Boeing 777 plane crash-lands at San Francisco airport

[skippybangkok]

One word Simulators. Category D Full Flight Simulators.

May sound fine to you, but doesn't sound very reassuring to me.

Well, other option is to load up the AC and practice take offs with engine fires and screaming passengers to add to the realism, followed by filling the cabin with smoke and see if the pilots can clear it quick enough before everyone chokes

I think simulators are more suited

[TallGuyJohninBKK]

Call me crazy...but I'd like the pilot landing my 777 to have at least assisted in at least some prior landings at the destination airport in the type of jet being flown before being handed over primary controls.

Yes, the pilot in question had a lot of hours and experience in other jets, but he had very little in 777s and apparently had never before flown a 777 into SFO in any capacity, if I'm following the news reports correctly.

Maybe experience with other jets is more transferrable in other situations. But given that the 777 is/was Boeing's first "fly-by-wire" airliner, it makes me think that the dynamics of flying the 777 perhaps aren't quite as comparable as they would be going from one older model to another older model jet.

[khaosai]

Hi,

The transition requires hard work on the trainees part, it can be demanding, but it is not particularly difficult. You will learn the technical side of the aircraft in a classroom environment and from there progress to simulator training where you get to learn the skills required to operate the aircraft in a safe manner. Once you have reached the expected standard and completed a check then will you go on to the actual aircraft and carry out line training. That also culminates in a check prior to being released to fly as part of a crew.

People learn and develop at different rates and as a result some people may require additional training. If additional training is required it will generally be offered to the student.

The 777 simulators that pilots use to train in accurately represent how the real aircraft flies and handles.

The B777 is a fantastic aircraft to operate. It flies in a very similar manner to the other large Boeing EFIS aircraft. The automation is very user friendly. It flies well, has lots of performance available and without a doubt makes money for the airlines that fly them.

This has all the hallmarks of a rushed approach which became unstable and should have resulted in a go around. This airline, like most will have specific stabilisation requirements that need to be met and maintained for the approach to continue. Parameters such as rate of descent, becoming too fast or too slow, aircraft configuration etc will have to be met prior to reaching a certain point on the approach.

SFO is not an overly demanding airport to fly into so long as you have carried out a briefing highlighting specific threats. For a crew visiting an airport for the first time those threats should be documented and should be made readily available to the crew to peruse at any time.

Edited July 10, 2013 by Scott

[negreanu]

Call me crazy...but I'd like the pilot landing my 777 to have at least assisted in at least some prior landings at the destination airport in the type of jet being flown before being handed over primary controls.

In the ideal world. Sadly that has never been the reality or never will. Its not a requirement.

[TallGuyJohninBKK]

This is the latest Tuesday news media briefing from the NTSB:

[skippybangkok]

Interesting Press Conf.

The concept is ass about tit depending on your mode --

-If auto throttle, the pilots typically push nose down/ pull nose up to maintain glide slope, auto throttle maintain speed

-If fully manual and stabilised, typically more throttle or less to maintain glide slope ( elevators will change speed as well as decent rate )

If u think ur on auto throttle, and below PAPI, reaction would be to pull nose up, which slows AC and increases drag. Not a good idea if not in auto throttle

My take is they were too high, pushed the nose down, when hit 2 white and 2 red on PAPI , pulled nose up expecting auto throttle to hit in, which it did not. Sunk to 3 red PAPI thinking it will stabilize - pull nose up more not realizing they were converting kinetic energy into potential energy and more drag ( but total sum in decline ) , and at 4 red " oh <deleted>"..... But the speed dropped off too, and too low / to late

Still amazing that 2 experienced pilots did not monitor a basic fundamental as speed, and that lack of auto throttle kicking in as pulled nose up on hitting glide slope

Edited July 10, 2013 by skippybangkok

[TallGuyJohninBKK]

Some interesting details from the NTSB briefing Tuesday:

--Drug and alcohol testing in the wake of aircraft crashes is required for U.S. licensed pilots for U.S. carriers. But the Asiana pilots have not been drug or alcohol tested, as jurisdiction for them and their carrier falls under the country where the air carrier is based (Korea), and there doesn't appear to be any specific U.S. requirement for them.

--Two of the flight attendants at the rear of the aircraft were ejected during the crash impact and ended up on the ground off to the side of the runway and "have injuries."

--The NTSB has requested additional air traffic plot data from the FAA on all 777 approaches to the 28L runway "within in the last few days," and for all of the go-arounds that have occurred on that same runway since June. Hersman said the data will help the NTSB establish baseline data and identify trends.

--In examining the cockpit, the NTSB found the flight director was on for the right seat, and off for the left seat. The auto throttles were armed (which Hersman said meant "they were available to be engaged"), but it's not clear as yet how or in what mode they were functioning.

--The NTSB as of Tues had completed interviews with all three of the pilots who were in the cockpit at the time of the crash, and as of yesterday's briefing was completing the interview with the fourth pilot who was seated in the aircraft cabin at the time of the crash.

--At the time of the crash, the flying pilot was seated in the left seat, the instructor pilot was seated in the right seat, and the relief first officer was seated in the jump seat. The relief captain was seated in the cabin.

--Hersman related the instructor pilot's statement as follows, noting that it would need to be corroborated with the available data: that they were slightly high when they passed 4000 feet.... At about 500 feet, he realized that they were low.... He told the pilot to pull back. They had set speed at 137 knots, and he assumed that the auto throttles were maintaining speed.

--Between 500 feet and 200 feet, they had a lateral deviation and they were low. They were trying to correct at that point. At 200 feet he noticed the four PAPIs [Precision Approach Path Indicator lights on the runway] were red [meaning the plane was below its glide path], the airspeed was in the hatched area on the speed tape and he recognized that the auto throttles were not maintaining speed, and he established a go-around attitude. He went to push the throttles forward, but he stated the other pilot had already pushed the throttles forward.

--The flying pilot said he had about 9700 hours of total flight time, including about 5000 hours as pilot in command in various types of aircraft. But he was undergoing his training in the 777 type aircraft with Asiana. To complete his training in the 777 with Asiana, he was required to have 20 flights and 60 flight hours. In the 777, he had completed 10 legs and about 35 hours flying the 777. "So he was about halfway through his initial operating experience on the Triple 7."

--The instructor pilot, also a captain, said he had total flight time of 13,000 hours, and total hours of about 3000 in the 777. His total pilot in command time was about 10,000 hours. But he said this was his first trip as an instructor pilot. "The instructor pilot stated that he was the pilot in command. He was sitting in the right seat. This was the first time that he and the flying pilot that he was instructing had flown together," Hersman said.

--Although the first officer in the jump seat suffered a cracked rib, neither the instructor pilot nor the flying pilot were admitted to the hospital.

--Regarding a slide or slides that deployed inside the aircraft, the relief first officer in the jump seat said a slide had deployed inside and trapped a flight attendant for a time that he had tried to free.

Edited July 10, 2013 by TallGuyJohninBKK

[Scott]

A post containing unsourced information has been deleted. Please follow the rules of fair use and provide a link when quoting.

Also deleted is a reply to the post.

[TallGuyJohninBKK]

Maybe some of the pilot-aware members here can post on the proper role for an instructor pilot in this kind of situation:

You're on a real commercial flight, fully loaded with passengers, the training pilot has the controls and is coming in for a landing. But as you're approaching the landing, you realize the training pilot is significantly off the mark.

What is the instructor pilot supposed to do in that kind of situation? Verbally instruct the training pilot to make the necessary changes? Or, if the instructor pilot thinks things have gotten out of control, take over the controls himself and try to right the aircraft?

[cloudhopper]

A post containing unsourced information has been deleted. Please follow the rules of fair use and provide a link when quoting.

Also deleted is a reply to the post.

Oooops sorry about that, here is the link -

http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/518568-asiana-flight-crash-san-francisco-63.html#post7931852

[TallGuyJohninBKK]

The original ThaiVisa member post that quoted the entire blog post above was deleted, per ThaiVisa policy.

But now that the source link has been provided and restored, here's probably a key part of the blog post, which claims to be from a retired U.S. commercial airline pilot who spent years training commercial pilots in Korea.

The Koreans are very very bright and smart so I was puzzled by their inability to fly an airplane well. They would show up on Day 1 of training (an hour before the scheduled briefing time, in a 3-piece suit, and shined shoes) with the entire contents of the FCOM and Flight Manual totally memorized. But, putting that information to actual use was many times impossible. Crosswind landings are also an unsolvable puzzle for most of them. I never did figure it out completely, but I think I did uncover a few clues. Here is my best guess. First off, their educational system emphasizes ROTE memorization from the first day of school as little kids. As you know, that is the lowest form of learning and they act like robots. They are also taught to NEVER challenge authority and in spite of the flight training heavily emphasizing CRM/CLR, it still exists either on the surface or very subtly. You just cant change 3000 years of culture.

[cloudhopper]

Maybe some of the pilot-aware members here can post on the proper role for an instructor pilot in this kind of situation:

You're on a real commercial flight, fully loaded with passengers, the training pilot has the controls and is coming in for a landing. But as you're approaching the landing, you realize the training pilot is significantly off the mark.

What is the instructor pilot supposed to do in that kind of situation? Verbally instruct the training pilot to make the necessary changes? Or, if the instructor pilot thinks things have gotten out of control, take over the controls himself and try to right the aircraft?

Whatever it takes. The instructor is entirely responsible for preventing the flight from "getting out of control" regardless of what the student does or fails to do. I went up once in a tandem trainer with a rated pilot who was getting recurrent and after 2 perfect landings and a perfect approach on the 3rd suddenly ripped the stick from my hand and slammed it forward when we were about 2 feet off the runway causing a hard landing resulting in major structural repairs to the airframe. He said he thought we were stalling. But it was still my fault all the way...

[TallGuyJohninBKK]

Thanks for the answer.

As a non-pilot, I had a bit of difficulty understanding the practical meaning of language the NTSB was using, in terms of saying the instructor pilot was "in command," but in fact the trainee pilot was the one actually flying the plane on the landing.

Edited July 10, 2013 by TallGuyJohninBKK

[jpinx]

Maybe some of the pilot-aware members here can post on the proper role for an instructor pilot in this kind of situation:

You're on a real commercial flight, fully loaded with passengers, the training pilot has the controls and is coming in for a landing. But as you're approaching the landing, you realize the training pilot is significantly off the mark.

What is the instructor pilot supposed to do in that kind of situation? Verbally instruct the training pilot to make the necessary changes? Or, if the instructor pilot thinks things have gotten out of control, take over the controls himself and try to right the aircraft?

I find it interesting that a novice pilot was flying the approach "under instruction" by a "new" instructor. It smacks of some seriously inappropriate crewing roster.

I know the rules are different nowadays but that would have been unthinkable a few years ago.

To answer the quoted comment, succintly put, the instructor is obliged to not let a bad situation develop. In any event all crew are responsible for averting any incident that jeapordises the safety of the aircraft. This includes wrenching the novice pilots hands off the controls and manually doing a go-around while it is still an option.

One comment was made about the auto throttles not maintaining the correct speed which raises 2 issues.

1. there might have been a mechanical failure - sea-bird ingestion maybe given the location - which might have reduced the thrust available.

2. Why did the pilots (there were 4 on the flight deck) not spot the low airspeed long before it became critical?

Looks like an accident culminating from many factors.

My heart goes out to the girls who were killed - possibly by ground vehicles after they had survived the worst impact. Similaly I am astounded by the luck of the 2 stewardesses who were "ejected" when the tail whacked the runway and fell off. Apparently they were sitting on the ground relatively unharmed and watched the rest of the aircraft careering off to it's final resting place....

Luck is a dangerous mistress !!!

[TallGuyJohninBKK]

I find it interesting that a novice pilot was flying the approach "under instruction" by a "new" instructor. It smacks of some seriously inappropriate crewing roster.

I know the rules are different nowadays but that would have been unthinkable a few years ago.

....................................................

2. Why did the pilots (there were 4 on the flight deck) not spot the low airspeed long before it became critical?

Well, just to be clear...

1. The trainee pilot was only a "novice" in terms of flying the 777. He was a certified pilot in several other models of aircraft, and had been flying as a captain for a fair number of years, most recently on an Airbus model.

2. In the cockpit at the time of the crash, the NTSB says there were 3 flightcrew: the trainee pilot, the instructor pilot and the relief first officer in the jump seat. The relief captain was sitting back in the passenger cabin.

3. But your underlying question seems a valid one. It does seem based on the public evidence thus far that they were slow in responding to the aircraft's speed falling below required levels as they approached for landing.

At least thus far, still no sign or evidence of any mechanical failure or external problem with the aircraft.

[jpinx]

I find it interesting that a novice pilot was flying the approach "under instruction" by a "new" instructor. It smacks of some seriously inappropriate crewing roster.

I know the rules are different nowadays but that would have been unthinkable a few years ago.

....................................................

2. Why did the pilots (there were 4 on the flight deck) not spot the low airspeed long before it became critical?

Well, just to be clear...

1. The trainee pilot was only a "novice" in terms of flying the 777. He was a certified pilot in several other models of aircraft, and had been flying as a captain for a fair number of years, most recently on an Airbus model.

2. In the cockpit at the time of the crash, the NTSB says there were 3 flightcrew: the trainee pilot, the instructor pilot and the relief first officer in the jump seat. The relief captain was sitting back in the passenger cabin.

3. But your underlying question seems a valid one. It does seem based on the public evidence thus far that they were slow in responding to the aircraft's speed falling below required levels as they approached for landing.

At least thus far, still no sign or evidence of any mechanical failure or external problem with the aircraft.

I stand corrected on those points - I am reading the on-going discussions elsewhere too

I am loathe to say "pilot-error" until all possibilities of mechanical problems are investigated., hence my suggestion that there might have been an ingestion event, but equally the automated systems need to be thoroughly verified. In the final analysis an airspeed of around 104knots (quoted elsewhere) during an approach meant to be at 137knots means someone had taken their eye off the ASI - or maybe were waiting for the autosystems to correct it. Either way - there is a large amount of culpability with the 3 aircrew on the flight deck at the time. Surely *one* of them must have been aware of what was happening or have training standards gone so badly wrong?

A school friend of mine used to fly for a well-known european airline and became a training captain in the latter part of his career. He was frequently reprimanded by airline management for making pilots actually *FLY* the approaches by hand. It's totally different to a simulator........

[Tywais]

A little background on PIC (Pilot in Command or Captain). Also, release of controls from trainee to instructor has to be done in accordance with standard or airline policies. It has to be very clear that it is happening and when control has been transferred. One doesn't just take over the controls even in an emergency as that can easily compound the situation. In this case, there just wasn't enough time to make a transition of command. The instructor would certainly be given his feedback during the landing phase.

Serving as pilot in command

Under U.S. FAA FAR 91.3, "Responsibility and authority of the pilot in command", the FAA declares:^[4]

• (a) The pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft.
• ( b In an in-flight emergency requiring immediate action, the pilot in command may deviate from any rule of this part to the extent required to meet that emergency.
• © Each pilot in command who deviates from a rule under paragraph ( b of this section shall, upon the request of the Administrator, send a written report of that deviation to the Administrator.

ICAO and other countries equivalent rules are similar. In Annex 2, "Rules of the Air", under par. "2.3.1 Responsibility of pilot-in-command", ICAO declares:^[1]

In Annex 2, par. "2.4 Authority of pilot-in-command of an aircraft", ICAO adds:^[1]

The pilot-in-command of an aircraft shall, whether manipulating the controls or not, be responsible for the operation of the aircraft in accordance with the rules of the air, except that the pilot-in-command may depart from these rules in circumstances that render such departure absolutely necessary in the interests of safety.

Both FAR 91.3( b and ICAO Annex 2, par. 2.3.1, specifically empower the PIC to override any other regulation in an emergency, and to take the safest course of action at his/her sole discretion. This provision mirrors the authority given to the captains of ships at sea, with similar justifications. It essentially gives the PIC the final authority in any situation involving the safety of a flight, irrespective of any other law or regulation.

The pilot-in-command of an aircraft shall have final authority as to the disposition of the aircraft while in command.

Wiki

[jpinx]

That transfer of command has an emergency mode when the instructor says loudly "I HAVE CONTROL" and the trainee removes his hands from the controls. Unfortunately these airliners are not designed well for these situations ... over-reliance on automated systems which have been incorrectly set or are failing, coupled with a deferential culture amongst the flightdeck crew.

[jackr]

I will fly this airline, route and aircraft again, I am sure!

I'm no expert, but I'm quite certain you won't be flying that aircraft again.

Shame on all those Expat experts that are so fast to judge..your age does not make you an authority..on anything!

Typical TV HOGWASH.

Shut your old mouth and let the professional investigators determine the truth.

Until you own the domain name 'www.thaivisa.com', I'm afraid you'll have to lump it. Regardless of what you or the 'real' experts--pilots/instructors et al--think, people can come on here and say what they like, whether it be re-iterating what the tabloids are intimating (that it could be pilot error, even if they are 'Merican) or something completely off the wall. It's not a legit, State-sanctioned website, a paid-for source or Wikipedia, it's a public forum where people exchange ideas. If it shakes you up, there are millions of others where you can rub shoulders with like-minded folk and spew forth.

[TallGuyJohninBKK]

In this case, there just wasn't enough time to make a transition of command.

Tywais, I'm curious how/why you make that assessment. It's not like the training captain has to write a memo and submit it to his home office.

At 500 feet of altitude and things not going well both vertically and laterally, I'd think he could have stepped in to do something more to avert a looming problem.

But then again, according to the NTSB account, this is the same guy who "assumed" the plane's speed would be sufficient as they headed to land since the auto throttle had been engaged.

As I've said above, I'm not a pilot... But whenever I've seen films of aircraft pilots landing craft, I always hear the changing airspeed being called out verbally by a member of the flight crew... Maybe that's just Hollywood, or maybe it's real... I'm sure someone here can say....

It just seems the flight crew weren't keeping their attention on their airspeed as much as they needed to under the circumstances.

[MaxYakov]

Line training with full fare paying passengers onboard is a common feature in airline flying. It's taken very seriously, with the actual training taking a very distant third behind the safety and commercial aspects of the job.

Would that typically include having a pilot with only 40+ hours in 777s total be sitting in the captain's chair and controlling the landing with a fully laden plane at an airport where he'd never flown a 777 before?

Does that put the training "a very distance third behind the safety and commercial aspects of the job"?

I don't know.. I'm just asking... as an airline passenger.

Yes, very standard. There isn't really a captain's chair. The plane can be fully flown from either seat. If the pilot in the right seat was the trainer, and the one in the left was the trainee, then the pilot in the right seat was the pilot in command and had full access to all instruments and controls.

40 hours is actually quite a bit of time. The guy had thousands of hours in heavies, so it wasn't as if he was a newbie. Here you have two highly experienced pilots and the SHTF. Either one could have firewalled the throttles 30 seconds out and it would all have been a non-issue. That's assuming there was no mechanical failure.

Apparently, not, if the '40 hours' is primarily in auto-pilot with only minutes of actual hands-on flying for each flight in a real, not simulated, aircraft.

Check this (KAL/Asiana Flight Instructor Veteran's Comments @ PPRUNE): http://www.thaivisa.com/forum/topic/651859-boeing-777-plane-crash-lands-at-san-francisco-airport/page-9#entry6596458

Edited July 10, 2013 by MaxYakov

[khaosai]

Maybe some of the pilot-aware members here can post on the proper role for an instructor pilot in this kind of situation:

You're on a real commercial flight, fully loaded with passengers, the training pilot has the controls and is coming in for a landing. But as you're approaching the landing, you realize the training pilot is significantly off the mark.

What is the instructor pilot supposed to do in that kind of situation? Verbally instruct the training pilot to make the necessary changes? Or, if the instructor pilot thinks things have gotten out of control, take over the controls himself and try to right the aircraft?

Hi,

As an instructor sitting in an operation seat, I.e. front left or right seat then you assume the role of commander, and therefore full responsibility for the safety of the flight. All crew have a shared responsibilty for safety but the Operating Captain has overall responsibility. As this seems to be a Captain transitioning from one aircraft type to another then it's important to let him make command decisions until such time that safety becomes compromised.

As part of an instructor course you will be given some guidance on how to train as well as check, and at what stage you should intervene. Now you would probably start with some form of verbal intervention. On occasion you have to take over control, manual intervention. It's important to not let a situation develop that will compromise the safety or the commercial aspect of the job.

Early manual intervention in this case would have prevented this situation and resulted in a go around so safety would not be compromised. However taking the commercial case, verbal intervention at a much earlier stage during descent and approach would have been far more effective. The approach would not have been unstable and would have probably resulted in a normal approach and landing.

The job is very dynamic, things are changing by the second and decisions need to be made soundly and correctly. During a normal sort of approach speed this aircraft is travelling close to one aircraft length per second. So paying attention and operating the aircraft accurately are very important.

It all comes down to being assertive in a flight deck. If things are not going how they should then you need to speak up, regardless if your the 200 hour new first officer or the experienced 20000 hour examiner.

Edited July 10, 2013 by khaosai

[jpinx]

Maybe some of the pilot-aware members here can post on the proper role for an instructor pilot in this kind of situation:

You're on a real commercial flight, fully loaded with passengers, the training pilot has the controls and is coming in for a landing. But as you're approaching the landing, you realize the training pilot is significantly off the mark.

What is the instructor pilot supposed to do in that kind of situation? Verbally instruct the training pilot to make the necessary changes? Or, if the instructor pilot thinks things have gotten out of control, take over the controls himself and try to right the aircraft?

Hi,

As an instructor sitting in an operation seat, I.e. front left or right seat then you assume the role of commander, and therefore full responsibility for the safety of the flight. All crew have a shared responsibilty for safety but the Operating Captain has overall responsibility. As this seems to be a Captain transitioning from one aircraft type to another then it's important to let him make command decisions until such time that safety becomes compromised.

As part of an instructor course you will be given some guidance on how to train as well as check, and at what stage you should intervene. Now you would probably start with some form of verbal intervention. On occasion you have to take over control, manual intervention. It's important to not let a situation develop that will compromise the safety or the commercial aspect of the job.

Early manual intervention in this case would have prevented this situation and resulted in a go around so safety would not be compromised. However taking the commercial case, verbal intervention at a much earlier stage during descent and approach would have been far more effective. The approach would not have been unstable and would have probably resulted in a normal approach and landing.

The job is very dynamic, things are changing by the second and decisions need to be made soundly and correctly. During a normal sort of approach speed this aircraft is travelling close to one aircraft length per second. So paying attention and operating the aircraft accurately are very important.

It all comes down to being assertive in a flight deck. If things are not going how they should then you need to speak up, regardless if your the 200 hour new first officer or the experienced 20000 hour examiner.

There are personalities involved. A deferential attitude does not work well in a structured command and control situation. One hesitates to paint with a broad brush, but given the cultural background of the crew there might well have been a reluctance by someone to speak up. I could almost accept that when - for example - the airspeed falls to 5 knots short, but we initial reports are talking about a HUGE speed loss. That should have set off alarm klaxons in everybodys heads as will as in the cockpit.

[khaosai]

Hi jpinx,

your right that the cultural aspect may have played a part here. Its a very hierarchical society, particularly if one has had an illustrious career in the military which may or not have been the case here. The cockpit voice recorder makes for interesting listening I am sure.

[F430murci]

Some of the arguments people are beating into the ground seem to be relying upon erroneous assumptions.

4 pilots on flight. I posted pages ago the regulations applicable for 8 and12 hour flights.

3 of the pilots were in the cockpit at time if the crash. 1 of the pilots was in the passenger cabin.

The pilot with only 43 hours had total flight time if 10,000 hours. That is a decent amount of time and the large planes are not difficult to land.

As I mentioned a couple of days ago, it may have been an auto throttle issue. Apparently, the pilots believed or expected auto throttles to maintain 137 until landing.

The question I had Sunday was whether auto throttles worked below 500 feet. I have spent many a weekends from 1983 until mid 90s shooting take offs and landings under normal and emergency scenarios in the Fed Ex 727 and DC 10 simulators. Father was International pilot and flex instructor and I would fly the sims for flight engineers he was teaching. Flown MD11 sims there too and it seemed like auto throttles on MD11 were engaged basically until right at touchdown. 727 and DC was not as automated.

Rather than wanting to sling shit about 43 hours ( the press enjoys stuff like that because people not knowing better tweak out over such details) why not research whether 777 auto throttles remain on until touch down. If so, this could have been a mechanical issue as the auto throttles were apparently engaged.

If auto throttle failed, I could see how pilots could have reacted slowly. One would not anticipate or expect auto throttle failure IMMEDIATELY and, unfortunately at 500 feet you don't have much time to go through your memtal checklist.

----------

Hersman said an examination of the wreckage showed that the auto-throttle was "armed," but it was not clear if it had been properly engaged or had somehow failed before the plane slowed to a near-stall and hit the ground. "We need to understand a little better" how the auto-throttle is used, she said.

"They had set speed at 137 knots (158 mph), and he assumed that the auto-throttles were maintaining speed," Hersman said of the instructor pilot.

http://news.airwise.com/story/view/1373427674.html

[MaxYakov]

Hi jpinx,

your right that the cultural aspect may have played a part here. Its a very hierarchical society, particularly if one has had an illustrious career in the military which may or not have been the case here. The cockpit voice recorder makes for interesting listening I am sure.

I hope it doesn't contain anything this interesting:

Ground Proximity Warning System: Pull up! Pull up!

Human voice (in Korean): What is this 'Pull Up'?

My bet is that is that it was relatively quiet on the flight deck until T_seawall -3 sec or so. Not even much engine noise - just that pesky stick-shaker.

Edited July 10, 2013 by MaxYakov

[TallGuyJohninBKK]

Hi jpinx,

your right that the cultural aspect may have played a part here. Its a very hierarchical society, particularly if one has had an illustrious career in the military which may or not have been the case here. The cockpit voice recorder makes for interesting listening I am sure.

I'm not sure how the "cultural" issue fits in in the relationship between the instructor pilot and the trainee pilot.

Just quickly doing this from my memory, the instructor pilot was the senior pilot overall in terms of tenure and hours flown, both overall and obviously in the 777. I think, from the NTSB briefing yesterday, it also indicated he was an ex military pilot, for whatever that's worth.

The trainee pilot was less tenured overall and relatively brand new on 777s. I don't recall the NTSB yesterday saying anything about him having a military background. He was a full captain flying Airbus jets previously for Asiana... But at least on the surface, there's nothing that would seem to put the instructor pilot in any kind of deferential role.

Except, and there's no way to know at this point how this factored in.... despite his pretty senior status, the SFO flight was his FIRST flight as an instructor pilot, from what the NTSB said....

I dunno if we'll ever know what the personal dynamics were that day in the cockpit. But I'd sure like to know.

[TallGuyJohninBKK]

The auto throttles issue is an interesting one, and even the NTSB in yesterday's briefing couldn't sort that one out.. Yes they were found to be armed or engaged, but not clear if they were functioning or in what mode they had been set... The instructor pilot told them he "assumed" the auto throttles would have kept the aircraft's speed in line. I guess time will tell what happened with that.

But I keep coming back to the same issue... No matter what was or wasn't happening with the auto throttled, wasn't anyone in the cockpit actively monitoring their airspeed in the final minute of descent. And if they were, it's hard to find much indication that anyone did anything about the speed issue until the very end.

[skippybangkok]

But I keep coming back to the same issue... No matter what was or wasn't happening with the auto throttled, wasn't anyone in the cockpit actively monitoring their airspeed in the final minute of .

Obviously not. Once they "turn on" auto throttle, they obviously now ignore speed and just focus on height/vs , glide slope and lateral position

I would bet if they opted for fully manual landing, it would never of happened as they would monitor speed constantly

[Chicog]

One of the pilots of Asiana Flight 214 that crashed in San Francisco shouted warnings that were ignored, according to South Korean media.

Sources in the country's transport ministry confirmed Bong Dong Won - who was in the cockpit jump seat - repeatedly yelled "sink rate" in the final minute before the crash, it was reported.

http://m.sky.com/skynews/article/1113782