Chiang Mai-bkk Airline Options

[sylviex]

I have always used Thai Air in the past (& had no problems with them) but have come to realise they're quite a bit more expensive than the other airlines.

Can anyone recommend other airlines for Chiang Mai - BKK ? Any to avoid ? Better to stick with Thai Air ?

Thanks.

[StevieH]

air asia is cheap as buttons if you book far enough in advance.

[miltonbentley]

We normally use Air Asia as they are considerably cheaper than Thai and still fly into Suvarnabhumi. However they are not as reliable as Thai on times especially later in the day so if you need to make an international connection give yourself plenty of time.

I think the other budget carriers all fly into DM which is OK if you are staying in BK but no good if you are making a connection. I flew with Nok recently and they were pretty good and reasonably priced.

[ChangMaiSausage]

Ill take Nok before Air Asia plenty of threads about Air Asia's luggage policy......

[Pond Life]

Its a case of you get what you pay for.

http://www.investigateudom.com/files/DCA_Summary.pdf

<<<<<<<A Summary of the Information Provided to the FAA on Thai-based Aviation

In our efforts for a proper investigation and accountability into the crash of Orient Thai’s

One-Two–Go OG269, we have received documents, photographs, and crew allegations demonstrating improper behavior of various Thai airlines and of Thailand’s civil aviation

authority, the DCA.

The evidence and allegations make it clear that prior to, during, and after the crash of OG269, the Thai DCA knew or should have known that Thai airlines were continually compromising safety. While much of the evidence suggests outright corruption and incompetence, even taken in the best possible light, DCA oversight of Thai aviation is inexcusably lax.

Information we received came from pilots and personnel working for Orient Thai Airlines, One-Two-Go Airlines, SkyStar Airways and Phuket Air. The vast majority of this information was known or could have been easily discovered by the DCA, including:

1. Airlines regularly falsify check rides. In one case, XXX informed DCA Deputy Director- General Vitichai [sometimes spelled Wittichai] of 4 fraudulent check rides taking place in December 2007. No action was taken by the DCA upon XXX’s notification. Nor was any

action taken after we made the material public. The DCA finally took some action just prior to the FAA’s recent visit. No management was every censored.

2. We have very credible testimony from pilots who learn of passing sim checks they have never taken.

3. We have very credible testimony of pilots who are not qualified for the aircraft they fly.

4. The airlines regularly require their pilots to fly in excess of the maximum legal limits

(110 hours a month in Thailand) and ICAO (100 hours a month) with full knowledge of

the DCA.

In an effort to show oversight in hindsight, the DCA recently ordered the pilots to

produce historic flight summaries for the FAA. Out of fear of being the scapegoats for

the excessive hours, some of the pilots refused to provide such paperwork.

5. The airlines regularly conduct maintenance malpractice.

A. Severe problems that have been “squawked” (made known by the pilots to

maintenance personnel) are often reported by maintenance personnel to have

cleared up or been remedied, only to reappear for the flight crew.

B. Inspections are frequently done on paper only.

C. Heavily documented cases where improper maintenance and illegal flights nearly

lead to catastrophes include:

•

At Orient Thai, a serious issue with a left engine thrust reverser on a

747 was ignored. One western-trained pilot resigned due to the airline’s

refusal to stop flying the aircraft. The thrust reverser sleeve eventually

separated from the aircraft – in mid air. The aircraft could have lost a

wing but fortunately did not.

•

Phuket Air needed to ferry an aircraft from Saudi Arabia to Jakarta for

an engine change. In order to legally fly the aircraft, the engine that

required replacement needed to be deemed serviceable. Papers were

signed and it was suddenly “serviceable”. Unfortunately, the engine

came apart during take-off, dumping engine parts including the entire

turbine for miles. The DCA had just 4 days previously audited Phuket

Air’s maintenance department. [There are publicly available pictures of

the separated turbine resting in the parking lot of a Saudi hotel.]

•

Three weeks after the first attempt to fly the Phuket Air 747, Phuket Air

violated numerous crew, maintenance and civil regulations and the

terms of their insurance why the flew the 3 engine 747 to Jakarta. Both

flight events were highly public and the sequence of events could not

reasonably have been unknown to the DCA.

6. At the time of the crash of OG269, Orient Thai had no training manuals, no safety

manual and no safety program all of which must be monitored by the DCA.

7. The airlines regularly operate in violation of the Minimum Equipment List (MEL). For

some airlines, the MEL is only a copy of the Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL).

Both are gross violations of ICAO standards and very unsafe.

8. At least one airline regularly flies overweight because of an inability of the staff to

properly track and convert weights between metric and English systems.

9. A lack of clear boundaries between the airlines and the DCA both creates opportunities

for corruption and makes it clear that the DCA is aware of Thai airline violations of safe

procedures:

A. The DCA runs a program in which a DCA agent works in the DCA office for 5 days

a week and then flies 2 days a week with their assigned airline. The airline pays

the DCA agent’s salary for the days spent at the airline. Besides conflict of

interest based on the payment and responsibilities of the DCA agent, these DCA

agents are themselves exceeding duty time by working 7 days a week.

[A few days before the FAA’s recent trip to Thailand, the DCA altered the

program to 1 flying day per week for agents.]

•

DCA agent Praphon is assigned to Orient Thai’s One-Two-Go fleet. As a

working pilot there, Agent Praphon is aware of and complicit in the

airline’s violations of ICAO and legal standards, including fraudulent and

frequently non-existent training and re-currency programs, lack of

required manuals and training program, and excessive flight and duty

hours and maintenance fraud.

1. Proof of these frauds by Orient Thai are publicly available and have

been given to the FAA.

2. Several pilots allege Agent Phraphon regularly extorts Thai First

Officers to pay for prostitutes on the Chaing Mai route.

B. DCA Deputy Director-General Vitichai and Orient Thai and One-Two-Go CEO

Udom Tantiprasongchai are “golf buddies”. Their relationship and its particulars

have led to credible allegations that the DCA overlooks Orient Thai and One-Two-

Go infractions and that DCA Deputy Director-General Vitichai protects Mr.

Tantiprasongchai’s interests. There are credible allegations of bribery, including

allegations from witnesses to such bribery.

•

In one well-known incident, a scheduled 747 flight was delayed by the

Flight Engineer because the landing pilot had overheated the brakes.

Rather than tolerate the delay, the pilot physically removed the flight

engineer’s bags from the aircraft and departed – with passengers – but

without the Flight Engineer. The incident was widely known and was

documented by the Flight Engineer. The DCA took no action.

•

DCA Deputy Director-General Vitichai admitted on camera that Orient

Thai’s One-Two-Go pilots were vastly over hours in the crash of OG269.

He further acknowledged that Orient Thai Airlines had provided crash

investigators, including the NTSB, with fraudulent flight hour

information. However, he never notified the NTSB of the fraud, even

though lead investigator Jill Andrews of the NTSB ghost wrote the crash

investigation report for the DCA.

[in February 2008, we informed Ms. Andrews of the fraud. In May, we

provided her with the true rosters. In June, Ms. Andrews completed the

crash report. The DCA has not released that report.]

•

In February 2008, long after he had the OG269 black box information

and proof of excessive flight hours, knowledge of an improper training

program and lack of a safety program at Orient Thai and One-Two-Go,

DCA Deputy Director-General Vitichai told the press, “No punishment will

be imposed on any agency or personnel after completion of the

investigation [into the crash of OG269] because the accident was

beyond control.”

[The immediate cause of the crash was flight crew error during a bad

weather landing. One pilot appears to have been incapacitated and the

other to have panicked. The root causes of the crash are shown here.]

A Category 1/Acceptable rating would require the FAA to conclude that the DCA licenses and

oversees air carriers in accordance with ICAO aviation safety standards. It seems

reasonable to expect Thailand could only achieve a Category 1/Acceptable rating after:

The DCA decertifies every airline that provided it with fraudulent information.

The DCA dismisses every manager and agent who accepted such obviously fraudulent

information.

A newly reconstituted DCA shows an ability and willingness to competently oversee Thai

civil aviation.

If the FAA does not find Thailand in compliance with the ICAO standards, then the FAA must

demote Thailand’s ranking to Category 2/Conditional or to Delisted/Unacceptable.

It is difficult to understand how the FAA itself could be performing appropriate oversight and

have provisionally concluded that the DCA performs oversight in accordance with ICAO

standards.

You still think its worth saving a few Baht ?

[britmaveric]

^Very safe Air Asia is spot on for short flights.

[gpdjohn]

I use Nok if we are staying in BKK and Air Asia to Swampy.

I have always liked Nok and Air Asia reminds me of Southwest Airlines in the states..cattle car of the sky.

Why do you always have to bus it from the plane to the terminal w/ Air Asia at Swampy?

Did they not pay enough to get a gate w/ a jetway??

[john b good]

Its a case of you get what you pay for.

http://www.investigateudom.com/files/DCA_Summary.pdf

<<<<<<<A Summary of the Information Provided to the FAA on Thai-based Aviation

In our efforts for a proper investigation and accountability into the crash of Orient Thai’s

One-Two–Go OG269, we have received documents, photographs, and crew allegations demonstrating improper behavior of various Thai airlines and of Thailand’s civil aviation

authority, the DCA.

The evidence and allegations make it clear that prior to, during, and after the crash of OG269, the Thai DCA knew or should have known that Thai airlines were continually compromising safety. While much of the evidence suggests outright corruption and incompetence, even taken in the best possible light, DCA oversight of Thai aviation is inexcusably lax.

Information we received came from pilots and personnel working for Orient Thai Airlines, One-Two-Go Airlines, SkyStar Airways and Phuket Air. The vast majority of this information was known or could have been easily discovered by the DCA, including:

1. Airlines regularly falsify check rides. In one case, XXX informed DCA Deputy Director- General Vitichai [sometimes spelled Wittichai] of 4 fraudulent check rides taking place in December 2007. No action was taken by the DCA upon XXX’s notification. Nor was any

action taken after we made the material public. The DCA finally took some action just prior to the FAA’s recent visit. No management was every censored.

2. We have very credible testimony from pilots who learn of passing sim checks they have never taken.

3. We have very credible testimony of pilots who are not qualified for the aircraft they fly.

4. The airlines regularly require their pilots to fly in excess of the maximum legal limits

(110 hours a month in Thailand) and ICAO (100 hours a month) with full knowledge of

the DCA.

In an effort to show oversight in hindsight, the DCA recently ordered the pilots to

produce historic flight summaries for the FAA. Out of fear of being the scapegoats for

the excessive hours, some of the pilots refused to provide such paperwork.

5. The airlines regularly conduct maintenance malpractice.

A. Severe problems that have been “squawked” (made known by the pilots to

maintenance personnel) are often reported by maintenance personnel to have

cleared up or been remedied, only to reappear for the flight crew.

B. Inspections are frequently done on paper only.

C. Heavily documented cases where improper maintenance and illegal flights nearly

lead to catastrophes include:

•

At Orient Thai, a serious issue with a left engine thrust reverser on a

747 was ignored. One western-trained pilot resigned due to the airline’s

refusal to stop flying the aircraft. The thrust reverser sleeve eventually

separated from the aircraft – in mid air. The aircraft could have lost a

wing but fortunately did not.

•

Phuket Air needed to ferry an aircraft from Saudi Arabia to Jakarta for

an engine change. In order to legally fly the aircraft, the engine that

required replacement needed to be deemed serviceable. Papers were

signed and it was suddenly “serviceable”. Unfortunately, the engine

came apart during take-off, dumping engine parts including the entire

turbine for miles. The DCA had just 4 days previously audited Phuket

Air’s maintenance department. [There are publicly available pictures of

the separated turbine resting in the parking lot of a Saudi hotel.]

•

Three weeks after the first attempt to fly the Phuket Air 747, Phuket Air

violated numerous crew, maintenance and civil regulations and the

terms of their insurance why the flew the 3 engine 747 to Jakarta. Both

flight events were highly public and the sequence of events could not

reasonably have been unknown to the DCA.

6. At the time of the crash of OG269, Orient Thai had no training manuals, no safety

manual and no safety program all of which must be monitored by the DCA.

7. The airlines regularly operate in violation of the Minimum Equipment List (MEL). For

some airlines, the MEL is only a copy of the Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL).

Both are gross violations of ICAO standards and very unsafe.

8. At least one airline regularly flies overweight because of an inability of the staff to

properly track and convert weights between metric and English systems.

9. A lack of clear boundaries between the airlines and the DCA both creates opportunities

for corruption and makes it clear that the DCA is aware of Thai airline violations of safe

procedures:

A. The DCA runs a program in which a DCA agent works in the DCA office for 5 days

a week and then flies 2 days a week with their assigned airline. The airline pays

the DCA agent’s salary for the days spent at the airline. Besides conflict of

interest based on the payment and responsibilities of the DCA agent, these DCA

agents are themselves exceeding duty time by working 7 days a week.

[A few days before the FAA’s recent trip to Thailand, the DCA altered the

program to 1 flying day per week for agents.]

•

DCA agent Praphon is assigned to Orient Thai’s One-Two-Go fleet. As a

working pilot there, Agent Praphon is aware of and complicit in the

airline’s violations of ICAO and legal standards, including fraudulent and

frequently non-existent training and re-currency programs, lack of

required manuals and training program, and excessive flight and duty

hours and maintenance fraud.

1. Proof of these frauds by Orient Thai are publicly available and have

been given to the FAA.

2. Several pilots allege Agent Phraphon regularly extorts Thai First

Officers to pay for prostitutes on the Chaing Mai route.

B. DCA Deputy Director-General Vitichai and Orient Thai and One-Two-Go CEO

Udom Tantiprasongchai are “golf buddies”. Their relationship and its particulars

have led to credible allegations that the DCA overlooks Orient Thai and One-Two-

Go infractions and that DCA Deputy Director-General Vitichai protects Mr.

Tantiprasongchai’s interests. There are credible allegations of bribery, including

allegations from witnesses to such bribery.

•

In one well-known incident, a scheduled 747 flight was delayed by the

Flight Engineer because the landing pilot had overheated the brakes.

Rather than tolerate the delay, the pilot physically removed the flight

engineer’s bags from the aircraft and departed – with passengers – but

without the Flight Engineer. The incident was widely known and was

documented by the Flight Engineer. The DCA took no action.

•

DCA Deputy Director-General Vitichai admitted on camera that Orient

Thai’s One-Two-Go pilots were vastly over hours in the crash of OG269.

He further acknowledged that Orient Thai Airlines had provided crash

investigators, including the NTSB, with fraudulent flight hour

information. However, he never notified the NTSB of the fraud, even

though lead investigator Jill Andrews of the NTSB ghost wrote the crash

investigation report for the DCA.

[in February 2008, we informed Ms. Andrews of the fraud. In May, we

provided her with the true rosters. In June, Ms. Andrews completed the

crash report. The DCA has not released that report.]

•

In February 2008, long after he had the OG269 black box information

and proof of excessive flight hours, knowledge of an improper training

program and lack of a safety program at Orient Thai and One-Two-Go,

DCA Deputy Director-General Vitichai told the press, “No punishment will

be imposed on any agency or personnel after completion of the

investigation [into the crash of OG269] because the accident was

beyond control.”

[The immediate cause of the crash was flight crew error during a bad

weather landing. One pilot appears to have been incapacitated and the

other to have panicked. The root causes of the crash are shown here.]

A Category 1/Acceptable rating would require the FAA to conclude that the DCA licenses and

oversees air carriers in accordance with ICAO aviation safety standards. It seems

reasonable to expect Thailand could only achieve a Category 1/Acceptable rating after:

The DCA decertifies every airline that provided it with fraudulent information.

The DCA dismisses every manager and agent who accepted such obviously fraudulent

information.

A newly reconstituted DCA shows an ability and willingness to competently oversee Thai

civil aviation.

If the FAA does not find Thailand in compliance with the ICAO standards, then the FAA must

demote Thailand’s ranking to Category 2/Conditional or to Delisted/Unacceptable.

It is difficult to understand how the FAA itself could be performing appropriate oversight and

have provisionally concluded that the DCA performs oversight in accordance with ICAO

standards.

You still think its worth saving a few Baht ?

The report on the TG crash at Surat Thani around 8-9 years ago has not been released yet. The official statement was that "they didn't want to hurt peoples feelings" lings"

Edited September 20, 2008 by john b good

[sylviex]

Thanks for the comments.

The difference in price is not so very great as to justify a change from Thai Air. However, that makes me wonder if there's any difference from a safety point of view.