reason is twofold. First, the violence, instability, underdevelopment, and potential for U.S./insurgent clashes are sufficient incentives for the Thai and U.S. governments to plan joint training in other parts of the country. Second, there is the fear that a U.S. military presence in the south might ignite increased hostility and the belief that the U.S. war on terror is being brought to bear against Thai Muslims. Neither reason for choosing not to use SF is adequate.

Green Berets are experts at living and working for long periods of time with local civilian and military leaders in other countries, teaching them how to operate professionally and humanely to gain the trust of the population. SF soldiers are mature, regionally oriented, culturally aware, small groups of men with foreign language skills, who have the ability to help better prepare foreign nationals at all levels while maintaining a 'small footprint.' U.S./insurgent clashes would be avoided at all costs, especially if SF were to be deployed in their optimum force structure: a handful of small, 12-man teams spread throughout the provinces several times a year, working very closely with Thai military and police authorities, maintaining a very low signature, with no other U.S. forces present.

It can not be emphasized enough that the military employment of Special Forces in southern Thailand is only one part of an overarching U.S.-Thai strategy that must encompass all instruments of statecraft to effectively confront the militant insurgency that our ally faces today. In an environment that involves an active insurgency, military initiatives are one small part in a complex interrelationship of social, political, military, and economic concerns that must be addressed.

For the military option described here to succeed, there must first be agreement among U.S. and Thai leaders and policymakers to relocate current training to the southernmost provinces. Special Forces are a useful asset that, if properly employed in a counterinsurgency role, can greatly assist in establishing regional stability and protecting the interests of the U.S. and its allies.

[jconners]

Legendary Chinese Bandit Recon LRRP Team 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav

"Spirit of Robert Rogers in the Footsteps of Lauri Torni and Tutelage of Frenchy Theriault...FIRST Wave"

The legendary Chinese Bandit Recon LRRP Team 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav 1965-66 was awarded TWO Presidential Unit Citations, the nation's highest unit decoration for extraordinary heroism for their participation in the Battles of the Ia Drang (Pleiku November 1965) and Nathan Hale (Trung Luong June 1966)...the ONLY Recon, LRRP, Ranger, Special Forces or Special Operations unit to be awarded TWO Presidential Unit Citations during a single combat tour of duty…in ANY US Conflict or War; conducted the historic FIRST night combat rappel during the Battle of the Ia Drang along the Cambodian border while attached to the 1st Airborne Brigade and lead by RANGER Lawson; and performed DOD/MACV/OP-35 directed long range reconnaissance (LRRP) operations lead by 101st RECONDO Grimes along the northern Cambodia and southern Laos borders in the spring of 1966 ..."Laying Down FIRST Tracks in the Central Highlands…Chinese Bandits Penetrate Deeper...and Where Others FEARED to Tread!"

RANGER Jerry Conners, Captain ([email protected]) 775-847-0214 (Ranger Class 502), Master Parachutist (Honor Graduate of 101st ABN Jumpmaster Class), Special Forces Weapons Expert (1964-65 SF MOI, Weapons & Branch), 101st RECONDO (Brand Number 1919), Army Aviator, AMOC, NRAS-PAL, Military Intelligence Officer Advance Course, Task Force Gramas [special Operations] ... "Loose Nukes" Recovery Team Greece/Turkey 1974, Sensitive Weapons Theft (RAF Anti-Terrorist Operation) Interdiction Team Misseau, Fort Campbell Sport Parachute Club 1963-64, Distinguished Military Graduate University of Nevada.

Chinese Bandit 13

Chinese Bandit Recon LRRP Team 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav 1965-66

http://www.chinesebandits.org

RAYMOND CARLEY REMEMBERED

by Ranger Jerry Conners,

Chinese Bandit Recon 1st Bn (ABN) 8th Cav, 1965-66

face down crawling

the pain does not matter anymore

they can not help me,

Don't try he yells

to those nearby

must it end

the ground is warm,

the smell of the earth

the fallen leaves in hand

engulfed in the sounds of withering fire

touched twice again

he grimaces and smiles

through gritted teeth

alone without strength

must it end,

colder now

shaking

unable to breathe

or tear the collar too close

about his neck,

struggling frantically

to hold on

numb now,

through squinted eyes some light,

soaked in blood

fingers slowly grasping emptiness,

swaying in the arms of death

let there be more

Note: Raymond Carley [

http://thewall-usa.com/guest.asp?recid=7869 ] was killed leading the attack on June 23, 1966 during the Battle of Trung Luong where the Chinese Bandits were awarded their 2d Presidential Unit Citation for extraordinary heroism during the period 1965-66…the first was awarded for participation in the Battle of Ia Drang in November 1965. More information on the Chinese Bandits can be obtained at http://www.chinesebandits.org

[JimmyTheMook]

How about some Tony Poe stories while your at it ?

[Humungus]

When is Thailand going to field a team to compete in the special olympics for Muay Thai?

Oh you meant military special forces, got it.

[Ulysses G.]

There is only one force.

The SAS.

I'm inclined to agree with you on that one.

The SAS are tough soldiers indeed, but there are great special forces units all over the world and many of the others have won the competitons between the different International SF teams.

My personal favorites are USMC Force Recon as they used to torture me when I got in trouble in bootcamp. The "motivation" platoon - those were the days.

[skybluestu]

SBS, best special forces in the world.

[MickA]

"SBS, best special forces in the world"

Without a doubt!