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104
So the U.S. elected an autocrat -- what to expect next from a Hungarian perspective
I was talking about capture by the Left following the strategy of "the Long March Through the Institutions". If you can't see the leftism/Wokeism for yourself I doubt that I can help you see it. -
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66
Driving round on my Harley shouting 'Slava Ukraini' to passers by..
You forget that Ukraine were Nazi sympathizers? That some of the most despicable acts of Nazi genocide were carried out on Ukrainian soil? Baba Yar for example in Kyiv. Even today the Jewish monuments to the victims of the Baba Yar genocide are routinely vandalized........by UKRAINIANS. Get off the CNN and mainstream propaganda buddy. -
17
Bangkok students assaulted, stripped, blackmailed by classmates
Have you followed any news about big cities in the U.S. You have 15-year-old kids shooting up houses? Cat fights were around when i was a teen LOL Maybe not as violent, but I never wanted to break one up. The challenge is that here, there is nothing to go by. They look at YouTube and think that what they see is how everyone acts. -
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Boris Johnson Accuses Starmer of Aligning with Hamas Over ICC Netanyahu Arrest Warrant
I don't get all the mass hysteria. If netanyahu and the other guy are innocent of the crimes they are accused of they will get off, won't they? Seems to me that all the vocal opponents of the ICC think they must be guilty, LOL. -
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Boris Johnson Accuses Starmer of Aligning with Hamas Over ICC Netanyahu Arrest Warrant
Havent seen the filithy terrorist scum (the Lefts foot soldiers) surrender yet. Thats how wars end. One side says "uncle" -
5
World War III Has Already Begun": Ukraine's Former Military Chief Warns of Global Conflict
Vladimir Putin’s decree on the new RF nuclear arms doctrine, 19 November 2024 By gilbertdoctorow on November 24, 2024 The first and most important thing that one can say about Russia’s new doctrine on nuclear deterrence and the circumstances under which Russia foresees use of its nuclear arsenal against adversaries is the following: it has been tailor-made to fit the situation in which Russia finds itself today with respect to the United States and its NATO allies. The doctrine is couched in abstract language without naming names, but behind every clause you can identify a specific threat to Russia that the United States and its allies have been implementing these past few years. The logic flowing from this is that if and when the strategy and/or tactics of the adversary changes, then there will be appropriate modifications to the doctrine. The doctrine itself has two parts to it. ‘The field of nuclear deterrence’ is what we read as the title of the Decree and ‘the essence of nuclear deterrence’ is the most lengthy and detailed part of the document, laid out in paragraphs 9 to 17, The second part, entitled ‘conditions for the Russian Federation to shift to use of nuclear weapons’ is set out in paragraphs 18 to 21. This is much more concise. Let us look at each of these parts in turn. ***** Deterrence The single biggest change in Russia’s nuclear doctrine is found in the very first article (9) which describes the ‘potential adversary’ to be deterred as ‘states and military coalitions (blocs, alliances) that are viewed by the Russian Federation as a potential adversary and which possess nuclear and/or other forms of weapons of mass destruction or significant fighting potential in conventional forces.’ Nuclear deterrence will also be applied with respect to ‘states which make available their territory, air and/or marine space and resources to prepare for and execute aggression against the Russian Federation.’ This is directly complemented by article 10 which explains that ‘Aggression of any state within a military coalition (bloc, alliance) against the Russian Federation and/or its allies is viewed as aggression of this coalition as a whole.’ The foregoing is absolutely new and binds the United States and NATO countries more closely together in a common fate than the famous Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. Article 5 of that treaty provides for the common defense of the signatory countries. Articles 9 and 10 of the Russian doctrine provide, as we see in part two of the doctrine, for Russian attack on any of them it chooses should one or more of them attack the Russian Federation and/or its allies directly or indirectly. Article 11 sets out what Vladimir Putin had said to a reporter first on 12 September and then repeated when he addressed Russia’s Security Council on 25 September: ‘Aggression against the Russian Federation and/or its allies coming from any non-nuclear state with the participation or support of a nuclear state is viewed as their combined attack.’ This is explicitly directed against the policy of the United States to wage proxy wars so as to inflict damage and possibly defeat a perceived adversary while expecting to avoid being identified as a co- belligerent. It is, of course, drawn from Russia’s experience in the current war in and about Ukraine. Note the mention of Russia’s allies as also being covered with its nuclear umbrella. Until recently this sounded like an empty piece of rhetoric. ‘What allies?’ one might ask. But the conclusion of a mutual defense treaty with North Korea leaves no doubt that Russia’s nuclear umbrella is part of their deal. Separate statements coming from both Minsk and Moscow tell us that the nuclear umbrella now covers Belarus. De facto we may suppose that the same goes for Iran, though properly speaking no mutual defense treaty has yet been signed with Teheran. Article 12 says the purpose of nuclear deterrence is to ensure that potential adversaries ‘understand the unavoidability of retaliation in case they commit aggression against the Russian Federation and/or its allies.’ The next article worthy of our attention is 15, which sets out in subclauses a list of military dangers which, depending on changing military-political and strategic circumstances, can grow into military threats to / aggression against the Russian Federation. These are all explicitly cases where ‘neutralization’ requires nuclear deterrence to be applied. Note as you review the list below that there is something akin here to the formulation of the Wolfowitz doctrine in the USA wherein the potential of an adversary is equated with malicious intent that must be stymied. a. The potential adversary’s having nuclear and/or other forms of weapons of mass destruction which could be applied against the Russian Federation and/or its allies, as well as the means to deliver these kinds of arms b. The potential adversary’s having and deploying air defenses including ABMs, medium and lesser range cruise and ballistic missiles, high precision conventional and hypersonic weapons, offensive drones variously based, directed energy weapons that could be used against the Russian Federation. c. The buildup by a potential adversary along territory bordering the Russian Federation and its allies or in nearby waters of groups of general-purpose military forces which possess the means to deliver a nuclear strike and/or the military infrastructure enabling such an attack. · The creation by a potential adversary of anti-missile defense equipment, attack weapons and satellite-killer equipment and his positioning this in outer space · Positioning of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery on the territory of non-nuclear states · The creation of new or expansion of existing military coalitions (blocs, alliances) resulting in their military infrastructure drawing closer to the borders of the Russian Federation · Actions by a potential adversary directed at isolating part of the territory of the Russian Federation, including blocking access to vitally important transport communications · Actions by a potential adversary directed at defeating (destroying) environmentally dangerous infrastructure of the Russian Federation which might lead to manmade, ecological or social catastrophes. · The potential adversary’s planning and carrying out large-scale military training exercises near the borders of the Russian Federation. · The uncontrolled spread of weapons of mass destruction, means of their delivery, technologies and equipment for their preparation. · The potential adversary’s having and deploying air defense including ABMs, medium and lesser range cruise and ballistic missiles, high precision conventional and hypersonic weapons, offensive drones variously based, directed energy weapons that could be used against the Russian Federation. It is worth remarking that many of the items in the list reflect directly what the United States and its NATO allies have done already or are talking about. Among them are a blockade of Kaliningrad, the positioning of NATO infrastructures close to the Russian border, holding war games close to Russia’s borders. The remarks in point h above surely refers to attacks on nuclear power stations, which Ukraine has done using drones and Soviet era missiles. Other items, particularly those that one might call a restoration of Reagan’s Star Wars plans are among the stated intentions of Donald Trump once he takes office and their inclusion in the list may be interpreted as a clear message to Trump to rethink this strategy if he wants to make peace with Russia. ***** Conditions under which the Russian Federation moves from deterrence to nuclear strikes Here some of the conditions were taken over from previous iterations of the nuclear doctrine, in particular what we read in article 18: a retaliatory attack for use of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction against Russia and its allies, Here we also read that conventional weapons attack on Russia and/or Belarus can trigger a nuclear response if there is a ‘critical threat to their sovereignty and/or territorial integrity.’ The mention of ‘territorial integrity’ is a new condition. Article 19 lists other conditions that could allow for Russia to use its nuclear arsenal: a. Reliable information about the launch of ballistic rockets attacking the territory of the Russian Federation and/or its allies b. The use by an adversary of nuclear or other forms of weapons of mass destruction on the territory of the Russian Federation and/or its allies against troop formations and/or infrastructure located outside its territory. [note: this is new] · Action by an adversary against critically important state or military infrastructure of the Russian Federation which, if knocked out, will disrupt retaliatory moves of the nuclear forces · Aggression against the Russian Federation and/or the Republic of Belarus using conventional weapons that create a critical threat to their sovereignty and/or territorial integrity [here, too, ‘territorial integrity’ is a concept introduced in this iteration of the doctrine] · Receipt of reliable information about a massive launch (take-off) in an air and space attack (strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, drones, hypersonic and other aircraft and their crossing the borders of the Russian Federation ***** All of the above is my read-out of the Decree. To that I add here what authoritative Russian analysts had to say on the news and commentary program The Great Game, edition of 19 November, i.e., shortly after the decree was published. The host opened the discussion by saying that the most important new provisions of Russia’s nuclear doctrine are in articles 10, 11 and 19. With respect to 19, it now shows 5 circumstances under which Russia is free to use nuclear weapons whereas the 2020 redaction of the nuclear doctrine only showed 3 such circumstances. He notes that point b of 19 means knock-out of early warning systems, of command and control centers; it also includes cyber attacks. Point c of 19 speaks of a threat to the sovereignty and/or territorial integrity whereas the point from 2020 that it replaces spoke of a threat to Russia’s existence as a state. This amounts to a significant lowering of the threshold for using nuclear weapons, per the host. Point d of 19: this expands the concept of an attack justifying use of nuclear weapons from strictly ballistic missiles to include any other aircraft. Comments by panelist Andrei Klintsevich, RF state counsellor: this decree is a timely adaptation of the doctrine to present-day realities, especially as regards dealing with blocs as a whole not as separate states for purposes of retaliation. The intention is for the non-nuclear states among NATO to go to Macron and tell him to just shut up since his words and actions can be used by the Russians against them. Klintsevich also points to the new principle of a Russian nuclear umbrella for its allies. Finally, there is the new concept of extraterritoriality, meaning that Russia will respond with nuclear arms to attacks on its bases outside the RF. He explains ‘nuclear deterrence’ as meaning not a nuclear strike but heightened readiness for such a strike, including decentralization of command to avoid decapitation, putting the nuclear triad on alert such as sending to sea submarines with nuclear strike capability. This document is intended to be kept on the desk of diplomats everywhere who must understand that there will be no divergence between the words in the decree and Russia’s future actions. The host concludes that the new doctrine is Russia’s direct answer to those madmen in the West who are calling for missile strikes deep into the Russian heartland. ©Gilbert Doctorow, 2024 -
246
K bank E-mail with Tax Forms attached ?
Almost 18 years ago the wife opened an account at BB. She is Thai. They gave her a questionnaire in Thai and English and she still didn't understand why they were asking her all these intrusive question. I took the paper and ripped it to shreds before the BB employee. She said nothing.- 1
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