Regarding "International Law". International Law is not forever. UNCLOS was negotiated in the early 1980s. While the US and Iran signed, both countries refuse to ratify it. Republicans since the 1990s, argue that ratification would transfer elements of U.S. sovereignty to international bodies. They object to binding dispute resolution and to international institutions having any authority over American maritime activities. The Straits of Malacca was mentioned. No toll levied, or ever will be, but in April, Indonesia proposed collection transit fees. The justification is that the littoral countries do spend a lot of money maintaining navigational safety, operating traffic separation schemes, combating piracy, responding to pollution incidents, and maintaining aids to navigation. The Montreux Convention governs ships passing through the Bosphorous. Its not some ancient agreement; it dates back to the 1930s. Turkey doesn't charge a toll, but its Department of Transport does collect transit fees, to pay for health inspections, lighthouse services, and rescue/salvage services. It doesn't charge a flat fee per ship, but charges based on tonnage Currently they charge $6.70 per ton. Super tankers are 200-500,000 DWT, so the fee collected by Turkey is about $1.7m to $3.5m per big tanker. Its not really clear how Iran is determining the toll/fee its charging, but it seems to be charging $1.5-2.5m; remarkably similar to Turkey, but no one is getting butt hurt about how much Turkey is raking in. Does anyone seriously believe that the Turkish formula is seriously related to the actual costs incurred by Ankara? Turkey won't seize ships that don't pay; they can pursue through the courts, or, if the ship is already in the straits, not grant it transit. What that means it allows the Turkish Coastguard, under international law, to intervene, order ships to heave to and drop anchor. A ship not cleared for transit is a danger to other shipping. The Convention does not prevent freedom of passage, it does not exempt them from complying with reasonable navigation and safety regulations. There are strong arguments to say UNCLOS is no longer fit for purpose. The Straits of Mallacca cost an enormous amount to keep clear, in a way that wasn't envisaged then. Sea mining wasn;t a thing. No one had any expectation that the Northwest Passage will be come navigable (the real reason for tensions over Greenland). UNCLOS isn't etched in stone. It was an agreement from the Cold War, written by the then dominant trading states, with many of the 150+ littoral states not really able to object. Negotiators should have been trying to apply Game Theory; Iran wants to keep the straits open because Iran wants to earn lots of money doing so, rather than forcing it through very expensive bombing. Game theory is fundamentally about how rational actors make decisions when the outcome depends on what others do. The key question is not "Can Iran close the strait?" but "What payoff does Iran receive from opening versus closing it under different circumstances?" I've said before, a Straits Transit authority should be established, with the objective of collecting fees, ensuring the straits are clear for shipping, with proceeds to be shared with Iran and Oman. You have that authority run by a neutral party, or even the United States. It would encourage Iran to maintain good relations with the US, in order to receive its cut. The US (or other) would be responsible for establishing the bureaucracy and payment collection processes (as well as debt recovery), charging a percentage of the transit fee. The US could even subcontract out the actual physical services needed, such as shipping lane maintenance, oceanographics etc to Iran, or Oman. The US has more global litigious reach than Iran, and has bigger clout to seize shipping assets for companies who are delinquent. The US has a lot of lawyers, probably more lawyers than Iran and Oman put together, and lawyers who are particularly skilled at negotiating different legal systems, and also advanced capabilities, through financial instruments, to identify hidden company assets. In the May Senate Armed Service Committee meetings, much was said, how, as the US disengages, China, and to a lesser extent, Russia, are taking over, in a manner that the Committee described as "Coercion ". The scheme takes no coercion. Actually quite the contrary, it will be met with reward., Iran would be financially rewarded through cooperation (paraphrasing Oberst Hans Landa's famous monologue). It would retain the international nature of the waterway, while acknowledging the concerns of the two littoral states concerned. 0
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