Bangkok CentralWorld Witness Describes 'Molotov Cocktails'

[Babcock]

A very good analysis of the photos

Conclusions

The photographs show that were at least three groups of people inside CTW in the hours just before the fire: (1) small numbers of protesters, who may have been looting; (2) CTW security guards, who apparently fled the mall after being fired at; and (3) unseen gunmen. Whether there was more than one group of gunmen, and whether the same gunmen shot the security guards in Photos 15-28 and the protester with the slingshot in Photo 9 (if he was indeed shot), we simply do not know based on these photographs.

The photographs also show at least three different sources of apparent gunfire: (1) unseen shooter(s) inside CTW, who fired upon security guards and possibly fired at a protester; (2) unseen shooter(s) located near the northeast corner of Siam Paragon; and (3) unseen shooter(s) on the west side of Siam Paragon, possibly connected to the camouflaged man in the ski mask photographed on the Siam BTS platform.

As discussed above, the photographer was almost certainly a security guard for CTW. This raises an important question: Have the security guards from inside the mall been questioned as to what they saw at CTW before the fire? Many faces can be clearly seen. No doubt they saw more than was photographed here. Will any journalists step up and track down these witnesses?

Col. Sansern Kaewkamnerd made a response to these photographs on behalf of CRES this past Tuesday, December 7th. (See the Matichon report.) He dismissed the photographs, saying they contain nothing new.

And while these photographs do not provide us with any ground shaking new conclusions about the CentralWorld fire, their release and the ongoing public response is striking, because it demonstrates how little information the public actually has about what happened. More than six months later we're still guessing, still bickering about who did what.

The government's dismissal of this new evidence out of hand, and their refusal to acknowledge and respond to a public clearly hungry for more information, simply demonstrates their ongoing dedication to a policy of strict opacity, and a lack of responsibility towards informing the public they are supposed to serve.

It is known that Central world allowed redshirts to use the toilets inside. All the shops were shuttered on the ground floor. The main fire was started on the 4th floor by professionals. There's a group of men shown strolling along. It is believed they were shop owners/workers

There's no sign of any looting inside now is there?.

The man sitting on the floor is a protestor. He has a slingshot and has just been shot with a shotgun. High res shots show blood seeping out from his leg and it's knocked him to the floor. The photographer was with the security guards on the 3rd floor and they were shot at and many were wounded. All injuries shown appear to be from shotgun wounds. Remember the soldiers were ordered to aim at the legs and almost all injuries are to legs.

Somebody didn't want them there. The staff congregate in a carparking level injured staff observed. Then they file out of the building in an orderly manner and then hang around outside at the back for some considerable time. They were being held there and we know by whom. The soldiers. Maybe they were told it was unsafe to leave but when they did leave they came under fire and they wre right by Wat Phathum overlooked by the skytrain where soldiers/snipers had taken positions. Thai Rath journalists went onto the rtack a week later or so and found spent cartridges and empty water bottles.

All shots were taken with the same camera/phone.

The workers are led out past soldiers lounging about. They had secured Centralworld. It's obvious. Imagine if it really was like the suicide bombers attacking the hotel in Mumbai. Would not the soldiers be seeking cover and in a state of readiness.

As to the security guards who knows. I've heard that most of the staff were on daily contracts believe it or not so they could easily be excluded, ignored but someone finally posted these photos on the internet and it's more than a year since these events.

There is so much photographic evidence out there yet to be released but people are afraid. We never heard from the fireman why they didn't attend.

On a more general note some groups of soldiers yes they had shotguns and shields. Some rubber bullets were fired but they soon switched to live rounds.

[whybother]

It is known that Central world allowed redshirts to use the toilets inside. All the shops were shuttered on the ground floor. The main fire was started on the 4th floor by professionals. There's a group of men shown strolling along. It is believed they were shop owners/workers

There's no sign of any looting inside now is there?.

The man sitting on the floor is a protestor. He has a slingshot and has just been shot with a shotgun. High res shots show blood seeping out from his leg and it's knocked him to the floor. The photographer was with the security guards on the 3rd floor and they were shot at and many were wounded. All injuries shown appear to be from shotgun wounds. Remember the soldiers were ordered to aim at the legs and almost all injuries are to legs.

Somebody didn't want them there. The staff congregate in a carparking level injured staff observed. Then they file out of the building in an orderly manner and then hang around outside at the back for some considerable time. They were being held there and we know by whom. The soldiers. Maybe they were told it was unsafe to leave but when they did leave they came under fire and they wre right by Wat Phathum overlooked by the skytrain where soldiers/snipers had taken positions. Thai Rath journalists went onto the rtack a week later or so and found spent cartridges and empty water bottles.

All shots were taken with the same camera/phone.

The workers are led out past soldiers lounging about. They had secured Centralworld. It's obvious. Imagine if it really was like the suicide bombers attacking the hotel in Mumbai. Would not the soldiers be seeking cover and in a state of readiness.

As to the security guards who knows. I've heard that most of the staff were on daily contracts believe it or not so they could easily be excluded, ignored but someone finally posted these photos on the internet and it's more than a year since these events.

There is so much photographic evidence out there yet to be released but people are afraid. We never heard from the fireman why they didn't attend.

On a more general note some groups of soldiers yes they had shotguns and shields. Some rubber bullets were fired but they soon switched to live rounds.

"There's no sign of any looting inside now is there?." - one red shirt protester died of smoke inhalation INSIDE one of the shops. There were many red shirt protesters caught with merchandise from the shops on the way home. There WAS looting of some of the shops.

"Remember the soldiers were ordered to aim at the legs and almost all injuries are to legs." - when were the soldiers ordered to aim at the legs?

"They were being held there and we know by whom. The soldiers." - where is there any evidence of that? There are no photos of soldiers and staff together.

"The workers are led out past soldiers lounging about." - Are those photos taken at the same time? Why would soldiers be lounging about, why would soldiers have riot shields and be using rubber bullets when they are in a gun fight trying to take control of the area?

The staff were at the back of the Wat and the back of Paragon, no where near the BTS.

"They had secured Centralworld. It's obvious." - It's not so obvious when you ignore all the false assumptions that you made.

[corkman]

I think you are missing the salient points of the testimony:

1. I was dark, im not sure

2. never seen the guys on trial before

3. not sure who i did see, could have been a red shirt, fake red shirt or black shirt

could they have introduced more reasonable doubt?

Only if he entered the court room with a guide dog.

5555555555!

Brilliant!!!

Breaking by butt laughing!

Thank you ...... funniest thing I've heard in ages!

(^ that is not saracasim, seriously!).

[hammered]

A very good analysis of the photos

Conclusions

The photographs show that were at least three groups of people inside CTW in the hours just before the fire: (1) small numbers of protesters, who may have been looting; (2) CTW security guards, who apparently fled the mall after being fired at; and (3) unseen gunmen. Whether there was more than one group of gunmen, and whether the same gunmen shot the security guards in Photos 15-28 and the protester with the slingshot in Photo 9 (if he was indeed shot), we simply do not know based on these photographs.

The photographs also show at least three different sources of apparent gunfire: (1) unseen shooter(s) inside CTW, who fired upon security guards and possibly fired at a protester; (2) unseen shooter(s) located near the northeast corner of Siam Paragon; and (3) unseen shooter(s) on the west side of Siam Paragon, possibly connected to the camouflaged man in the ski mask photographed on the Siam BTS platform.

As discussed above, the photographer was almost certainly a security guard for CTW. This raises an important question: Have the security guards from inside the mall been questioned as to what they saw at CTW before the fire? Many faces can be clearly seen. No doubt they saw more than was photographed here. Will any journalists step up and track down these witnesses?

Col. Sansern Kaewkamnerd made a response to these photographs on behalf of CRES this past Tuesday, December 7th. (See the Matichon report.) He dismissed the photographs, saying they contain nothing new.

And while these photographs do not provide us with any ground shaking new conclusions about the CentralWorld fire, their release and the ongoing public response is striking, because it demonstrates how little information the public actually has about what happened. More than six months later we're still guessing, still bickering about who did what.

The government's dismissal of this new evidence out of hand, and their refusal to acknowledge and respond to a public clearly hungry for more information, simply demonstrates their ongoing dedication to a policy of strict opacity, and a lack of responsibility towards informing the public they are supposed to serve.

A completely independent investigation is needed if findings are to be believed and if that is still possible. An investigation done by those viewed as bias to either side will never be accepted by the other. That however, raises another big question do either or both sides want truth coming out?

[lannarebirth]

It is known that Central world allowed redshirts to use the toilets inside. All the shops were shuttered on the ground floor. The main fire was started on the 4th floor by professionals. There's a group of men shown strolling along. It is believed they were shop owners/workers

There's no sign of any looting inside now is there?.

The man sitting on the floor is a protestor. He has a slingshot and has just been shot with a shotgun. High res shots show blood seeping out from his leg and it's knocked him to the floor. The photographer was with the security guards on the 3rd floor and they were shot at and many were wounded. All injuries shown appear to be from shotgun wounds. Remember the soldiers were ordered to aim at the legs and almost all injuries are to legs.

Somebody didn't want them there. The staff congregate in a carparking level injured staff observed. Then they file out of the building in an orderly manner and then hang around outside at the back for some considerable time. They were being held there and we know by whom. The soldiers. Maybe they were told it was unsafe to leave but when they did leave they came under fire and they wre right by Wat Phathum overlooked by the skytrain where soldiers/snipers had taken positions. Thai Rath journalists went onto the rtack a week later or so and found spent cartridges and empty water bottles.

All shots were taken with the same camera/phone.

The workers are led out past soldiers lounging about. They had secured Centralworld. It's obvious. Imagine if it really was like the suicide bombers attacking the hotel in Mumbai. Would not the soldiers be seeking cover and in a state of readiness.

As to the security guards who knows. I've heard that most of the staff were on daily contracts believe it or not so they could easily be excluded, ignored but someone finally posted these photos on the internet and it's more than a year since these events.

There is so much photographic evidence out there yet to be released but people are afraid. We never heard from the fireman why they didn't attend.

On a more general note some groups of soldiers yes they had shotguns and shields. Some rubber bullets were fired but they soon switched to live rounds.

"There's no sign of any looting inside now is there?." - one red shirt protester died of smoke inhalation INSIDE one of the shops. There were many red shirt protesters caught with merchandise from the shops on the way home. There WAS looting of some of the shops.

"Remember the soldiers were ordered to aim at the legs and almost all injuries are to legs." - when were the soldiers ordered to aim at the legs?

"They were being held there and we know by whom. The soldiers." - where is there any evidence of that? There are no photos of soldiers and staff together.

"The workers are led out past soldiers lounging about." - Are those photos taken at the same time? Why would soldiers be lounging about, why would soldiers have riot shields and be using rubber bullets when they are in a gun fight trying to take control of the area?

The staff were at the back of the Wat and the back of Paragon, no where near the BTS.

"They had secured Centralworld. It's obvious." - It's not so obvious when you ignore all the false assumptions that you made.

Wasn't it one of the Red Shirt leader's wife that was stopped carrying millions of baht of diamonds from one of the CW shops in her Mercedes?. The guy from Udon Thani as i recall. A frequent Dubai visitor. Might have been Nong Khai.

Edited July 18, 2011 by lannarebirth

[SteeleJoe]

Paragon hired a general to take care of it. I wonder if that's why it didn't get torched, no one was going to dare to go near it knowing that guy and his gang were there. Although maybe it just wasn't a target.

First time I hear a general was involved keeping Paragon safe. Mind you the family controlling Central Group seems a bit Democrats leaning, the family controlling Paragon, etc., a bit more supportive to Pheu Thai. Still as you say, may be it just wasn't a target, too far from the main stage perhaps

Uhmmm...are you unaware of who owns the land in that area? It's an entity that is commonly shortened to, in English, 3 letters.

Just sayin'

[longway]

A very good analysis of the photos

Conclusions

The photographs show that were at least three groups of people inside CTW in the hours just before the fire: (1) small numbers of protesters, who may have been looting; (2) CTW security guards, who apparently fled the mall after being fired at; and (3) unseen gunmen. Whether there was more than one group of gunmen, and whether the same gunmen shot the security guards in Photos 15-28 and the protester with the slingshot in Photo 9 (if he was indeed shot), we simply do not know based on these photographs.

The photographs also show at least three different sources of apparent gunfire: (1) unseen shooter(s) inside CTW, who fired upon security guards and possibly fired at a protester; (2) unseen shooter(s) located near the northeast corner of Siam Paragon; and (3) unseen shooter(s) on the west side of Siam Paragon, possibly connected to the camouflaged man in the ski mask photographed on the Siam BTS platform.

As discussed above, the photographer was almost certainly a security guard for CTW. This raises an important question: Have the security guards from inside the mall been questioned as to what they saw at CTW before the fire? Many faces can be clearly seen. No doubt they saw more than was photographed here. Will any journalists step up and track down these witnesses?

Col. Sansern Kaewkamnerd made a response to these photographs on behalf of CRES this past Tuesday, December 7th. (See the Matichon report.) He dismissed the photographs, saying they contain nothing new.

And while these photographs do not provide us with any ground shaking new conclusions about the CentralWorld fire, their release and the ongoing public response is striking, because it demonstrates how little information the public actually has about what happened. More than six months later we're still guessing, still bickering about who did what.

The government's dismissal of this new evidence out of hand, and their refusal to acknowledge and respond to a public clearly hungry for more information, simply demonstrates their ongoing dedication to a policy of strict opacity, and a lack of responsibility towards informing the public they are supposed to serve.

It is known that Central world allowed redshirts to use the toilets inside. All the shops were shuttered on the ground floor. The main fire was started on the 4th floor by professionals. There's a group of men shown strolling along. It is believed they were shop owners/workers

There's no sign of any looting inside now is there?.

The man sitting on the floor is a protestor. He has a slingshot and has just been shot with a shotgun. High res shots show blood seeping out from his leg and it's knocked him to the floor. The photographer was with the security guards on the 3rd floor and they were shot at and many were wounded. All injuries shown appear to be from shotgun wounds. Remember the soldiers were ordered to aim at the legs and almost all injuries are to legs.

Somebody didn't want them there. The staff congregate in a carparking level injured staff observed. Then they file out of the building in an orderly manner and then hang around outside at the back for some considerable time. They were being held there and we know by whom. The soldiers. Maybe they were told it was unsafe to leave but when they did leave they came under fire and they wre right by Wat Phathum overlooked by the skytrain where soldiers/snipers had taken positions. Thai Rath journalists went onto the rtack a week later or so and found spent cartridges and empty water bottles.

All shots were taken with the same camera/phone.

The workers are led out past soldiers lounging about. They had secured Centralworld. It's obvious. Imagine if it really was like the suicide bombers attacking the hotel in Mumbai. Would not the soldiers be seeking cover and in a state of readiness.

As to the security guards who knows. I've heard that most of the staff were on daily contracts believe it or not so they could easily be excluded, ignored but someone finally posted these photos on the internet and it's more than a year since these events.

There is so much photographic evidence out there yet to be released but people are afraid. We never heard from the fireman why they didn't attend.

On a more general note some groups of soldiers yes they had shotguns and shields. Some rubber bullets were fired but they soon switched to live rounds.

I've heard this a few times, I would certainly agree that the fire was planned before hand, but where does the idea that the fire originated on the 4th floor come from? Is this a conclusion from some sort of investigation?

[rubl]

Paragon hired a general to take care of it. I wonder if that's why it didn't get torched, no one was going to dare to go near it knowing that guy and his gang were there. Although maybe it just wasn't a target.

First time I hear a general was involved keeping Paragon safe. Mind you the family controlling Central Group seems a bit Democrats leaning, the family controlling Paragon, etc., a bit more supportive to Pheu Thai. Still as you say, may be it just wasn't a target, too far from the main stage perhaps

Uhmmm...are you unaware of who owns the land in that area? It's an entity that is commonly shortened to, in English, 3 letters.

Just sayin'

True, true, land owned by that entity, but all leased out to others to develop. So question remains, 'a general hired to keep Paragon safe' ?

Edited July 18, 2011 by rubl

[SteeleJoe]

Paragon hired a general to take care of it. I wonder if that's why it didn't get torched, no one was going to dare to go near it knowing that guy and his gang were there. Although maybe it just wasn't a target.

First time I hear a general was involved keeping Paragon safe. Mind you the family controlling Central Group seems a bit Democrats leaning, the family controlling Paragon, etc., a bit more supportive to Pheu Thai. Still as you say, may be it just wasn't a target, too far from the main stage perhaps

Uhmmm...are you unaware of who owns the land in that area? It's an entity that is commonly shortened to, in English, 3 letters.

Just sayin'

True, true, land owned by that entity, but all leased out to others to develop. So question remains, 'a general hired to keep Paragon safe' ?

I have a reply to that...but I'm not going to make it.

[sbk]

lets drop this line of discussion it has very little to do with the topic at hand.

[Babcock]

It is known that Central world allowed redshirts to use the toilets inside. All the shops were shuttered on the ground floor. The main fire was started on the 4th floor by professionals. There's a group of men shown strolling along. It is believed they were shop owners/workers

There's no sign of any looting inside now is there?.

The man sitting on the floor is a protestor. He has a slingshot and has just been shot with a shotgun. High res shots show blood seeping out from his leg and it's knocked him to the floor. The photographer was with the security guards on the 3rd floor and they were shot at and many were wounded. All injuries shown appear to be from shotgun wounds. Remember the soldiers were ordered to aim at the legs and almost all injuries are to legs.

Somebody didn't want them there. The staff congregate in a carparking level injured staff observed. Then they file out of the building in an orderly manner and then hang around outside at the back for some considerable time. They were being held there and we know by whom. The soldiers. Maybe they were told it was unsafe to leave but when they did leave they came under fire and they wre right by Wat Phathum overlooked by the skytrain where soldiers/snipers had taken positions. Thai Rath journalists went onto the rtack a week later or so and found spent cartridges and empty water bottles.

All shots were taken with the same camera/phone.

The workers are led out past soldiers lounging about. They had secured Centralworld. It's obvious. Imagine if it really was like the suicide bombers attacking the hotel in Mumbai. Would not the soldiers be seeking cover and in a state of readiness.

As to the security guards who knows. I've heard that most of the staff were on daily contracts believe it or not so they could easily be excluded, ignored but someone finally posted these photos on the internet and it's more than a year since these events.

There is so much photographic evidence out there yet to be released but people are afraid. We never heard from the fireman why they didn't attend.

On a more general note some groups of soldiers yes they had shotguns and shields. Some rubber bullets were fired but they soon switched to live rounds.

"There's no sign of any looting inside now is there?." - one red shirt protester died of smoke inhalation INSIDE one of the shops. There were many red shirt protesters caught with merchandise from the shops on the way home. There WAS looting of some of the shops.

"Remember the soldiers were ordered to aim at the legs and almost all injuries are to legs." - when were the soldiers ordered to aim at the legs?

"They were being held there and we know by whom. The soldiers." - where is there any evidence of that? There are no photos of soldiers and staff together.

"The workers are led out past soldiers lounging about." - Are those photos taken at the same time? Why would soldiers be lounging about, why would soldiers have riot shields and be using rubber bullets when they are in a gun fight trying to take control of the area?

The staff were at the back of the Wat and the back of Paragon, no where near the BTS.

"They had secured Centralworld. It's obvious." - It's not so obvious when you ignore all the false assumptions that you made.

Firstly in the photos there is no signs of looting. Yes the small shops in Siam some were looted.

We were informed by Abhisit's government some of the soldiers were armed with shotguns and orders were to aim for the legs. Where have you been? Some used rubber bullets. Noone yet has claimed that the so-called black shirts ("at least 500" we were informed by the Abhisit government) used shotguns. The injuries are from shotgunns in the pictures.

Of course all these photos were taken that day. It's just a case of arranging them in the correct order. The shaows cahge and get longer as it gets later to around 5pm when the smoke appears. The guy roasted in the inferno well his picture is from the following day. The aftermath. He was hiding in an office. his ID was displayed. He had a brother apparently. He was trapped. Noone has as yet accused him of being an arsonist nor was I aware ,but I may be wrong, that he was a redshirt.

If you look at the map on google you will see that the back of Centralworld is adjacent to Wat Phatum next door to Siam Paragon. My wife and I visited the temple to pay our respects to those who died there shot at from above despite the lies of Abhisit claiming the injuries were sustained from ground level fire.

Have you heard the story of the redshirts outside the temple on the road hiding behind and underneath the cars parked there. The soldiers shot up the cars parked there, cars later removed.

The soldiers ordered them out from under and behind the cars and told them to surrender and take off their redshirts.

They came out but then ran inside the wat infuriating the soldiers. You've heard of the the young volunteer nurse dressed in green who had just treated the UK Indepent newspapers photo-journalist from shotgun wounds to the leg who then went to treat a redshirt injured and was then shot 3 times, one bullet going through her shoulder but entering her brain.

You can look up his report.

Thai Rath (thai newspaper) exposed the evidence of the soldiers on the BTS above the temple when they visited the track and found spent cartridges and empty water bottles. I have the pics and will happily send. Enough thais realise what went on even if only through word of mouth and redshirt propoganda CDs but it's a start.

I love this country. I want to see the people living good lives. This is the 21st century but I was shocked but not entirely surprised when I just read of a redshirt rally amongst university students at a uni with 21000 students but only 14 attended.

It makes it easy to decieve the people when so few are prepared to challenge authority. Just look at the furor in UK about the News of the World. The press freedoms and the unaccountability of a free press versus here where it is truly dangerous for thai reporters to report without using abbreviations etc. Somewhere a balance has to be drawn. We should be more idealistic like the John Lennon's of this world. The capitalist system cracked showing the corrupt practices emplyed by them and yet not banker has been found guilty of anything and sent down.

Only the other day a trader in theUK was found guillty of exploiting loopholes in the CDF market making himself a million legitimately it would seem but noone is allowed to defeat the systems set up to fleece the mug punters so he had to return all his profit making. Like in the casino the bank always wins.

The general apathy, conditioning, call it what you like here is the real challenge. In a fast moving world the anachronistic state we're living in here has got to evolve. Rusting firetrucks etc. Farangs count for nothing and the mafia are all about.

[rubl]

Just searching around a bit and leafing through the internet on the CentralWorld torching I found many photo's, some clips, and many hilarious remarks on who started fires. Remember in Bangkok alone there were about 37 of them.

The most truly amazing justification I read was "whom most believe was in the vacant building under construction - think you agree with that point - and was most likely a pro-government/army/militia - and was why the reds then set fire to the lower floor of that building to smoke him out" (taken from a blog I don't think I can properly quote here).

Anyway, it seems things really started just before or just after a dozen UDD leaders said 'it's over, please go home now' and surrendered. Brilliant, mob all pumped up with shoutcasts on 'till the last drop of our blood' and then 'go home now'. K. Arisman, the 'burn it down' karaoke singer fleeing the scene. Obviously the government is to blame, 'all' say so

As for further evidence, may be ask these tourists who seem to film ZEN as the fire is still in early stages?

[lannarebirth]

It is known that Central world allowed redshirts to use the toilets inside. All the shops were shuttered on the ground floor. The main fire was started on the 4th floor by professionals. There's a group of men shown strolling along. It is believed they were shop owners/workers

There's no sign of any looting inside now is there?.

The man sitting on the floor is a protestor. He has a slingshot and has just been shot with a shotgun. High res shots show blood seeping out from his leg and it's knocked him to the floor. The photographer was with the security guards on the 3rd floor and they were shot at and many were wounded. All injuries shown appear to be from shotgun wounds. Remember the soldiers were ordered to aim at the legs and almost all injuries are to legs.

Somebody didn't want them there. The staff congregate in a carparking level injured staff observed. Then they file out of the building in an orderly manner and then hang around outside at the back for some considerable time. They were being held there and we know by whom. The soldiers. Maybe they were told it was unsafe to leave but when they did leave they came under fire and they wre right by Wat Phathum overlooked by the skytrain where soldiers/snipers had taken positions. Thai Rath journalists went onto the rtack a week later or so and found spent cartridges and empty water bottles.

All shots were taken with the same camera/phone.

The workers are led out past soldiers lounging about. They had secured Centralworld. It's obvious. Imagine if it really was like the suicide bombers attacking the hotel in Mumbai. Would not the soldiers be seeking cover and in a state of readiness.

As to the security guards who knows. I've heard that most of the staff were on daily contracts believe it or not so they could easily be excluded, ignored but someone finally posted these photos on the internet and it's more than a year since these events.

There is so much photographic evidence out there yet to be released but people are afraid. We never heard from the fireman why they didn't attend.

On a more general note some groups of soldiers yes they had shotguns and shields. Some rubber bullets were fired but they soon switched to live rounds.

"There's no sign of any looting inside now is there?." - one red shirt protester died of smoke inhalation INSIDE one of the shops. There were many red shirt protesters caught with merchandise from the shops on the way home. There WAS looting of some of the shops.

"Remember the soldiers were ordered to aim at the legs and almost all injuries are to legs." - when were the soldiers ordered to aim at the legs?

"They were being held there and we know by whom. The soldiers." - where is there any evidence of that? There are no photos of soldiers and staff together.

"The workers are led out past soldiers lounging about." - Are those photos taken at the same time? Why would soldiers be lounging about, why would soldiers have riot shields and be using rubber bullets when they are in a gun fight trying to take control of the area?

The staff were at the back of the Wat and the back of Paragon, no where near the BTS.

"They had secured Centralworld. It's obvious." - It's not so obvious when you ignore all the false assumptions that you made.

Firstly in the photos there is no signs of looting. Yes the small shops in Siam some were looted.

We were informed by Abhisit's government some of the soldiers were armed with shotguns and orders were to aim for the legs. Where have you been? Some used rubber bullets. Noone yet has claimed that the so-called black shirts ("at least 500" we were informed by the Abhisit government) used shotguns. The injuries are from shotgunns in the pictures.

Of course all these photos were taken that day. It's just a case of arranging them in the correct order. The shaows cahge and get longer as it gets later to around 5pm when the smoke appears. The guy roasted in the inferno well his picture is from the following day. The aftermath. He was hiding in an office. his ID was displayed. He had a brother apparently. He was trapped. Noone has as yet accused him of being an arsonist nor was I aware ,but I may be wrong, that he was a redshirt.

If you look at the map on google you will see that the back of Centralworld is adjacent to Wat Phatum next door to Siam Paragon. My wife and I visited the temple to pay our respects to those who died there shot at from above despite the lies of Abhisit claiming the injuries were sustained from ground level fire.

Have you heard the story of the redshirts outside the temple on the road hiding behind and underneath the cars parked there. The soldiers shot up the cars parked there, cars later removed.

The soldiers ordered them out from under and behind the cars and told them to surrender and take off their redshirts.

They came out but then ran inside the wat infuriating the soldiers. You've heard of the the young volunteer nurse dressed in green who had just treated the UK Indepent newspapers photo-journalist from shotgun wounds to the leg who then went to treat a redshirt injured and was then shot 3 times, one bullet going through her shoulder but entering her brain.

You can look up his report.

Thai Rath (thai newspaper) exposed the evidence of the soldiers on the BTS above the temple when they visited the track and found spent cartridges and empty water bottles. I have the pics and will happily send. Enough thais realise what went on even if only through word of mouth and redshirt propoganda CDs but it's a start.

I love this country. I want to see the people living good lives. This is the 21st century but I was shocked but not entirely surprised when I just read of a redshirt rally amongst university students at a uni with 21000 students but only 14 attended.

It makes it easy to decieve the people when so few are prepared to challenge authority. Just look at the furor in UK about the News of the World. The press freedoms and the unaccountability of a free press versus here where it is truly dangerous for thai reporters to report without using abbreviations etc. Somewhere a balance has to be drawn. We should be more idealistic like the John Lennon's of this world. The capitalist system cracked showing the corrupt practices emplyed by them and yet not banker has been found guilty of anything and sent down.

Only the other day a trader in theUK was found guillty of exploiting loopholes in the CDF market making himself a million legitimately it would seem but noone is allowed to defeat the systems set up to fleece the mug punters so he had to return all his profit making. Like in the casino the bank always wins.

The general apathy, conditioning, call it what you like here is the real challenge. In a fast moving world the anachronistic state we're living in here has got to evolve. Rusting firetrucks etc. Farangs count for nothing and the mafia are all about.

How many died from their shotgun wounds at Central World? When I think of shotgun injuriies I think of massive cavities or missing limbs. Not the kind of injuries I've seen displayed here, which are not so severe as some skateboard injuries I've had. Clearly whoever shot these people was either wholly incompetent or had no intention of actually hurting them.

Edited July 18, 2011 by lannarebirth

[whybother]

<snipped ... read above>

The guy who died in the CTW fire was identified as being a 20 yo from Sisaket, in casual clothing and the shop window was smashed. From the analysis in the link above suggests he was a looter. There are plenty of reports of looted shops and ATMs in central world.

The photos of soldiers lazing about and with riot shields simply do not match everything else that is going on around them. You're suggesting the army led them out, but there are no photos of staff with soldiers. You're suggesting that the army were shooting at (or around) them from the BTS, but why would the army do that if their were soldiers there with the staff? Why would the soldiers have riot shields? When the army broke down the barricades on May 19, there wasn't a riot shield in site. Why would they be in the middle of the protest site with riot shields?

Evidence of the army being inside, around, but especially in control of CTW at the time the fire started is at best circumstantial.

[SteeleJoe]

How many died from their shotgun wounds at Central World? When I think of shotgun injuriies I think of massive cavities or missing limbs. Not the kind of injuries I've seen displayed here, which are not so severe as some skateboard injuries I've had. Clearly whoever shot these people was either wholly incompetent or had no intention of actually hurting them.

It depends on a few things (chief among them range and, very significantly, type of ammo ) but it's not unusual for shotguns to inflict nonlethal wounds.

Ever heard of a "riot gun"? (That's just another type of shotgun and the reason why they are called that is probably obvious -- they can take people down without necessarily maiming or killing them).

[lannarebirth]

How many died from their shotgun wounds at Central World? When I think of shotgun injuriies I think of massive cavities or missing limbs. Not the kind of injuries I've seen displayed here, which are not so severe as some skateboard injuries I've had. Clearly whoever shot these people was either wholly incompetent or had no intention of actually hurting them.

It depends on a few things (chief among them range and, very significantly, type of ammo ) but it's not unusual for shotguns to inflict nonlethal wounds.

Ever heard of a "riot gun"? (That's just another type of shotgun and the reason why they are called that is probably obvious -- they can take people down without necessarily maiming or killing them).

I have no idea who did what at Central World, save for a lot of higher up Red Shirts got a lot of booty. Yeah, sure they might have traded for that with the Army, had the Army decided to burn down Central World (what are you a f'ing idiot), but most likely they got it because they were the perpatrators. " Liars are cheaters and cheaters are thieves ". That's the best advice my dad ever gave me and he was Oh so right.

[SteeleJoe]

How many died from their shotgun wounds at Central World? When I think of shotgun injuriies I think of massive cavities or missing limbs. Not the kind of injuries I've seen displayed here, which are not so severe as some skateboard injuries I've had. Clearly whoever shot these people was either wholly incompetent or had no intention of actually hurting them.

It depends on a few things (chief among them range and, very significantly, type of ammo ) but it's not unusual for shotguns to inflict nonlethal wounds.

Ever heard of a "riot gun"? (That's just another type of shotgun and the reason why they are called that is probably obvious -- they can take people down without necessarily maiming or killing them).

I have no idea who did what at Central World, save for a lot of higher up Red Shirts got a lot of booty. Yeah, sure they might have traded for that with the Army, had the Army decided to burn down Central World (what are you a f'ing idiot), but most likely they got it because they were the perpatrators. " Liars are cheaters and cheaters are thieves ". That's the best advice my dad ever gave me and he was Oh so right.

Don't mistake me -- I was not implying support for any theory of culpability or identity of perpetrators (and least of all am I trying in any way to deflect suspicion or deserved censure from the Red Shirts; I confess that while I would NEVER countenance them -- or anyone else --being assigned blame they don't deserve, given a choice I'd rather it be them that was in the wrong.)

Just pointing out a minor but perhaps pertinent fact, in reference your previous comment.

[Siam Simon]

How many died from their shotgun wounds at Central World? When I think of shotgun injuriies I think of massive cavities or missing limbs. Not the kind of injuries I've seen displayed here, which are not so severe as some skateboard injuries I've had. Clearly whoever shot these people was either wholly incompetent or had no intention of actually hurting them.

It depends on a few things (chief among them range and, very significantly, type of ammo ) but it's not unusual for shotguns to inflict nonlethal wounds.

Ever heard of a "riot gun"? (That's just another type of shotgun and the reason why they are called that is probably obvious -- they can take people down without necessarily maiming or killing them).

I have no idea who did what at Central World, save for a lot of higher up Red Shirts got a lot of booty. Yeah, sure they might have traded for that with the Army, had the Army decided to burn down Central World (what are you a f'ing idiot), but most likely they got it because they were the perpatrators. " Liars are cheaters and cheaters are thieves ". That's the best advice my dad ever gave me and he was Oh so right.

Don't mistake me -- I was not implying support for any theory of culpability or identity of perpetrators (and least of all am I trying in any way to deflect suspicion or deserved censure from the Red Shirts; I confess that while I would NEVER countenance them -- or anyone else --being assigned blame they don't deserve, given a choice I'd rather it be them that was in the wrong.)

Just pointing out a minor but perhaps pertinent fact, in reference your previous comment.

Be careful there, Joe. You will find, as has Hammered, that providing truths that don't fit the program will get you enemies very quickly .

[Siam Simon]

They would if they'd secured CTW.

Even (hugely big) IF they had secured CTW, there was still a lot of fighting going on. They wouldn't have been standing around leaning against walls.

And WHEN did you see any soldiers with riot shields on May 19? They went in with APC's because they were being shot at. Do you really think they would have used riot shields to protect them from bullets.

That's nearly as good as your "He must have been shot by soldiers because he got hit in the leg" argument.

It's quite clear that there was no Army vs Red Shirt fighting going on in or in the near vicinity of CTW at the time that the photos were taken during the 'torching' period of time.

It wasn't "he" who was shot in the calf in CTW, it was 'they'. "He" could've been attributed to a very lucky shot. 'they' being hit in the same place on the calf by shotgun fire from distance would kind-of indicate an expert at work, don't you think? Now, let me think....how many expert shotgun snipers are there in Thailand? And where is training available for such a unique skill? Hmmm.....let me think.....

Anyway, the conspiracy theory which I was roundly lambasted for speculating about a few months ago on this forum seems to be taking on a life of it's own in Thai society now. Maybe there's no smoke without fire? (please excuse the truly awful pun.)

[SteeleJoe]

Be careful there, Joe. You will find, as has Hammered, that providing truths that don't fit the program will get you enemies very quickly .

True or not, somehow I think I shall mange to go on living even if I have "enemies" on an inconsequential and anonymous internet forum where I kill time making pointless comments.

[whybother]

They would if they'd secured CTW.

Even (hugely big) IF they had secured CTW, there was still a lot of fighting going on. They wouldn't have been standing around leaning against walls.

And WHEN did you see any soldiers with riot shields on May 19? They went in with APC's because they were being shot at. Do you really think they would have used riot shields to protect them from bullets.

That's nearly as good as your "He must have been shot by soldiers because he got hit in the leg" argument.

It's quite clear that there was no Army vs Red Shirt fighting going on in or in the near vicinity of CTW at the time that the photos were taken during the 'torching' period of time.

It wasn't "he" who was shot in the calf in CTW, it was 'they'. "He" could've been attributed to a very lucky shot. 'they' being hit in the same place on the calf by shotgun fire from distance would kind-of indicate an expert at work, don't you think? Now, let me think....how many expert shotgun snipers are there in Thailand? And where is training available for such a unique skill? Hmmm.....let me think.....

Anyway, the conspiracy theory which I was roundly lambasted for speculating about a few months ago on this forum seems to be taking on a life of it's own in Thai society now. Maybe there's no smoke without fire? (please excuse the truly awful pun.)

"Expert shotgun snipers" Did you just make that up? Maybe you've been playing too many shoot-em-up games.

"no Army vs Red Shirt fighting" ... I know you're making that up.

OK. Explain the riot shields. That should be funny.

[rubl]

begin removed ...

Anyway, the conspiracy theory which I was roundly lambasted for speculating about a few months ago on this forum seems to be taking on a life of it's own in Thai society now. Maybe there's no smoke without fire? (please excuse the truly awful pun.)

'all' red-shirts in North and NorthEast just 'know' k. Abhisit ordered the army to kill some protesters in April 2009. Why ? Simple, doctored tape. Say something often enough, shoutcast something often enough at full-blast sound level and slowly people not only start to believe, but even stop questioning. They just know!

Just for the fun of it, read up on 'urban legends'

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Urban_legends

[longway]

Am still hoping to find out how some people know that the fire was started on one of the upper floors?

Btw in my opinion the photos do not show any kind of shocking new evidence one way or the other, nor do they prove or show that anyone had shotgun wounds.

also the pics with the soldiers and the firemen were supposed to have been taken on May 21, so their presence does not indicate anything regarding CW on May 19.

Edited July 19, 2011 by longway

[SteeleJoe]

Now, let me think....how many expert shotgun snipers are there in Thailand? And where is training available for such a unique skill? Hmmm.....let me think.....

Speaking with a bit of knowledge on the subject, allow me to guess answers for these questions.

None.

Nowhere (in Thailand).

[Babcock]

Am still hoping to find out how some people know that the fire was started on one of the upper floors?

Btw in my opinion the photos do not show any kind of shocking new evidence one way or the other, nor do they prove or show that anyone had shotgun wounds.

also the pics with the soldiers and the firemen were supposed to have been taken on May 21, so their presence does not indicate anything regarding CW on May 19.

Yes maybe the guy burnt his picture wasn't taken until the 21st not the 20th. The other photsos I re-piblished were taken on the 19th.

Here below a cut and paste of the armies conclusions entitled:

Lessons from Operation Encirclement at Ratchaprasong during 14-19 May 2010

but before I publish I highlight army instructions ergarding shooting suspects. Read on:

Tactical achievements: The tightening of the cordon in the Ratchaprasong area.

1. The tactical operation was complementary to Operation Encirclement by the CRES which capitalized on the concurrence of the military’s strategy and the government’s political will as explained above. When the political line was clearly spelled out, the instructions from commanding officers were likewise clear and could be effectively implemented by commanders of lower ranks. Thus the operational plan and tactical plan were clearly directed and successful.

2. Tactically, the operational plan was adapted from an operation to suppress civilian unrest to one to suppress armed militants or terrorists hidden among the UDD demonstrators. According to CRES intelligence, there were around 500 with snipers equipped with war weapons including M-79, M-16, Ak-47, and Tavor-21.

3. Rubber bullets fired from shotguns were replaced by live bullets. It was important, however, to see to it that firing was done in a very careful manner, respecting the Rules of Engagement, from light to harsh measures. Internationally, firing should be aimed at a point below the knees. Firing can be done when the subject is clearly armed or for self-defence. Threats to shoot can be made when demonstrators fail to obey verbal commands for them to halt.

4. The distance between the military ranks and the frontline of the demonstrators was kept within the effective range of M-16 guns, or about 400 yards. And forces operated on shifts to constantly monitor the movement of the UDD demonstrators during both day and night time.

And to follow here the whole document::

Lessons from Operation Encirclement at Ratchaprasong during 14-19 May 2010

Wed, 06/07/2011 - 12:21 | by prachatai The article was first printed in Senathipat (Vol. 59, No. 3, September-December 2010), an academic journal published by the Centre of Doctrine and Strategic Development, Army Training Command, and written by an army officer under the pen name Chief Khuang, a Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy Cadet Class 32 (Infantry Regiment). This article is said to be part of the “Guideline Document for Military Operations: A Case Study of Conflict Resolution in an Urban Area” as an attempt to redesign the Army’s role in dealing with a new form of conflict in urban areas.

000

The success of Operation Encirclement at the Ratchaprasong area has to be attributed to the achievement of a political strategy and how policy makers, including the cabinet, the Deputy Prime Minister, concerned ministries and departments and other government units, worked in a concerted effort with the Army.

Introduction

During the political standoff between the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD), aka the “Red Shirts”, and the government, the former staged demonstrations and acted beyond legal provisions from 12 March to 18 May 2010. The UDD mobilized their masses and permanently occupied Ratchaprasong intersection causing great inconvenience to people in Bangkok and affecting the government’s stability. The vast impact on the economy was simply unprecedented.

The Abhisit Vejjajiva-led government set up the Centre for the Resolution of the Emergency Situation (CRES) to address problems stemming from the UDD demonstrations. Invoking the Emergency Decree on Public Administration in Emergency Situations B.E. 2548 (2005), the Royal Thai Army (RTA) was designated to take the lead in solving the problem. Forces were mobilized in three major events including the 10 April incident at Khok Wua intersection, the maintenance of the Silom area and the dispersal of the UDD demonstrations at the War Memorial in the Don Mueang area.

As the government declared a clear policy of tightening a cordon around the demonstration site at Ratchaprasong, the CRES, on instructions from the RTA, planned to deploy forces to make possible Operation Encirclement. The Operation was divided into three stages: (1) the initial encirclement on 14 May 2010; (2) the strategic retreat to establish rapid defensive posts during 15-18 May; and (3) the final stage of encirclement from 03.00 on 19 May until the abandonment of the demonstrations by the core leaders at Ratchaprasong at 13.20 of that day.

This paper is an attempt to reflect on the achievements of Operation Encirclement at Ratchaprasong at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, as well as to provide recommendations to the government, CRES, RTA and operational units for further implementation.

Strategic achievements: the tightening of cordon at Ratchaprasong

In a speech televised via the TV Pool at 22.00 on 19 May 2010, ten hours after the success of Operation Encirclement, the Thai Prime Minister, Mr. Abhisit Vejjajiva, shared his satisfaction with the dispersal of the demonstrations: “…it was the aim of the CRES to tighten the cordon in order to put an end to the demonstrations as soon as possible. We have been keeping to international standards and thus are happy…” A few words from the PM in the midst of the crisis made military officials and the army, the last resort in enforcing the law, feel confident and believe in the value of the political strategies underpinning this Operation.

The success of the military Operation Encirclement on 19 May 2010 can be attributed to three major political determining factors.

1. The government clearly declared the use of military force to put pressure on the UDD demonstrators. Clearly, the policy of tightening the cordon was aimed at bringing the demonstrations to a halt, not to pave the way for negotiation. Therefore, with a clear political will, military operations can be implemented smoothly. In addition, the PM gave an order during a CRES meeting held on 12 May 2010 for the army to commence the operation as planned.

2. This political signal was conveyed to the public at large and had a psychological effect. The use of the phrase “tightening the cordon” instead of “suppressing the demonstration”, or “busting the mobs”, or “sealing off the area” made it easy for people to accept the operation. This made them feel that, though there might be some loss of civilian life, the casualties would not be as high as in the past.

3. The decision to terminate public utilities including water, power and phone services, to cut off other supplies and to halt incoming demonstrators at Ratchaprasong was made by CRES under the supervision of the government. Measures tightening the cordon put physical and psychological pressure on the demonstrators at Ratchaprasong. Nevertheless, these measures also had an impact on residents living in adjacent areas. And if they were put in place for too long, they might create a backlash against the government as local people would begin to oppose the government.

4. The government was firmly united with the army. Though there were some reports of discord stemming from the idea of using military force to regain the area and though lessons from 10 April 2010 might still have haunted some military leaders, the government and the army, based on a strategic assessment and in anticipation of a successful scenario, cooperated to implement the operation. The assured confidence and cooperation among all military units attested to the strong solidarity among them.

5. Timing played a significant role in the failure of the operation to reclaim the area on 14 May 2010 and as a result, military units on Rama IV road, in Bon Kai and on Ratprarop road (Din Daeng intersection) were redeployed and ordered to hold their ground. It could be said in other words that they had to retreat out of shooting range of UDD snipers or UDD guards. But as the government understood the importance of time flexibility, the cabinet passed a resolution declaring two public holiday periods in Bangkok during 17-18 May 2010 and 19-21 May 2010. This eliminated any time pressure for the military, unlike the pressure they felt during the previous operation on 10 April.

6. The information operation achieved strategic success. Public relations were carried out through the Public Relations Department (PRD) media including NBT TV and press conferences by the CRES; the CRES spokesperson was able to respond to the points raised by the UDD and answer all questions raised by the public, the demonstrators, local residents living in area adjacent to the demonstration site, and other people in the country, though the public relations were ineffective for people in the Northeast and North who were hard-core red. Communications with the international community were fairly successful as well as they were carried out through the Deputy Secretary-General of the Cabinet as the government spokesperson and the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

7. The CRES was able to capitalize on control of TV coverage which aired public statements made by military commanders elaborating their attempts to solve the problems including the Deputy Army Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, the First Army Area Commander, and generals commanding divisions, making all the troops feel confident. Also, during Operation Encirclement, the deployment of forces and chain of command was clearly laid out making the public at large feel confident of the successful outcome of the Operation.

8. Timely explanations and clarifications reiterated compliance with international standards regarding the use of arms and Rules of Engagement, as well as the use of live ammunition and snipers, in response to news coverage from inside and outside the country. Without an effort to correct the news, the concerns expressed could have caught the attention of the UN Secretary-General and ASEAN Secretary-General making the problem more complicated and the government might eventually fail to cope with pressure from abroad.

9. The complete censorship of all kinds of communication was a major strategic operation. The Ministry of Information and Communication Technology (MICT) ordered the blocking of websites, Facebook, and Twitter used by networks of the former PM, Mr. Thaksin Shinawatra, completely shutting down their communications.

10. The complementary measures to terminate public utilities and the order of the Department of Special Investigation (DSI) to freeze the financial transactions of those believed to have provided financial support to the UDD had a significant impact on financial support for the unrest.

11. The prosecution of terrorist charges against the Red Shirt demonstrators by the DSI advanced quickly and effectively. As many as 11 government agencies became involved in the investigation regarding terrorist charges showing how actively the law enforcement agencies were involved.

12. One strategic fallacy of the UDD which was taken advantage of by the government was the withdrawal of the UDD Chairperson, Mr. Vira Musikapong, and the death of Major General Khattiya Sawasdipol, aka “Seh Daeng”, a military expert in charge of the training and deployment of UDD guards. It signalled a strategic loss. The UDD was left without any leadership on political strategy and without any military expert well-versed in military tactics when they were about to be dispersed by the military.

In sum, the success of the Operation Encirclement at Ratchaprasong could be attributed to the achievement of political strategies from the policy level including the cabinet, the Deputy PM in charge of national security, ministries and departments and other concerned agencies, as well as the solidarity of the government and the army. The army were able to figure out their military strategies clearly because of the clear political will of the government. Most importantly, as Sun Tzu stated, "Supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting” and in this case, the conflicts of ideals among the UDD core leaders and the loss of a veteran military expert eventually defeated the UDD strategically.

Operational plans and responsible units in the tightening of the cordon at Ratchaprasong

The commencement of the operational plan to disperse the demonstration at Ratchaprasong was scheduled for 03.30 on 19 May 2010. The first units to be dispatched were sniper units to occupy elevated areas particularly buildings on Wireless Road (Kian Nguan Building) and around Sarasin intersection (Bangkok Cable Building). The high-rise building on Wireless Rd was seized before 05.00 am, whereas the high-rise on at Sarasin intersection had not yet then been penetrated.

Troops from the 2nd Cavalry Division were mobilized into the area in three directions along Wireless, Silom and Surawong Roads, accompanied by armoured vehicles and ranks of infantry in a familiar full-scale warfare formation for the use of army vehicles and fighting units in urban warfare.

But prior to the crushing and demolition of the barricades set up by the UDD at Saladaeng intersection by armoured vehicles, plans had been subject to revision for months in light of the lessons learned from the 10 April incident. Therefore, this operational plan was developed carefully and based on the most likely scenario. Clearly, the operation was implemented in accordance with the military and political strategies as explained above.

Stages of Operation Encirclement

Based on press conferences by the CRES and media reports, the operational plan can be divided into four stages.

1. The initial encirclement to assess the effectiveness of the use of force to reclaim the area: one day (14 May 2010)

2. Imposing defensive posts around the perimeter to prevent more people from joining the UDD demonstrators. It could be called a 180 degree change with the military staying on the defensive in three major strongholds: Bon Kai, Ratchaprarop and Sam Yan. Utmost patience was needed at this stage to calm the situation while waiting for further instructions during the next four days (15-18 May 2010).

3. The dispersal of the demonstrations was carried out after four days of waiting. During the second stage, attempts were made to gather intelligence about the UDD’s deployment and weapons in the Lumpini area, the deployment of forces behind checkpoints and UDD guards around Ratchaprasong, the location of M-79 grenade launchers, the deployment of 500 militants in different areas, etc. Once all units were ready, the Operation commenced at dawn on 19 May 2010 and it was supposed to finish by 18.00 the same day.

4. The final stage of encirclement was carried out to gather implicating evidence and identify illegal weapons and objects. It started on 20 May 2010. The reason the operation could not take place on the same day that the UDD demonstrations were dispersed was because UDD tents and shelters were pitched at various spots and from the afternoon of 19 May 2010, the Red Shirt masses started disturbances in the area of Ratchaprasong and around Bangkok.

Responsible units for Operation Encirclement

This was a joint operation of the three branches of the military: the Royal Thai Army, Royal Thai Air Force and Royal Thai Navy. The three battalions leading the Operation came from the RTA.

The 1st Cavalry Division, the King’s Guard, mobilized three major regiments including the 1st Calvary Regiment, the 11th Calvary Regiment and the 31st Calvary Regiment. The first two regiments were deployed in the area of Phya Thai and Ratchaprarop, and the 31st Calvary Regiment, a rapid deployment unit, stood by for special operations. The 2nd Calvary Division was designated to take charge of the area around Wireless Rd., Bon Kai, Sala Daeng, Lumpini and Sam Yan. And the 9th Infantry Division was to take charge of the Asok, Ploenchit and Chidlom area.

The operational reserve included troops from the 2nd Infantry Division and the Ground Security Force Corps of the Royal Thai Air Force which stood by and were ready to operate within 24 hours. In addition, air force units were put in place to conduct aerial patrols over the Ratchaprasong area, while Royal Thai Navy forces were deployed to provide special protection in important locations, including around Sirirat Hospital.

During the operation, all military units could be identified by colour codes attached to their right shoulders and right arms. The colour codes were changed every day. But during full-scale operations on 19 May 2010, all tactical units used only pink and had ribbons attached to their helmets.

Operational achievements: The tightening of the cordon in the Ratchaprasong area

1. The operational plan was solidly laid out and echoed successful military strategies and the government’s political will.

2. The operation was planned carefully and prudently and the timeframe was flexible helping to obviate time pressure.

3. Information operations effectively boosted the moral support of operational units and at same time demoralized the unknown militant forces.

4. Successful intelligence gathering in the area occupied by the UDD demonstrators was effectively used making it feasible to deploy snipers from all concerned units correctly on high-rise buildings along Wireless Road and Sarasin Road.

5. The successful assault: though the operational plan did not consider a timing advantage, rapid deployment security forces occupied high-rise buildings and most of Lumpini Park before dawn and the intrusion from three directions.

6. The operational plan was advanced carefully in each area as it was estimated that the potential of the UDD guards would be much higher than during the 10 April operation. The troops thus needed better protection. As a result, during the operation utilizing around 20,000 personnel, only one died and a few were injured. This loss was acceptable.

7. The UDD guards prepared a defensive operation as in guerrilla warfare. Though their forces were spread throughout the area, a lack of expertise in the placement of units in defence and delaying actions stemming from the loss of Major General Khattiya Sawasdipol, caused instability in the UDD and was capitalized on by the military.

8. Similar to full-scale urban warfare, three major military divisions were mobilized, creating a military force much more powerful than the UDD. The instructions to use live ammunition against the armed militants for self-defence emboldened troops demoralized by the 10 April incident.

9. During the implementation of the unilateral offensive operational plan, troops were mobilized from Sathorn, Silom, Surawong and Wireless Roads making it possible for the military to keep their operational momentum and to keep the area behind Lumpini Park (Silom area) safe.

10. The Operation was launched in concurrence with instructions sent from the First Army Area Commander to the three Divisions during both the offensive and delaying actions waiting for other units to complete their missions. For example, when the decisive offensive units including troops from the 2nd Calvary Division were manoeuvred from Silom toward Saladaeng intersection, other operational units including the 9th Infantry Division in charge of Asok, Ploenchit, and Chidlom and the 1st Cavalry Division, the King’s Guard, in charge of Din Daeng, Phya Thai and Ratchaprarop were instructed to stand by and block any escape route. Meanwhile, they had to make a way for the UDD demonstrators to gradually empty the Ratchaprasong area via Rama I Road toward Pathumwan intersection or to take refuge in Wat Pathumwanaram.

Tactical achievements: The tightening of the cordon in the Ratchaprasong area

Operation Encirclement on 19 May 2010 was a full-scale military operation and its clear mission was to tighten the cordon by using live ammunition and mobilizing forces from the infantry, cavalry and air services such as the 31st Calvary Regiment, a special forces unit. It could be said to be a full-scale urban warfare operation in which the troops were fully equipped with sophisticated weapons plus sniper units, armoured vehicle units, etc. Significant tactical modifications resulted from lessons learned during the incident on 10 April 2011.

The Operation took place over nine hours (sic) (from 03.30-13.30) and should be treated as a very important and historic precedent of an urban warfare operation with the following details.

1. The tactical operation was complementary to Operation Encirclement by the CRES which capitalized on the concurrence of the military’s strategy and the government’s political will as explained above. When the political line was clearly spelled out, the instructions from commanding officers were likewise clear and could be effectively implemented by commanders of lower ranks. Thus the operational plan and tactical plan were clearly directed and successful.

2. Tactically, the operational plan was adapted from an operation to suppress civilian unrest to one to suppress armed militants or terrorists hidden among the UDD demonstrators. According to CRES intelligence, there were around 500 with snipers equipped with war weapons including M-79, M-16, Ak-47, and Tavor-21.

3. Rubber bullets fired from shotguns were replaced by live bullets. It was important, however, to see to it that firing was done in a very careful manner, respecting the Rules of Engagement, from light to harsh measures. Internationally, firing should be aimed at a point below the knees. Firing can be done when the subject is clearly armed or for self-defence. Threats to shoot can be made when demonstrators fail to obey verbal commands for them to halt.

4. The distance between the military ranks and the frontline of the demonstrators was kept within the effective range of M-16 guns, or about 400 yards. And forces operated on shifts to constantly monitor the movement of the UDD demonstrators during both day and night time.

5. Unlike conventional formations deployed to control demonstrators in a normal unrest suppression operation, in this Operation, where forces were inside buildings, forces were redeployed and movement adjusted to prevent ambushes from behind the demonstrators.

6. Posts were urgently adapted to accommodate the rapid advance and retreat of troops. Bunkers made of sandbags at knee-height were put up for soldiers having to operate lying down, or at head-height when they were in a standing position. Instead of holding a single offensive line, multiple-line formations on the path toward the demonstrators were practised to prevent situations in which demonstrators outnumbered troops and the possibility that troops would be surrounded and robbed of their guns.

7. The commanding officers of smaller units had to be very patient, calm, and impervious to any incitement or distraction including smoke from burning tires day and night.

8. Snipers were deployed to give protection when troops were mobilized forward and to hold the ground for days and nights. Snipers were also used to protect high ranking commanding officers.

9. Forces should be spread out, the more the better, to avoid becoming a high value target of M-79 grenades fired by the insurgents.

10. An outpost system was developed and forces were deployed on flyovers hidden behind a black curtain and protected with bunkers and sandbags. This helped deter UDD guard patrols, enhanced protection and prevented the media from taking pictures.

11. The RTA’s existing sharp-shooter forces and snipers were all mobilized, both on high-rise buildings and elevated areas, to retaliate against UDD ambushes.

12. Hazardous zones including Live Fire Zones within the effective range between the UDD’s holding ground and the military forces were declared as a military tactic.

13. A declared “no-fly zone” was part of the operational plan as tactical support to ensure that any aerial operation around the Ratchaprasong area was under our control and to our advantage.

14. The tactic of retreating from ground held and moving to safer areas was used to keep the military forces out of the range of UDD snipers. The retreat occurred on 14 May 2010 and should be commended as a clever tactic not to deliberately enter the killing zone.

15. Redeployment of more widely spread forces after dark was considered an appropriate tactic to avoid falling into the trap of becoming a high value target.

16. The use of armoured vehicle units was intended only for achieving a decisive victory. As a result, there was no movement of armoured vehicles prior to 19 May 2010.

17. The use of armoured vehicles and mobile units was a tactic adapted to demoralize the UDD guards and resulted from the loss of forces from M-79 or RPG grenades or claymore mines along the UDD defensive lines.

18. The perfect combination of forces including snipers, armoured vehicle units, troops following armoured vehicles, the fire brigade, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams, etc, was intriguingly successful.

19. Time flexibility given to tactical operations, i.e. by launching the operation at dawn, allowed tactical units more time to advance into and clear the area. Fighting waged in the dark is compromised by limited visibility and the troops could fall prey to hidden terrorists. Most importantly, it helped prevent friendly fire or firing at innocent people.

20. The use of a psychological operations unit to create understanding prior to the raid to disperse the demonstration was an act in compliance with international principles.

21. Troops were deployed well in advance since 14 May 2010 to prevent reinforcement of the demonstrators in the Ratchaprasong area, and prior to the use of force to disperse the demonstration.

22. Redeployment of forces in the Ratchaprasong area after the attack with M-79 grenades in the evening on Sarasin Road and the withdrawal of forces to safe areas on Silom Road was a correct tactical decision made to avoid unnecessary losses.

23. Drills had been conducted prior to the actual operations at each unit location and at the 11th Infantry Regiment to ensure successful operations and to minimize any risk.

Strategic, tactical and operational recommendations

Major strategic recommendations

1. The government should put in place a pre-emptive strategy including promulgation of the Public Demonstration Act to prevent the number of demonstrators from accumulating and a demonstration from lasting too long, until it reaches the point where law enforcement is impossible. Decisive legal provisions should be available to deal with core leaders who could instigate a situation and incite uncontrollable violence to a point which may make military operations an inevitable option and usually results in losses. Apart from the loss of invaluable lives, it will be a long-lasting wound in society.

2. A clear policy should be spelled out by the government, as in the case of Operation Encirclement. This makes it easy for the military to translate the policy into military strategy and lay out tactical plans which shall be the last resort to enforce the law.

3. Prior to the cut-off of public utilities, the government should assess the impact to be borne by people living in areas adjacent to the Ratchaprasong demonstration site and prepare measures to provide immediate relief such as by evacuating people from conflict zones to safe areas.

4. The government should make an attempt to work in concert with the military to give the public confidence and the belief that all actions ordered by the government are consistent with actual operations.

5. The government should encourage the CRES to review all lessons learned from the operation including the management structure, support, legal provisions, national image in the international community, and the political, economic, social and military impacts.

6. The CRES should evaluate Operation Information and explore its strengths and weaknesses. While the Operation was carried out, news from all media should be monitored to assess the situation and in light of the lessons learned, the government should learn how to properly implement an information operation as part of the government mission.

7. The military should make an attempt to explore how each public appearance by high ranking commanders during the operation of CRES affected public confidence and acceptance.

8. Lessons from this operation should be synthesized and made into a case study to be used in military schools including as part of the curriculum on anti-terrorism and unrest, and the curriculum on the prevention and suppression of urban civilian unrest, urban warfare operations, unrest suppression, etc.

9. Lessons from the operation should be explored in light of both domestic and international law, particularly, cooperation with the DSI to investigate terrorist actions, lèse majesté cases, and cases regarding the freezing of financial transactions among companies, groups of individuals and individuals.

10. The government should provide financial support to the military for the procurement of additional troops, weapons, vehicles and special equipment needed for the suppression of civilian unrest and anti-terrorism missions and the identification of terrorists among innocent demonstrators.

11. The government should set out a policy and action plan to prepare for a scenario in which even though core leaders call off a demonstration, demonstrators do not heed the order and instead became enraged and upset and torch property and create unrest in Bangkok and the provinces.

12. The military should decisively penalize any rogue military officer who becomes too involved with politics and tries to lead any political movement, since such an act will taint the public image of the military.

Major tactical recommendations

1. The RTA should set out an operational plan for dispersing demonstrations, reclaiming an area and tightening a cordon, making it sufficiently flexible and practical within the scope of law and strictly following the Rules of Engagement.

2. Through the CRES, the RTA should set out a plan for suppressing civilian unrest to deal situations in which demonstrators are left with no core leaders and become enraged and angry and set fire to various places causing serious disturbances in Bangkok and the provinces.

3. Through the CRES, the RTA should review lessons learned from the operation making it a model on which the other operational plans and principles could be developed and applied when public unrest starts, or during large peaceful demonstrations which do not infringe on the law and illegal demonstrations. The RTA is supposed to follow the Emergency Decree and to act in compliance with each of the instructions made by the government.

4. Through the CRES, the RTA should make better efforts to explore further safe areas or safe pathways to ensure that demonstrators are guided to safe areas through safe pathways.

5. Through the CRES, the RTA should consider recruiting troops from Divisions which have experience handling urban operations.

6. Through the CRES, the RTA should monitor and investigate the behaviour of rogue military officials involved in partisan politics and should consider serious penalties to prevent further examples. These officials may pass on information regarding pre-emptive and suppression tactics used for dispersing urban unrest among political groups’ members, allowing terrorism to continue unabated.

7. Through the CRES, the RTA should reconsider its existing offensive plans and steps taken. Covert and deception tactics should be used on occasion, particularly when having to deal with the resistance from urban guerrilla warfare factions.

8. Through the CRES, the RTA should consider time flexibility as a lesson for devising future operations. The threats posed by the hidden terrorists among the demonstrators can form serious resistance and a very difficult obstacle in the battlefield. Flexibility should be considered when devising operational plans and other frameworks in highly volatile situations. Commanding officers should give themselves more time before making any decisions; the sole pursuit of success may bring a mission to collapse.

9. Through the CRES, the RTA should support the role of the 2nd Cavalry Division in handling urban warfare decisively to ensure that in future, troops can penetrate the defensive ground of hostile groups, since it is likely that they will build up much stronger barricades in future.

10. Through the CRES, the RTA should review lessons learned from implementing Operation Encirclement and develop an annual training curriculum to enhance missions to prevent and suppress insurgency. A drill can be conducted based on the curriculum in areas which are likely to be permanent demonstration sites around Bangkok.

11. Through the CRES, the RTA should launch a public relations scheme in the neighbourhoods of Bon Kai, Rama IV and the Din Daeng triangle around Din Daeng and the Victory Monument to help local people understand the rationale of the military operations.

12. Through the CRES, the RTA should recruit a substitute for the current CRES spokesperson and to prepare to recruit an ISOC (Internal Security Operations Command) spokesperson.

Major tactical recommendations

1. Commanding officers at the unit level should demonstrate a high level of discipline and patience and should be ready to allow more time for operations. Preparations should be made at least seven days in advance so that subordinate officers can prepare themselves for protracted operations (three days is too short), i.e. when facing fierce resistance from the Bon Kai community.

2. Commanding officers at the unit level should be confident and believe in the rationale that their tactical missions synchronize with overall operational plans and the strategic plans of both the CRES and the government.

3. Commanding officers at the unit level should maintain confidentiality prior to and after their operations to prevent leaks of legal evidence to hostile factions or to prevent the opposition from releasing the information among the media.

4. Commanding officers at the tactical level should give priority to saving the lives of innocent people, take care when firing live ammunition and intentionally avoid inciting hatred or anger among troops or prevent them from taking revenge.

5. Armed subordinates should carry and use their arms in the safest manner. They should always remember that a bullet fired could cause the government to collapse.

6. Tactics should be implemented carefully and prudently. Serious attention should be given to segregating hidden terrorists from innocent demonstrators, particularly children, women and older persons.

7. In terms of work with the media, off-limits areas and hazardous zones should be clearly identified and the military should consider designating a unit to shoot both still and motion pictures during operations so that the footage can be used as evidence to justify military operations.

8. Multipurpose operational units for urban missions should be deployed comprising a unit of armoured vehicles, infantry, snipers, an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team, a fire brigade unit, photo-taking unit and anti-riot team. They should be prepared to rotate duties and change gear in accordance with three major missions: (1) urban warfare; (2) anti-riot and (3) defensive.

9. A major obstacle to tightening the cordon was UDD snipers. Tactically, it is of urgent importance that more snipers be trained to serve Divisions under the RTA to prepare for future missions in Bangkok and the provinces.

10. Lessons from the operations on 10 April at Khok Wua intersection, the War Memorial operation, the ambush of Seh Daeng on 13 May 2010, and Operation Encirclement should be compiled as a manual or guidelines for tactical operations of the RTA.

11. Rapid formation of defensive bunkers should be enhanced to serve in a timely manner the needs for tactical units to change operations from crowd dispersal or riot suppression to holding defensive ground along footpaths.

12. Models from elsewhere should be explored to determine the appropriateness of declaring live fire zones, since until now no such tactic has been known to be adopted by any country for demonstration dispersal.

13. More studies should be conducted to explore the technique of deploying snipers for the prevention and suppression of urban unrest in three major locations: (1) in flat areas; (2) on flyovers, and (3) in high-rise buildings.

14. When dark, troops should consider pulling out regardless of whether their missions are yet successful or not. This helps prevent ambushes by remaining snipers and avoids unnecessary losses.

15. Models of employing armoured vehicles to tighten the cordon should be further explored to make it comply with common standards.

16. During the operation to search and clear the area, operating officers should wear gloves to avoid tampering with latent fingerprints on any potential evidence. Pictures should be taken of the scene prior to the search for forensic purposes.

Conclusions

Operation Encirclement at Ratchaprasong has been mostly viewed as a successful mission, strategically, tactically and operationally. The government, CRES, RTA and operating units in a few minutes were able to help make the Thai people feel relieved. Nevertheless, immediately after the demonstration was called off by the core leaders, which helped to lessen the intensity of the situation, other disturbances erupted in an organized effort to torch the city as a result of the anger and disappointment of the Red Shirt protesters. Fires were started all over the land, in Bangkok and the provinces. Torching the city is another episode of the riot which has not been written about, but has already caused much havoc to the country and prompted a major daily to use “The Devastation of the Nation” as a headline the following morning on 20 May 2010.

Translated by Pipob Udomittipong

So Why Bother,

You have here some clear evidence of the armies deliberate attempt to minimise casualties by aiming at the legs.

The army was informed that there were 500 armed terrorists and that live fire was required.

Who supplied this information to the army and is it factually true. I see no army injuries so I believe this is information all to be false and the responsibility lies with the Abhisit Democrat government. We know 93 died and under 2000 were injured, some very seriously but only 4 or 5 soldiers killed . From 500 armed terrorists? Give me a break.

We know there were up to 70000 soldiers deployed and it is stated above that by 6pm central Bangkok was contained and controlled by the thai army.

The staff leaving Central World were leaving around 5-530 pm through analysis of shadows etc.

The army was in full control.

You got to believe otherwise that determined terrorists entered Central world under the noses of the army who controlled the perimeter. They shot those they confronted but in the legs and went on to burn down the building. Meanwhile the staff congregated on one floor, a parking level and eventually left from my photos under the watchfull eyes of soldiers just stood around or they self organised and left ignoring soldiers standing by.

Have it your own way then and a year and more has passed and none are the wiser. But a new government is coming in.

This is my take:

The stark reality is that in the baking heat Abhisit thought the protests wouldn't last too long. His government like many previous chose to ignore them. The demonstrations were legal and then something happened.

Didn't it!

Around town grenades went off. There were no injuries, no witnesses, no CCTV, no damage except in one case against the commerce minister's father's spa gulag for impressionable young ladies. A real carbomb misfired injuring a security guard etc.

That Porntiva issue could have been a political redshirt attack over the exploitation of issan women etc or just some mafia business! Who knows but it stood out from the rest.

This was the excuse for the Abhisit regime to impose Thaksin's law , the internal security law suspending hah habeus corpus in selected areas. A demonstration of and I saw 150000 people declared illegal and the military planning that then evolved.

The redshirts having been ignored situated as they were in the old city around the democracy monument (what's that all about I hear you say?) then removed to Siam, shopping centres to the elite and the farangs.

A major confrontation was inevitable, Dialogue was futile as both sides were implacably opposed although the honourable Dem mayor and some independant senators attempted to broker some sort of compromise/saving of face.

Certain charcters have left these boards. Mr Bucholz perhaps? Paychecks stopped coming in?

I once knew a Mr Bucholz who owned 26 nightclubs in London including Annabels and he was no fool.

[whybother]

Yes maybe the guy burnt his picture wasn't taken until the 21st not the 20th. The other photsos I re-piblished were taken on the 19th.

Here below a cut and paste of the armies conclusions entitled:

Lessons from Operation Encirclement at Ratchaprasong during 14-19 May 2010

but before I publish I highlight army instructions ergarding shooting suspects. Read on:

Tactical achievements: The tightening of the cordon in the Ratchaprasong area.

1. The tactical operation was complementary to Operation Encirclement by the CRES which capitalized on the concurrence of the military's strategy and the government's political will as explained above. When the political line was clearly spelled out, the instructions from commanding officers were likewise clear and could be effectively implemented by commanders of lower ranks. Thus the operational plan and tactical plan were clearly directed and successful.

2. Tactically, the operational plan was adapted from an operation to suppress civilian unrest to one to suppress armed militants or terrorists hidden among the UDD demonstrators. According to CRES intelligence, there were around 500 with snipers equipped with war weapons including M-79, M-16, Ak-47, and Tavor-21.

3. Rubber bullets fired from shotguns were replaced by live bullets. It was important, however, to see to it that firing was done in a very careful manner, respecting the Rules of Engagement, from light to harsh measures. Internationally, firing should be aimed at a point below the knees. Firing can be done when the subject is clearly armed or for self-defence. Threats to shoot can be made when demonstrators fail to obey verbal commands for them to halt.

4. The distance between the military ranks and the frontline of the demonstrators was kept within the effective range of M-16 guns, or about 400 yards. And forces operated on shifts to constantly monitor the movement of the UDD demonstrators during both day and night time.

And to follow here the whole document::

<snipped document and provided link - http://www.prachatai3.info/english/node/2642 >

So Why Bother,

You have here some clear evidence of the armies deliberate attempt to minimise casualties by aiming at the legs.

The army was informed that there were 500 armed terrorists and that live fire was required.

Who supplied this information to the army and is it factually true. I see no army injuries so I believe this is information all to be false and the responsibility lies with the Abhisit Democrat government. We know 93 died and under 2000 were injured, some very seriously but only 4 or 5 soldiers killed . From 500 armed terrorists? Give me a break.

We know there were up to 70000 soldiers deployed and it is stated above that by 6pm central Bangkok was contained and controlled by the thai army.

The staff leaving Central World were leaving around 5-530 pm through analysis of shadows etc.

The army was in full control.

You got to believe otherwise that determined terrorists entered Central world under the noses of the army who controlled the perimeter. They shot those they confronted but in the legs and went on to burn down the building. Meanwhile the staff congregated on one floor, a parking level and eventually left from my photos under the watchfull eyes of soldiers just stood around or they self organised and left ignoring soldiers standing by.

Have it your own way then and a year and more has passed and none are the wiser. But a new government is coming in.

This is my take:

The stark reality is that in the baking heat Abhisit thought the protests wouldn't last too long. His government like many previous chose to ignore them. The demonstrations were legal and then something happened.

Didn't it!

Around town grenades went off. There were no injuries, no witnesses, no CCTV, no damage except in one case against the commerce minister's father's spa gulag for impressionable young ladies. A real carbomb misfired injuring a security guard etc.

That Porntiva issue could have been a political redshirt attack over the exploitation of issan women etc or just some mafia business! Who knows but it stood out from the rest.

This was the excuse for the Abhisit regime to impose Thaksin's law , the internal security law suspending hah habeus corpus in selected areas. A demonstration of and I saw 150000 people declared illegal and the military planning that then evolved.

The redshirts having been ignored situated as they were in the old city around the democracy monument (what's that all about I hear you say?) then removed to Siam, shopping centres to the elite and the farangs.

A major confrontation was inevitable, Dialogue was futile as both sides were implacably opposed although the honourable Dem mayor and some independant senators attempted to broker some sort of compromise/saving of face.

How do you know the all the photos were taken on the 19th? Why would the army be lounging around and why would they have riot gear?

There were actually 20 soldiers killed and 400 injured. There was also BBC footage of red/black shirts with rifles returning fire on May 19th. There certainly weren't 70,000 soldiers storming Ratchaprasong.

The analysis of the photos indicate that the fire was raging by 5pm so had probably started at least an hour before that. The first photos were taken at about 2:30pm. Did the army have full control then? According to the photo analysis, the photos of the staff standing around watching the fire were taken before there were gunshots heard, so the army didn't have full control when the fire was raging.

The army were given clear instructions to avoid casualties with "Firing can be done when the subject is clearly armed or for self-defence. Threats to shoot can be made when demonstrators fail to obey verbal commands for them to halt." Obviously, the red shirts in CTW were not armed, there was no requirement for self defence, and there was obviously no verbal commands for them to halt. Why would the army shoot someone and then not detain them? They were detaining people all through the protest area.

The protests were legal, and then the red shirts started camping in Ratchaprasong. That's when they were declared illegal and when the state of emergency was called.

You're using so many half truths, it's no wonder you've convinced yourself that it wasn't the red shirts.

[rubl]

just one paragraph, look at original for full text

We know there were up to 70000 soldiers deployed and it is stated above that by 6pm central Bangkok was contained and controlled by the thai army.

This reminds me that a month or two ago a poster wrote '70,000 soldiers in Siam to crush the protesters' or something similar. Must have been very cozy packed like that. A bit difficult to run around, lift your rifle, etc., etc. It seems the 2nd Cavalry Division was deployed which is a wee bit smaller than that 70,000. So if not a lie indeed mis-information.

I don't bother with the other parts, other things to do

[dickyknee]

when it comes to reading between the lines, i hate it when there are just so many of them.