OPINION:

After a year of crisis, it may be the end of Thailand (as we know it)

AFTER more than a year of prolonged political crisis and confrontation that was capped by the military coup of September 19, 2006, Thailand's murky political environment appears headed towards even greater uncertainty and instability.

The coup restored the holy trinity of the military, the bureaucracy and the monarchy to the apex of Thailand's socio-political hierarchy, and put down, for the time being at least, the upstart new order represented by deposed Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his crew. However, the putsch did not put away Thaksin politically thanks to the litany of corruption accusations and alleged abuses of power that hounded his five-year rule.

By New Year's Eve, when multiple and coordinated bomb blasts convulsed central Bangkok, it became clear that what had transpired since 19 September amounted to a coup gone awry. Insinuating that remnants of Thaksin's ousted regime were culpable for the lethal bomb attacks, the military junta, the self-styled Council for National Security (CNS), appeared inept and dysfunctional as it sought to maintain security in the capital.

Separately, the interim govern is reeling from a series of setbacks ranging from the failed liberalisation of the underground lottery, slow progress in prosecuting the Shinawatra family's shady land purchases and tax evasion accusations, to policy flip-flops on capital controls. The government of caretaker Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont, an erstwhile Privy Councillor and former army commander-in-chief, consequently became more reliant on the CNS, as security priorities surged to the forefront of its policy agenda against the backdrop of its apparent technocratic incompetence.

As both the CNS and the Surayud government have lost their way in the aftermath of the coup, what is likely to take place from here onwards is the continuation of a titanic struggle between the forces of the establishment and those of Thaksin. At stake will be no less than Thailand's very heart and soul. Three concurrent trends portend why and how this grand battle will run its course.

First, Thaksin still represents a potent and unrivalled political phenomenon previously unseen in Thailand. He commands deep pockets, thanks to a telecommunications and media empire built on state concessions and government connections. The sale of his family's flagship company, Shin Corp, to Temasek Holdings early last year netted Thaksin a 73.3 billion baht windfall. Moreover, Thaksin is a unique, consummate personality, who can count on a vast network of contacts, informants, sympathisers, and loyalists in many echelons of the police, the military, the bureaucracy, the private sector, not to mention the rural masses and urban poor who voted his Thai Rak Thai party into office in January 2001 with two successful re-elections in February 2005 and April 2006, the latter result subsequently nullified. Most important, Thaksin believes in the righteousness of his cause. Although his opponents have justifiably deplored him for corruption and abuses of power, he sees his pro-poor populist platform as innovative ideas to remake Thailand into a more egalitarian society uprooting its neo-feudal underpinnings.

Thaksin's background and experience reveal a man on a mission, a fighter who has spectacularly monopolised the Thai telecoms industry and Thai politics. His nature is not to accept defeat unless it is forced on him. Thus the Thaksin phenomenon, his denials in media outlets such as CNN notwithstanding, is unstoppable because of the sheer force of his resources, conviction, and personality.

Second, the CNS generals have unwittingly facilitated Thaksin's political longevity. After failing to take Thaksin to task aggressively in the fortnight after the coup, the CNS set up a lacklustre cabinet full of elderly and mostly retired hands from the bureaucracy, and followed up with an appointment of a national assembly with substantial military representation.

The ruling generals also failed to press their coup justifications, namely, Thaksin's corruption, constitutional usurpation, societal polarisation and disrespect directed, by the nature of Thaksin's rule, to the king. Their post-coup management had been so dismal that the New Year's Eve bomb blasts led to rumours of another coup to tighten the military's grip and get rid of Thaksin's agent provocateurs and other agitators for good.

Indeed, if its security management slips further and Thaksin continues to gain ground on the generals, a harsher, incumbency coup may be in the offing. It would be a coup staged in the same direction with similar objectives, but with a new leadership and tougher methods and means. Another coup in 2007 would almost certainly delay the already contentious and problematic constitution-drafting and election timetables, and could become a source of street protests, with enabling conditions for Thaksin to make his political comeback.

Thirdly, the September 19 coup is unlike previous putsches in contemporary Thailand for its critical timing. Its tumultuous aftermath is panning out as Thais enter the twilight of their monarch's glorious 60-year-old reign in a 21st century kingdom that is characterised by unresolved polarisation and ongoing tussle for the country's future after the royal succession. Thailand as it is known today has modernised from a village backwater to a middle-income nation with a gleaming metropolitan capital, weighed down by social and income disparities between the rich and middle classes on the one hand, and the poor on the other, or as Thaksin's reign highlighted, between Bangkok and the countryside.

Unless the establishment makes greater efforts to bridge this yawning gap, Thaksin may well get another turn. Whichever side comes out on top in this grand struggle, Thailand as we know it is coming to an end.

A new Thailand will emerge in an arduous and contested process during which its denizens and foreign friends from near and far should lend their support for as smooth a transition as possible

-- Thitinan Pongsudhirak 2007-01-21

Thitinan Pongsudhirak is Director of the Institute of Security and International Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok.

thailand is still semi-feudal, agricultural country with a military and police as a ruling elite, monopolised mass-media, state controlled mass education and luck of political understanding in the working classes.

there is not a chance for a real change within the near future as there is no any organised political alternative to the present system - everything will be only changes within the ruling class, and thaksin is very much a part of the polical set up

Londonthai--I think your right on.

Democracy, however, is a process. It takes a lot of time for the institutions to develop and it takes patience.

Thai democracy at stake

Just days after being criticized for abstaining on a draft resolution against Mynamar's military junta at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Indonesia reminded the military rulers in Thailand to stick to their commitment to return that country to democracy.

Foreign Minister Hassan Wirayuda on Wednesday urged the Thai junta to hold general elections by Sept. 19, the one-year anniversary of the day it toppled Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. The minister's remark implied a 'friendly' warning to neighboring countries that it could not stand alone in defending the regional ASEAN grouping on the international stage.

While Indonesia had actually agreed that Myanmar's junta should move toward democracy, it had to speak in one voice with other ASEAN members.

It is probably only a coincidence, but it is interesting to note that the minister's comment came just few days after a group of activists, politicians, former state officials and generals demanded that President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono resign.

"They (the Thai junta) promised to hold an election within one year after the coup, so we hope they keep their promise," Hassan said Wednesday.

Citing accusations of corruption and other ills, Thai Military leader Gen. Sonthi Boonyaratglin staged the bloodless coup with the full blessing of the country's most respected leader, King Bhumibol Adulyadez.

The King's endorsement as well as public support for the coup helped tone down international criticism. Washington reportedly expressed its "understanding".

Thailand's neighbors kept silent, including Indonesia and the Philippines, who along with pre-coup Thailand were perceived as the most democratic countries in the region. Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, whose government has itself been the subject of coup rumors, distanced herself from the situation. ASEAN stuck to its obsolete "non-interference" principles.

The Myanmar military government is among the happiest in the world with the Thai coup, because a former preacher of democracy to Mynamar has had to eat its words.

The situations in Thailand and Myanmar are completely different. But any military junta is against the fundamental values of democracy, because it contradicts the credo that vox populi vox dei (the people's voice is God's voice).

Thus, we fully support the government's position in reminding the Thai military junta not to delay general elections.

The prolonged military emergency in the country -- no matter how strong the junta's reasons for retaining its political grip -not only violates the sovereignty of the Thai people but endangers the values of ASEAN.

Thailand is a key ASEAN member and a model of development in the region. It has grown its economy at an impressive pace since the economic crisis.

Some in the Thai government perhaps felt irritated by Hassan's statement, believing it was a "violation of sovereignty". It is much more productive to get such a comment from a close neighbor, however, before it becomes an international issue.

We believe the Thai military leaders will set up a road map for a fair and democratic election before September. Times have changed. The international community is much less willing to accept any kind of military coup.

Source: Jakarta Post Editorial - 22 January 2007

Thirdly, the September 19 coup is unlike previous putsches in contemporary Thailand for its critical timing. Its tumultuous aftermath is panning out as Thais enter the twilight of their monarch's glorious 60-year-old reign in a 21st century kingdom that is characterised by unresolved polarisation and ongoing tussle for the country's future after the royal succession. Thailand as it is known today has modernised from a village backwater to a middle-income nation with a gleaming metropolitan capital, weighed down by social and income disparities between the rich and middle classes on the one hand, and the poor on the other, or as Thaksin's reign highlighted, between Bangkok and the countryside.

Wow

excellent to see the subject broached ............................................

Thaksin is in a minority here, one bad apple. Most of his supporters will survive, adjust, and find a new place in the system. He alone must be sacrificed.

By supporters I don't mean people who voted for him, btw. Voters don't matter much in Thailand and they won't challenge combined power of the military, bureaucracy, big business, and monarchy. Once the real powers strike the deal, people would just go along.

The only social class that can project political power is Bangkokians with their demonstrations and they are in a pro-junta camp.

Forrest's and trees .....................................

Thirdly, the September 19 coup is unlike previous putsches in contemporary Thailand for its critical timing. Its tumultuous aftermath is panning out as Thais enter the twilight of their monarch's glorious 60-year-old reign in a 21st century kingdom that is characterised by unresolved polarisation and ongoing tussle for the country's future after the royal succession. Thailand as it is known today has modernised from a village backwater to a middle-income nation with a gleaming metropolitan capital, weighed down by social and income disparities between the rich and middle classes on the one hand, and the poor on the other, or as Thaksin's reign highlighted, between Bangkok and the countryside.

Could someone please give me directions?

The rest of the paragraph is spot on and the structure of post succession Thailand is one of my major concerns.

Thaksin is in a minority here, one bad apple. Most of his supporters will survive, adjust, and find a new place in the system. He alone must be sacrificed.

By supporters I don't mean people who voted for him, btw. Voters don't matter much in Thailand and they won't challenge combined power of the military, bureaucracy, big business, and monarchy. Once the real powers strike the deal, people would just go along.

The only social class that can project political power is Bangkokians with their demonstrations and they are in a pro-junta camp.

Bangkokians are a social class???

Pro-Junta camp?

Sorry but I do not think you make any sense at all?

Do you actually talk with Thai's? Do you talk to the educated Thai elite from Bangkok each day?

Thaksin is in a minority here, one bad apple. Most of his supporters will survive, adjust, and find a new place in the system. He alone must be sacrificed.

By supporters I don't mean people who voted for him, btw. Voters don't matter much in Thailand and they won't challenge combined power of the military, bureaucracy, big business, and monarchy. Once the real powers strike the deal, people would just go along.

The only social class that can project political power is Bangkokians with their demonstrations and they are in a pro-junta camp.

Pro-Junta camp?

Sorry but I do not think you make any sense at all?

Do you actually talk with Thai's? Do you talk to the educated Thai elite from Bangkok each day?

Could someone please give me directions? (apologies to Philharries).

Other than the oxymoron above, you are right in your comments.

Thais enter the twilight of their monarch's glorious 60-year-old reign in a 21st century kingdom that is characterised by unresolved polarisation and ongoing tussle for the country's future after the royal succession.

At last ! Someone, and a thai, dares to write something about this key issue : the succession.

For that matter, coup, countercoup, fighting behind the scene, masquerade of Thaksin and other policy flip flops are epiphenomenal...

Thirdly, the September 19 coup is unlike previous putsches in contemporary Thailand for its critical timing. Its tumultuous aftermath is panning out as Thais enter the twilight of their monarch's glorious 60-year-old reign in a 21st century kingdom that is characterised by unresolved polarisation and ongoing tussle for the country's future after the royal succession. Thailand as it is known today has modernised from a village backwater to a middle-income nation with a gleaming metropolitan capital, weighed down by social and income disparities between the rich and middle classes on the one hand, and the poor on the other, or as Thaksin's reign highlighted, between Bangkok and the countryside.

Wow

excellent to see the subject broached ............................................

Careful...

Pro-Junta camp?

Sorry but I do not think you make any sense at all?

Do you actually talk with Thai's? Do you talk to the educated Thai elite from Bangkok each day?

I don't know about the elite, but the Thais I talk to every day are educated.

Until New Year's bombings the junta and the government enjoyed unprecedented support among Bangkokians, the same social class that formed the basis of PAD last year.

The same social class that now gets a rap from anti-coup "intellectuals" whose last rally attracted 500 people.

In priniciple I have nothing against those intellectuals but at the moment they are alienating themselves from the mainstream society and creating enemies, not friends.

At last ! Someone, and a thai, dares to write something about this key issue : the succession.

For that matter, coup, countercoup, fighting behind the scene, masquerade of Thaksin and other policy flip flops are epiphenomenal...

This discussion won't go very far, but as a check point - one of the main duties of the Privy Council is to manage all succession issues, and, in effect, be a country's supreme power during transition period. It has been put in every Consititution so far.

Strong Privy Council is a guarantor of peace, at least in the short term.

I don't think we should go beyond this check point and speculate further, but the role of the Privy Council should be remembered before we go into shush shush mode.

In priniciple I have nothing against those intellectuals but at the moment they are alienating themselves from the mainstream society and creating enemies, not friends.

Actually, not really.

It is rather interesting to note that now for the first time these intellectuals have managed to start building a bridge over the class gap between them and the rural and urban poor (which, given the numbers, are Thai mainstream society), leaving the pro junta middle classes as the odd ones out.

Names such as Ajarn Jai Ungpakorn are nowadays often mentioned with high respect by members of poorer classes. Well, if you care to speak with them about politics.

Just judging from the relatively small attendence of the demonstrations to the level of support of the junta by the population is a fallacy.

The only hope i personally have at the moment is that far more people in previously apathetic sectors of society do voice, in private conversations at least, strong political opinions. And most of them are not exactly pro junta.

In priniciple I have nothing against those intellectuals but at the moment they are alienating themselves from the mainstream society and creating enemies, not friends.

Actually, not really.

It is rather interesting to note that now for the first time these intellectuals have managed to start building a bridge over the class gap between them and the rural and urban poor (which, given the numbers, are Thai mainstream society), leaving the pro junta middle classes as the odd ones out.

Names such as Ajarn Jai Ungpakorn are nowadays often mentioned with high respect by members of poorer classes. Well, if you care to speak with them about politics.

Just judging from the relatively small attendence of the demonstrations to the level of support of the junta by the population is a fallacy.

The only hope i personally have at the moment is that far more people in previously apathetic sectors of society do voice, in private conversations at least, strong political opinions. And most of them are not exactly pro junta.

That is a different development altogether - Bangkok intellectuals trying to speak up for upcountry farmers. It remains to be seen if they have any lasting success.

Traditionally farmers relied on benevolent elite, then Thaksin came along to save them, now it's "intellectuals" and left wing socialists, taking over where communists left.

It's still more of the same - someone else always knows better what's good for them, just the names change.

Londonthai--I think your right on.

Democracy, however, is a process. It takes a lot of time for the institutions to develop and it takes patience.

And methinks that Thailand is going for the Guiness Book on this one

Thirdly, the September 19 coup is unlike previous putsches in contemporary Thailand for its critical timing. Its tumultuous aftermath is panning out as Thais enter the twilight of their monarch's glorious 60-year-old reign in a 21st century kingdom that is characterised by unresolved polarisation and ongoing tussle for the country's future after the royal succession. Thailand as it is known today has modernised from a village backwater to a middle-income nation with a gleaming metropolitan capital, weighed down by social and income disparities between the rich and middle classes on the one hand, and the poor on the other, or as Thaksin's reign highlighted, between Bangkok and the countryside.

Could someone please give me directions?

The rest of the paragraph is spot on and the structure of post succession Thailand is one of my major concerns.

It is the Jakarta Post that is making the reference. Compared to Jakarta ........