Human Rights Groups Urge Thai Police Reform

[george]

Human rights groups urge police reform

By John Le Fevre

BANGKOK (thaivisa.com): -- Human rights groups have called on the Thailand Government to push ahead with the police reform Bill, claiming it will have benefits for the police and the public.

Angkhana Neelaphaijit, chairwoman of the Working Group for Peace and Justice said the Bill, drafted by the coup-appointed Surayud Chulanont government, was needed to improve police welfare.

"If police officers receive good pay and good welfare, I believe they will not wallow in corruption and the people's basic rights will be better protected,” she told a seminar on police and human rights violations conducted by the Campaign Committee for Human Rights.

Somchai Homlaor, chairman of the NGO's Coalition for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, echoed the call, saying it was time the police force was reformed, as many innocent people had been treated unfairly over the years.

He said many were victims of the administration of deposed former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, an administration he described as "not only showed no respect for the rights of the people, but also undermined the credibility of the police force".

The reforms have been supported by relatives of crime victims, though police representatives sitting on a review panel chaired by former justice minister Charnchai Likhitjittha have remained steadfastly opposed to the draft Bill.

-- thaivisa.com 2009-08-04

[hammered]

Reforming the police is going to be nigh on impossible. It is also linked into the poltical power struggle which complicates things. Stuff like human rights, formal equality before the law and innocence until proven guilty are not really issues that are driving anything right now.

[dale8]

Hello, reform the Thai BIB?

[Bisto]

NOT IMPOSSIBLE

LINK

The violation of state and federal laws or the violation of individuals' constitutional rights by police officers; also when police commit crimes for personal gain.

Police misconduct and corruption are abuses of police authority. Sometimes used interchangeably, the terms refer to a wide range of procedural, criminal, and civil violations. Misconduct is the broadest category. Misconduct is "procedural" when it refers to police who violate police department rules and regulations; "criminal" when it refers to police who violate state and federal laws; "unconstitutional" when it refers to police who violate a citizen's Civil Rights; or any combination thereof. Common forms of misconduct are excessive use of physical or Deadly Force, discriminatory arrest, physical or verbal harassment, and selective enforcement of the law.

Police corruption is the abuse of police authority for personal gain. Corruption may involve profit or another type of material benefit gained illegally as a consequence of the officer's authority. Typical forms of corruption include Bribery, Extortion, receiving or fencing stolen goods, and selling drugs. The term also refers to patterns of misconduct within a given police department or special unit, particularly where offenses are repeated with the acquiescence of superiors or through other ongoing failure to correct them.

Safeguards against police misconduct exist throughout the law. Police departments themselves establish codes of conduct, train new recruits, and investigate and discipline officers, sometimes in cooperation with civilian complaint review boards which are intended to provide independent evaluative and remedial advice. Protections are also found in state law, which permits victims to sue police for damages in civil actions. Typically, these actions are brought for claims such as the use of excessive force ("police brutality"), false arrest and imprisonment, Malicious Prosecution, and Wrongful Death. State actions may be brought simultaneously with additional claims for constitutional violations.

Through both criminal and civil statutes, federal law specifically targets police misconduct. Federal law is applicable to all state, county, and local officers, including those who work in correctional facilities. The key federal criminal statute makes it unlawful for anyone acting with police authority to deprive or conspire to deprive another person of any right protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States (Section 18 U.S.C. § 241 [2000]). Another statute, commonly referred to as the police misconduct provision, makes it unlawful for state or local police to engage in a pattern or practice of conduct that deprives persons of their rights (42 U.S.C.A. 14141 [2000]).

Additionally, federal law prohibits discrimination in police work. Any police department receiving federal funding is covered by Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000d) and the Office of Justice Programs statute (42 U.S.C. § 3789d[c]), which prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, and religion. These laws prohibit conduct ranging from racial slurs and unjustified arrests to the refusal of departments to respond to discrimination complaints.

Because neither the federal criminal statute nor the civil police misconduct provision provides for lawsuits by individuals, only the federal government may bring suit under these laws. Enforcement is the responsibility of the Justice Department. Criminal convictions are punishable by fines and imprisonment. Civil convictions are remedied through injunctive relief, a type of court order that requires a change in behavior; typically, resolutions in such cases force police departments to stop abusive practices, institute types of reform, or submit to court supervision.

Private litigation against police officers or departments is difficult. Besides time and expense, a significant hurdle to success is found in the legal protections that police enjoy. Since the late twentieth century, many court decisions have expanded the powers of police to perform routine stops and searches. Plaintiffs generally must prove willful or unlawful conduct on the part of police; showing mere Negligence or other failure of due care by police officers often does not suffice in court.

Most problematically of all for plaintiffs, police are protected by the defense of immunity—an exemption from penalties and burdens that the law generally places on other citizens. This Immunity is limited, unlike the absolute immunity enjoyed by judges or legislators. In theory, the defense allows police to do their job without fear of Reprisal. In practice, however, it has become increasingly difficult for individuals to sue law enforcement officers for damages for allegedly violating their civil rights. U.S. Supreme Court decisions have continually asserted the general rule that officers must be given the benefit of the doubt that they acted lawfully in carrying out their day-to-day duties, a position reasserted in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2001).

History

Society has grappled with misconduct and corruption issues for as long as it has had police officers. Through the mid-to-late nineteenth century, private police forces were commonplace, and agents of Pinkerton's and other forhire services became notorious as the muscle employers used to violently end strikes. Heavyhanded law enforcement as well as Vigilantism by groups such as the racist Ku Klux Klan spurred passage of the civil rights act of 1871, which criminalized acting under state law to deprive a person of constitutional or other rights under federal law. Section 1983 of the act remains a critical tool in the early 2000s for enforcing constitutional rights, with direct applicability to police misconduct cases.

The twentieth century saw multiple legal, administrative, and scholarly approaches to the problem. Some developments bore indirectly upon police misconduct, such as the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which gave new protections to citizens who had long suffered discriminatory policing. Additionally, a string of landmark Supreme Court decisions during the era gave new force both to individual privacy rights as well as to curbs upon Police Power: highly influential cases resulted in the strengthening of Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable Search and Seizure, evidentiary rules forbidding the use at trial of evidence tainted by unconstitutional police actions, and the establishment of the so-called Miranda Warning requiring officers to advise detained suspects of their constitutional rights.

While these decisions profoundly shaped the legal and social landscape, renewed focus on police misconduct and corruption occurred in the latter part of the century. As the pioneering criminologist Herman Goldstein argued, traditional views were based on the assumption that police abuse reflected the moral failings of individual officers—the so-called "bad cop." Public scandals began to shape a new view of the problem. In 1971, New York City organized the Knapp Commission to hold hearings on the extent of corruption in the city's police department. Police officer Frank Serpico's startling testimony against fellow officers not only revealed systemic corruption but highlighted a longstanding obstacle to investigating these abuses: the fraternal understanding among police officers known variously as "the Code of Silence" and "the Blue Curtain" under which officers regard testimony against a fellow officer as betrayal.

Broader recognition of the problem brought more ambitious reform efforts in the 1980s and 1990s. Spurred by the work of criminologists such as Goldstein and others, police departments sought to improve organizational rules, training, and prevention and control mechanisms. Such efforts are reflected in the publication of a code of police conduct by the International Association of Chiefs of Police, more rigorous training for officers, and experimented with so-called community policing programs to improve ties between officers and the public. Several cities established joint police and civilian complaint review boards to give citizens a larger role in what traditionally had been a closed, internal process by police departments.

Among the most dramatic examples of system-wide reform is New York City's response to long-standing brutality, discrimination, and corruption within the New York City Police Department (NYPD). After flirting with civilian review of complaints against police in the 1960s, the city committed to it after public outcry over the videotaping of officers beating citizens who violated curfew in 1988. The city subsequently established its Civilian Complaint Review Board, which became an all-civilian agency in 1993. In 1992, responding to new complaints, Mayor David N. Dinkins appointed the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and the Anti-Corruption Procedures of the Police Department, known as the Mollen Commission. Two years later, the commission concluded that the city had alternated between cycles of corruption and reform. Afterwards, in 1995, Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani established the full-time Commission to Combat Police Corruption (CCPC) as an entity independent from the police department. The CCPC monitors

the NYPD anti-corruption policies and procedures, conducts audits, and issues public reports.

Contemporary Problems

Despite legal safeguards and well-intentioned reforms, police problems have continued to produce headlines. The exact scope of misconduct is unknown. Misconduct complaints can be quantified on a city-by-city basis, but these data are often subjective, and far more complaints are filed than ever are evaluated at trial. Corruption is even harder to measure. As the National Institute of Justice acknowledged in its May 2000 report, The Measurement of Police Integrity, most corruption incidents go unreported, and data that do exist "are best regarded as measures of a police agency's anticorruption activity, not the actual level of corruption."

During the late 1990s, highly-publicized cases in New York, New Jersey, Texas, Detroit, and Cleveland exposed an apparently new trend: police drug corruption. In the Cleveland case alone, the FBI arrested 42 officers from five law enforcement agencies in 1998 on charges of conspiracy to distribute cocaine. In a 1998 report to U.S. Congressman Charles B. Rangel, the federal General Accounting Office (GAO) found evidence of growing police involvement in drug sales, theft of drugs and money from drug dealers, and perjured testimony about illegal searches. The GAO survey of police commission reports and academic research suggested a troubling new dimension previously not seen in studies of police corruption. Traditionally, police corruption had been understood to involve individuals acting alone, but the new trend revealed officers working in small groups to protect and assist each other.

In 1999, this pattern emerged in one of the worst police corruption scandals in U.S. history. The scandal involved the Los Angeles Police Department's Rampart precinct and particularly its elite anti-gang unit, CRASH (Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums). Following local and federal investigations, CRASH was dismantled, some 70 officers were investigated, and several either pleaded guilty to or were convicted of crimes ranging from drug theft and peddling to assault, fabricating arrests, and filing false reports.

The Rampart scandal bore heavy costs, financially as well as in human terms. Several dozen criminal convictions credited to the work of the corrupt officers were overturned. By 2003, the city had already paid $40 million to settle lawsuits. In a settlement with the federal government in 2000, the Los Angeles City Council accepted a Consent Decree that placed the city's police department under the supervision of a federal judge for five years to implement and monitor reforms.

However, reform is no panacea. Even New York City's extensive reforms were called into doubt by two high-profile police cases in the 1990s. Both highlighted the difficulties inherent in prosecuting even apparently clear-cut misconduct. The first, in 1997, involved Haitian immigrant Abner Louima, who was shockingly beaten in a police cruiser and sodomized in a bathroom with a broom handle by four NYPD officers. Louima ultimately settled a civil case against the department for $8.7 million in 2001, one of the highest police brutality settlements ever paid and the highest by New York City since paying a $3 million settlement in the choking death of Anthony Baez in 1994.

Yet, despite much public frustration, prosecution of the officers was less conclusive. Officer Justin Volpe pleaded guilty to leading the Sodomy assault and was sentenced to 30 years in prison. However, in 1999, his fellow three officers were acquitted on charges of assault in the police cruiser; one of them, officer Charles Schwarz, was convicted of violating Louima's civil rights for holding him down during the bathroom assault. In 2000, all three were convicted of obstructing justice for their actions in covering up evidence of the attack, but these convictions were later overturned in United States v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2002). Ordered a new trial on the civil rights charge, Schwarz reached a plea bargain in September 2002, agreeing to be sentenced to a 5-year prison term.

The second New York controversy involved the killing in 1999 of an unarmed man. Four undercover police officers shot Amadou Diallo 41 times after stopping the Guinean immigrant in the vestibule of his apartment building, where, they said, he reached into his back pocket. Large public protests attracted activists such as Susan Sarandon and former New York mayor David Dinkins, who argued that the department's so-called Aggressive Street Crimes Unit was in fact far too aggressive. In 2000, the four officers were acquitted in a trial that supporters said vindicated them but which critics blamed on lax prosecution.

Outside the courts, mounting resentment over discriminatory misconduct by police officers has occasionally led to rioting. In contemporary experience, the Los Angeles riots in 1992 followed the acquittal of white police officers charged with the videotaped beating of black motorist rodney king. In April 2001, three days of rioting in Cincinnati followed the acquittal of a white police officer on charges of shooting Timothy Thomas, a 19-year old unarmed black man.

Cities, courts, police departments, and criminologists all continue to examine ways to bring meaningful reform to police departments. Some critics have argued that misconduct and corruption are age-old problems that resist all efforts at eradication; the best society can do, in this view, is monitor and correct. Others trace recent problems to public policy that emphasizes aggressive policing of drug, gang, and street crimes. Whatever the cause and the solution, until more efficacious remedies are found, some citizens will still require protection from the very people appointed to protect and serve them.

[Bisto]

There is now a real opportunity to reform the police.

The traffic police scandals caught fire so easily because there was no revelation, no surprise, no secret. Anyone with a vehicle has had to pay "informal tax" to the police at some time. The saying "in the army seniors take care of juniors, in the police juniors take care of seniors" has the status of a proverb. Few doubt that the highway police extort money and pass it up to their bosses.

But if the scandal results only in a clean-up in the traffic police, then a great opportunity will be lost. The highway extortion is only one part of police revenue-gathering activities. At least three others are worth mentioning: 1) many businesses including gold shops and entertainment outlets have to pay regular protection fees; 2) many illegal businesses like gambling and prostitution are "licensed" by regular payments to the police; 3) police officers are often found in illegal businesses, especially drugs, the sex trade, and human trafficking.

Since the scandal broke, several senior police figures have wrung their hands in public about the need for reform. But they claim the institution is basically fine. The problems, they argue, arise from a minority of "bad" officers. This can be fixed by improvements in recruitment and training. The Interior Minister has informally endorsed this view.

But the problems run much deeper. Consider just the scandals of the last few years. The Saudi jewelry scandal revealed gangs of police officers fighting and killing one another over some very valuable loot. The Lang Suan massacre allegedly happened because one officer lost patience with the massive revenue-gathering at a provincial police station. The Golden Pig affair suggested several senior officers were involved in the gambling business.

It may be true that most of the 200,000 plus police officers are good and honest people, and that these scandals are the work of a bad minority. But it is the structure and culture of the police service which attracts, nurtures and often protects this minority. Any real reform has to attack the structure.

How did the police get to be like this? Four factors in the service’s history helped to shape the structure. First, the force was created around a century ago as part of the general centralisation of government power, and as a specific device to control the Chinese angyi (secret societies). From the beginning it was more like an army of occupation than a community-based service. Second, also from the beginning government skimped on the budget and expected the police to supplement by informal revenue-gathering. Third, during the Cold War the police was extensively militarised to fight communists. Fourth, also during the Cold War, some senior officers developed illegal business rackets, especially drug trading.

Junior officers are so poorly paid that they are easily socialised into a culture of corruption. As one officer wryly commented: a new recruit may start out pure white, but will begin greying before he is out of the police school, and get steadily darker from then on.

The force is top-heavy. Too many senior levels have too little to do except manage the informal revenue flows. The highway scandal revealed a massive paperwork operation to disguise the misallocation of revenue from fines. The junior traffic policemen’s complaint that they were short-changed by their bosses is not unique. Past investigations have found senior officers pocketing allowances and bonuses due to their subordinates.

Authority within the police is very centralised. This promotes corruption, nepotism, and abuse of power. It also makes it impossible to build any significant relationships between local police units and the communities they serve.

The public feel helpless in the face of police misconduct. There is no channel of public recourse. Senior officers and ministers usually defend the institution against criticism. It took the very new factor of independent electronic journalism to prise the lid off.

This state of the Thai police is far from unique. Many countries have gone through a similar stage. In the US and Europe, reform of similar police problems was a major issue earlier this century. World-wide there is a lot of learning on how to tackle these problems. The difference is that in Thailand there has been no government with a political willl to do anything about it. Reform of the Thai police must certainly include adjustments in recruitment and training, but must also go far beyond:

-Pay and equip the junior officers properly, and so remove the rationale for the regular and irregular bonus systems.

-Rationalise the top-heavy structure through an enforced early retirement scheme.

-Decentralise the control structure and move towards the model of a community-based police force.

-Demilitarise by adjusting ranks, uniforms, and many aspects of the police’s internal culture.

-Enforce a better code-of-conduct, but offer an amnesty. The amnesty is a very eloquent device. It says: we will not harass you for mistakes of the past, because often those mistakes were intrinsic to the system and culture, rather than the failings of individuals; but now the system has changed so individual conduct must change too.

-Provide a better channel for public recourse against police actions.

-Decriminalise petty illegalities which offer opportunities for revenue-gathering. Many other countries have reformed laws on gambling, liquor and prostitution to bring the law into line with social reality and so remove opportunities for widespread police corruption.

Most of these reforms have been recommended by past investigations. But dictatorial governments thought reform unnecessary (this sort of police force suited them), and democratic governments have found the topic too dangerous. Reform will only come about through popular pressure. It will not be easy and it will take time. But it has to start at some point. At least now the topic is up for discussion. This is a great opportunity.

1

[caf]

"If police officers receive good pay" Correct. But what about a culture change , Somchai Homlaor. Do you not see a need for that?

"He said many were victims of the administration of deposed former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra..." Keep politics out of this debate. How long and under what governments has there been a problem?

"though police representatives sitting on a review panel chaired by former justice minister Charnchai Likhitjittha have remained steadfastly opposed to the draft Bill."

steadfastly no compromise or discussion????

[caf]

NOT IMPOSSIBLE

LINK

The violation of state and federal laws or the violation of individuals' constitutional rights by police officers; also when police commit crimes for personal gain.

Police misconduct and corruption are abuses of police authority. Sometimes used interchangeably, the terms refer to a wide range of procedural, criminal, and civil violations. Misconduct is the broadest category. Misconduct is "procedural" wg failure to correct them.

ld unarmed black man.

Cities, courts, police departments, and criminologists all continue to examine ways to bring meaningful reform to police from the very people appointed to protect and serve them.

Interesting but this is a Thai topic. Do you have any views about this topic?

( I have cut chunks out of this long post)

Edited August 4, 2009 by caf

[Ferwert]

Thank you for exposing yourself Bisto. You just confirmed you agenda. And it is not police corruption.

[caf]

Some good points Bisto,

Will some reform work this time

[Lite Beer]

Post have been temporarily removed while under Moderation revue.

[caf]

Reforming the police is going to be nigh on impossible. It is also linked into the poltical power struggle which complicates things. Stuff like human rights, formal equality before the law and innocence until proven guilty are not really issues that are driving anything right now.

This sums up the thread

Let's diarise it and look at this thread in 1 , 2 , 3 months time

[Plus]

Police reform comes into effect on August 16, like it or not. There are thousands of positions in colonel-general range to be reshuffled, and that list is one of the factors in Abhisit-Suthep-Patcharawat power play. Politicians are prohibited from interfering with the list, but they can appoint the Police Chief who can, even as Acting police chief while Patcharawat is on forced holidays. Then, in September, permanent Police Chief position is up for grabs.

Thaksin staffed the police with his cronies, if the position were awarded according to seniority, then next in line are Thaksin's brother in law and a classmate. Abhisit said he'd appoint Patcharawat's successor according to suitability instead.

[JoeThePoster]

Abhisit said he'd appoint Patcharawat's successor according to suitability instead.

That would be a neat trick - considering he couldn't do that with his own cabinet.

[Mario2008]

1 post and 2 replies have been deleted after discussion between the moderators.

[rkidlad]

1 post and 2 replies have been deleted after discussion between the moderators.

Does this really need to be discussed? If one of you doesn't like it, take it out.

Take yourselves way too seriously! This is Thaivisa, not BBC or CNN.

[meadish_sweetball]

The reason for such posts is that if we don't inform about removals in the threads, we tend to receive lots of PMs from posters asking where the posts went, and it's a lot more tedious answering many individual PMs than making an announcement in the thread.