Who Will Bang Their Heads If Malaysia And Thailand Build A Border Wall

[NongKhaiKid]

8 hours ago, kamahele said:

Good luck with that. Trump's "big big wall" is estimated to cost about 25 billion dollars so I wonder how much the Thai - Malay wall will cost.

When the corruption on both sides of the wall is factored in... expensive !

[Torrens54]

Okay, just a couple of questions.

1: Do they have a quote to build it from TRUMP CON-structions?

2: Will MEXICO pay for it?

[hotchilli]

Don't panic...
if the wall is built to the same standards as most of the roads it will collapse inside 6 months..

[Srikcir]

6 hours ago, ddavidovsky said:

If they had their own language they would have more of a case - I'm not sure having their own dialect is enough.

Although of the major regional languages of Thailand, Southern Thai is most similar in lexicon and grammar to Central Thai, the varieties are sufficiently different that mutual intelligibility between the two can be problematic. Southern Thai presents a diglossic situation wherein registers range from the most formal (Standard Central Thai spoken with Southern Thai tones and accent) to the common vernacular (which utilises more local vocabulary and incorporates more words from Patani Malay). The Thai language was introduced with Siamese incursions into the Malay Peninsula possibly starting as early as the Sukhothai Kingdom. During this and successive kingdoms, the area in which Southern Thai is spoken was a frontier zone between Thai polities and the Malay Sultanates. Malay vocabulary is an integral part of the lexicon, as Malay was formerly spoken throughout the region and many speakers of the language still speak the Patani dialect of Malay.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Southern_Thai_language#Differences_from_Standard_Thai

Apparently there is sufficient difference between Southern Thai and Central Thai that the Kingdom mandated upon annexation that the official language will be Central Thai for interaction with government organizations and public education.

[PatOngo]

Who Will Bang Their Heads If Malaysia And Thailand Build A Border Wall

 

...........Headbangers, of course!

[jamesbrock]

7 hours ago, ddavidovsky said:

If anything, they will just reinforce the border adjacent to populated areas, though I suggest they spend the money instead on developing the southern provinces and giving them greater autonomy, which is really what they want - I don't believe even the insurgents think that a separate state is viable.

 

One of the problems is the Thai Government are spending - just not in the right way to make any meaningful change.

 

Between 2004 and 2012 the government spent 161 billion Baht on resolving the conflict in Patani. Approximately 70 per cent of this (110 billion Baht) was spent on counter-insurgency operations. 

 

7 hours ago, ddavidovsky said:

Statehood is like species differentiation. It takes an aeon of nurturing a distinct heritage. The place is just not different enough. If they had their own language they would have more of a case - I'm not sure having their own dialect is enough.

 

Except that the local language, Yawi, or Kelantan-Pattani Malay, is a Malayan language - not a dialect of Thai - proving that the Patani are ethnic Malay, not ethnic Thai.

 

7 hours ago, ddavidovsky said:

As to the economics of it, it takes more than a bit of agriculture. Tourism potential is only moderate and it's a smallish area - limited room for development but still would require sufficient GDP to keep it running.

 

According to the 2009 Thailand Human Development Report, published by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the combined size of the Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat’s economy in 2007 was just over 120,000 million Baht.

 

7 hours ago, ddavidovsky said:

I can't see it working and I doubt that was ever their real goal, though the idea of independence has crept up recently in order to sustain the struggle. Thailand can solve this problem by throwing money down there and giving them enough autonomy. No other solution is needed - and there really is no other solution.

 

Agreed. With the caveat that the money spent down there actually goes to the region. According to the above UNDP report, 

 

"During fiscal years 2004-2008, 109,000 million baht was allocated to security and development activities in five provinces in the deep South. For fiscal years 2009-2012, 63 billion baht was earmarked under the Development Plan for the Special Area – Five Southern Border Provinces. It is the largest programme budget for the area, and the first that development activities are allocated more budget than security activities. A key issue is the implementation; to ensure that the local population truly benefit from the allocation. There also remains an issue of people’s participation in shaping their own destiny which invites an effective response."

 

The government placed ISOC in charge of the disbursement of most of the above mentioned 63 billion Baht funds allocated for development programs, and, in many instances, it was the military themselves who perform the development activities. UNICEF also reported how government development projects are seen as disregarding local input and how much of the benefits of these projects go to business interests outside of the region. 

Edited September 13, 2016 by jamesbrock
formatting issues

[jamesbrock]

10 minutes ago, Srikcir said:

Although of the major regional languages of Thailand, Southern Thai is most similar in lexicon and grammar to Central Thai, the varieties are sufficiently different that mutual intelligibility between the two can be problematic. Southern Thai presents a diglossic situation wherein registers range from the most formal (Standard Central Thai spoken with Southern Thai tones and accent) to the common vernacular (which utilises more local vocabulary and incorporates more words from Patani Malay). The Thai language was introduced with Siamese incursions into the Malay Peninsula possibly starting as early as the Sukhothai Kingdom. During this and successive kingdoms, the area in which Southern Thai is spoken was a frontier zone between Thai polities and the Malay Sultanates. Malay vocabulary is an integral part of the lexicon, as Malay was formerly spoken throughout the region and many speakers of the language still speak the Patani dialect of Malay.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Southern_Thai_language#Differences_from_Standard_Thai

Apparently there is sufficient difference between Southern Thai and Central Thai that the Kingdom mandated upon annexation that the official language will be Central Thai for interaction with government organizations and public education.

 

As replied to ddavidovsky, the local language of the ethnic Malay population of Patani is Yawi, or Kelantan-Pattani Malay. It is is a highly divergent dialect of Malay.

 

From the introduction of the Wiki article you quoted, 

 

Quote

Southern Thai ... is spoken by roughly five million people, and as a second language by the 1.5 million speakers of Kelantan-Pattani Malay and other ethnic groups...

 

[Oxx]

11 minutes ago, jamesbrock said:

Except that the local language, Yawi, or Kelantan-Pattani Malay, is a Malayan language - not a dialect of Thai - proving that the Patani are ethnic Malay, not ethnic Thai.

 

This is very much an over-simplification, and Jawi is only one of the languages of the area.

 

The whole of Siam was a patchwork of people of different ethnicities:  Thai, Mon, Khmer, Vietnamese, Malay, etc., typically living in separate villages, speaking their own languages.  One can still see vestiges of this across the Kingdom, with some villages retaining their ethnic roots (and traditional trades such as knife making or pottery).  In the south it was the same, with Thai and Malay people living in separate communities.

 

The ongoing terrorism has led to a massive exodus of peoples from the south.  However, given that the Buddhist communities were typically wealthier than the Moslem ones, more (Thai) Buddhists have left than (Malay) Moslem ones, leading to a now higher proportion of Moslems in the four southern provinces.

 

[jamesbrock]

Just now, Oxx said:

This is very much an over-simplification, and Jawi is only one of the languages of the area.

 

In the south it was the same, with Thai and Malay people living in separate communities.

 

The ongoing terrorism has led to a massive exodus of peoples from the south.  However, given that the Buddhist communities were typically wealthier than the Moslem ones, more (Thai) Buddhists have left than (Malay) Moslem ones, leading to a now higher proportion of Moslems in the four southern provinces.

 

Wrong on so many counts.

 

There has been a great deal of academic research undertaken on the Southern Insurgency - by Thai and international academics and security experts - most of which routinely ignored by the Thai authorities (and people who only want to see a religious reason).

 

This paper, The Root Cause and Aggravating Factors Behind the Violence in Patani, presented to the Conflict in Thailand Seminar in Lund, Sweden, on August 31st 2013, aggregates a large number of studies, and is a very interesting read:

 

 

https://www.academia.edu/5071475/The_root_cause_and_aggravating_factors_behind_the_violence_in_Patani

 

For those who don't have the time to read, or the desire to understand, I'll include the conclusions:

 

Quote

Conclusions 

 

The paper has attempted to illuminate the reasons behind the surge in violent attacks which has made Patani one of the most unstable regions in the world. It argues that while the literature has suggested numerous drivers behind the violence, it is important to distinguish between the root cause of the conflict and aggravating factors which are fuelling the violence. The paper will end with concluding remarks concerning addressing the root cause of the instability which is necessary for resolving the conflict. However, since addressing the root cause is unlikely to be sufficient in resolving the conflict without confronting the aggravating factors, important points on the latter are now raised. 

 

The major aggravating factors extracted from the literature and reported in this paper include; 1) the militarisation of the region including the use of civilian militia and public spaces, such as Buddhist temples, 2) an excess of illegitimate state institutions which lack professionalism and undermine one another, 3) national political rivalries whose competition channels through the local state institutions and manifests into poor collaboration in areas such as counter-insurgency, and 4) economic marginalisation felt by the Malay community. Ironically, all four of these factors are a direct result of the government’s policies towards resolving the conflict. The solution to alleviating these destabilising policies is, as Barter (2011) argues, for the government to do less, not more, which I would add, includes the military especially. Sarosi and Sombatpoonsiri’s (2011) call for disbanding civilian militias and restricting gun ownership along with what one would naturally infer from Jerryson (2009), which would be for security forces to stop using Buddhist temples as military spaces, would be the most positive form of action for de-militarising the region. 

 

An effective way to reduce the excessive number of inefficient institutions would be to follow Barter’s (2011) recommendation of getting rid of overlapping administrative bodies and intelligence agencies. This links in with confronting the destabilising effect of competition between different political forces, which undermines counter-insurgency operations. Conglomerating these different political factions into one institution would force the different groups to collaborate as resources and intelligence would have to be shared and these parties would not be able to function separately. Currently, the balance of power and control of resources is too much to the advantage of the military which adds to tensions within the security forces. 

 

Finally, the military or any other security force should not be involved in development projects in the region, let alone conducting them themselves without participation from the local community. Resources for development should be in the hands of local community organisations which are made up of the Patani inhabitants. If the government is truly concerned about the poor state of education and health in Patani then improving the access of Patani Malays to working in these sectors as well as providing a better service in these areas for Patani Malays can be facilitated in allowing the local language, Yawi, to be used in these public sectors. 

 

There are many options available to the government in attempting to resolve the conflict in Patani. However, for any real chance of resolving the conflict, the government has to be seriously committed to tackling the root cause of the conflict. Without this political will, any other peace initiatives will have been made in vain. The Thai state has to officially recognise the existence of the Patani Malay identity, to give it an equal status to the Thai national identity within the Patani region, and to stop trying to assimilate the Patani Malays into Thais. This may seem trivial to outsiders but it has serious symbolic meaning to Patani Malays and especially to those involved in the Patani insurgency movement. 

 

Likewise, this recognition is anything but trivial for the Thai state as it means a complete revision of the government’s attitude to its ethnic minorities since the beginning of the Thai nationalist project over a hundred years ago. This brings us back to the argument held by many state officials that giving such concessions to the Patani Malays will attract demands from other ethnic groups within Thailand for the same recognition. The simple answer to this is yes, and of course it should if the country is to live up to its self-proclaimed status as the land of the free. 

 

In reality, however, many ethnic minorities may show no interest in forming a distinct identity to the Thai identity. For instance, the ethnic Malays in Patani’s neighboring province of Satun have never showed any interest in differentiating themselves from Thais, apart from stating that they are Muslim. Likewise, the 9.4 million ethnic Chinese who make up 14 per cent of Thailand’s population (The CIA Factbook) are also unlikely to show much interest in adopting another identity other than Thai or Thai-Chinese. The point is that all citizens of Thailand should have the choice to decide their own identities, whether it be simply Thai or another ethnic identity, such as Malay, Lao or Northern Khmer, for example.

 

Sooner or later, Thailand will have to address its attitude towards its ethnic minorities whether it decides to seriously commit itself to resolving the conflict in Patani or not. Although there is no longer a strong resistance to Thai hegemony amongst the Isan (meaning northeasterners in Thai), the majority still refer to themselves as Lao privately, use their own language, which is distinct from Thai and the Lao language which is spoken in neighbouring Laos, and have a strong feeling of being treated as second-class citizens in Thailand (McCargo and Hongladarom, 2004). On the other hand, according to Vail (2007), the northern Khmer, of which there are over one million speakers in Thailand, do not show any interest in conserving a distinct identity from Thai. However, they still face major social stigmatism and choose to hide their Khmer roots through fear of denigration from the Thai populace. 

 

The treatment of ethnic minorities as inferior to ethnic Thais is problematic as they make up a substantial proportion of the country’s population. The Lao, from the Isan region represent over 20 million of all Thai citizens (McCargo and Hongladarom, 2004) which means they are an important source of political support for anyone who aims to lead the country. Unlike the Thai- Chinese, it was the Thai state which came to the Malays, Lao, Northern Khmer and other ethnic groups and not the other way around. Thailand fails to officially recognise and respect this, and the ethnic minorities should not forget this either.

 

[Srikcir]

1 hour ago, jamesbrock said:

For those who don't have the time to read

An interesting excerpt below. Thanks for the publication.

 

.....to overcome the fact that the Malay identity was so strong in Patani, the military junta invented the idea of Thai-Islam whereby Patani Malays would be seen as Thai-Muslims or simply Thais.
By introducing the creation of Thai-Islam into Thai nationalism, while the state was allowing religious tolerance to exist it was confirming that there could be no other difference between Thai citizens (Aphornsuvan, 2003). Porath (2010) describes these new laws as the beginning of ethnocide which affected all ethnic minorities in Thailand. For the Malays it meant they had to give up the traditional Muslim dress and stop speaking the Malay language in public. While Islam was now officially tolerated, religious repression continued. Although many of Phibun’s draconian laws were repealed after his fall from office his policies left a lasting impression on what constituted the Thai nation (Porath, 2010).

 

The Malay-Thai insurgency is the Thai military's own frankenstein.

[ddavidovsky]

For those with a serious interest, this paper also contains some useful sociological insights into the situation:

http://www.apu.ac.jp/rcaps/uploads/fckeditor/publications/journal/RJAPS_V27_Otto.pdf

 

I said Thailand needs to increase development and give greater autonomy to the south. Perhaps even more important is for Bangkok to show more respect for their culture.

[Srikcir]

1 hour ago, ddavidovsky said:

Perhaps even more important is for Bangkok to show more respect for their culture.

Little incentive for that now.

 

Instead of promoting religious unity among Buddhism and other religions as the 2007 constitution did, the 2016 draft mandates the government to protect Buddhism from all forms of threats. Although the protection of religious freedom remains intact, the shift in religious policy should be red-flagged as it indicates less tolerance and more influence for radical Buddhist groups. (Khemthong Tonsakulrungruang 2016). It is for that reason that CDC Chairman Meechai did not require Buddhism to be the State religion in the 2016 draft.

[garyk]

I have been on the Rio Grande , Texas and Mexico borders birding many times. It is more like a war zone. Good luck what that one!

[anotheruser]

Will Mexico pay for it?

[Gulfsailor]

3 hours ago, Father Fintan Stack said:

 

Of course there can be talks and there has been previously on numerous occasions. Former PM Anand headed a delegation when Thaksin was in power and came up with a list of compromises to address the situation however they were dismissed out of hand by General Prem and the Privy Council. The dinosaurs in the Thai military won't budge an inch, one of the reasons why the conflict has gotten worse since the took power in 2006. 

 

The separatists simply want more autonomy for the four Southern provinces, and for their culture and language to be recognised by the Thai state. They are in the majority there and it is traditionally their land.

 

This conflict has more parallels with the Troubles in Ireland than any Islamic extremism and with a little more tolerance and understanding could be more easily solved than people think. 

 

Nice to see the usual fascists celebrating building walls and further oppression of the locals instead of constructive dialogue and amicable solutions. 

 You have it all backwards. The violence escalated when Thaksin came to power in 2001 and took a hawkish approach to the southern problem. He dissolved the SBPAC in 2002 which was a major contributor to the 2004 Tak Bai incident in 2004. That's when the violence escalated rapidly. Thaksins mishandling of the southern conflict was one of the main reasons the coup of 2007 took place. 

[garyk]

39 minutes ago, anotheruser said:

Will Mexico pay for it?

Sure!!!!!!!!  

[jamesbrock]

8 hours ago, ddavidovsky said:

For those with a serious interest, this paper also contains some useful sociological insights into the situation:

http://www.apu.ac.jp/rcaps/uploads/fckeditor/publications/journal/RJAPS_V27_Otto.pdf

 

I said Thailand needs to increase development and give greater autonomy to the south. Perhaps even more important is for Bangkok to show more respect for their culture.

 

Good one. A very good paper, well worth reading. 

[Srikcir]

4 hours ago, Gulfsailor said:

Thaksins mishandling of the southern conflict was one of the main reasons the coup of 2007 took place.

No. It was not the main reason and likely not even a minor reason.

 

In fact the Thai military supported Thaksin's hardline against the Malay-Thai protests and insurgency. Thaksin's overthrow had more to do with his increasing power through the Thai populace that challenged the traditional loyalist power base.

So while Thaksin came into power in 2001, it wasn't until September 2006 that he and his government were overthrown by military coup. In January 2004 Thaksin imposed martial law allowing military security forces to search and arrest suspected militants without a warrant and hold them without charge. And in 2005, the Thaksin government imposed a state of emergency in the southern provinces, giving military security forces immunity from prosecution for any act committed in the line of duty.

 

The Tak Bai incident occurred on 25 October 2004 in Tak Bai, Narathiwat Province. Obviously, with the military’s explicit support for Thaksin’s increasing aggressive behavior towards the insurgency over the five years of Thaksin’s regime the coup was not in opposition to Thaksin's policies towards the insurgency or the Tak Bai incident.

 

In the Tak Bai incident 1,500 people protested the detention of six men. Several hours into the protest, the crowd attempted to cross the police barrier into the station. Police responded with tear gas and water cannons, and the crowd responded by throwing rocks. Police fired into the air and then into the crowd at head height, killing seven. Then 1,300 protesters were detained by the Thai military security forces and transported to an army camp Army Camp in Pattani Province. By the time the trucks arrived at the destination, 78 detainees had died from suffocation or organ collapse. (Wikipedia, etc.)

 

The military was, therefore, a willing and participating party in the deaths of the Tak Bai 78 detainees.

 

Unsurprisingly, a 2009 inquest found that security officials had performed their duty without wrongdoing, concluding that the 78 detainees were not killed deliberately. A Supreme Court ruling in August 2013 absolved security personnel of the blame, saying they were only performing their duties.

[ddavidovsky]

The more I think about it, the more the solution seems to be obvious. Rapprochement through cultural empathy rather than attempts at coercive assimiliation. Simple example: in movie theatres, the south could have a special version of the pre-film anthem tailored to local cultural sensibilities, rather than just including 'token man in sarong'.

 

A wall is precisely the opposite of what is needed. It will only heighten the sense of oppression. The Thais obviously don't get it and are fundamentally using the wrong strategy.

[DeepInTheForest]

On 9/12/2016 at 0:08 PM, BKKBrit said:

Incredible amount of uninformed and frankly ignorant comments in this thread. If you guys live here...shame on you.  For those outside the country and blame Islam for the price of bread and your property value dropping...do some research.  It's seriously frightening how many don't even know the history of the country they call home and profess to be experts. Jeesh. 

What, and give up our emotional, foundationless, jingoistic ranting? What kind of over-intellected killjoy are you? This site will go t--s up in a month. And then where will we all be, Mr. Sensible? Posting on BP with its eensy-weensy little comment boxes? No, thank you, if I do daresay so.

[DeepInTheForest]

On 9/12/2016 at 0:37 PM, ddavidovsky said:

 

Statehood is like species differentiation. It takes an aeon of nurturing a distinct heritage. The place is just not different enough. If they had their own language they would have more of a case - I'm not sure having their own dialect is enough.

As to the economics of it, it takes more than a bit of agriculture. Tourism potential is only moderate and it's a smallish area - limited room for development but still would require sufficient GDP to keep it running.

What would be it's new capital, Yala?

I can't see it working and I doubt that was ever their real goal, though the idea of independence has crept up recently in order to sustain the struggle. Thailand can solve this problem by throwing money down there and giving them enough autonomy. No other solution is needed - and there really is no other solution.

The first 3 paras employ muddled logic. Since when has a unique language been a sine qua non for statehood? If so, we should anticipate the US returning to the fold of the UK soon. And Cuba to Spain. And should Singapore, being too small, declare itself a failure and reattach itself to Malaysia? And Taiwan to China...? Those Caribbean principalities and Pacific Island states would have to throw in the towel, too.

 

I agree that Pattani probably does not desire statehood at this time, but these arguments are dubious.

[ddavidovsky]

20 minutes ago, DeepInTheForest said:

The first 3 paras employ muddled logic. Since when has a unique language been a sine qua non for statehood? If so, we should anticipate the US returning to the fold of the UK soon. And Cuba to Spain. And should Singapore, being too small, declare itself a failure and reattach itself to Malaysia? And Taiwan to China...? Those Caribbean principalities and Pacific Island states would have to throw in the towel, too.

 

I agree that Pattani probably does not desire statehood at this time, but these arguments are dubious.

 

Let's only draw reasonable comparisons. Tiny islands don't count. They are independent because they are tiny islands - they can pay their way because there's nothing much to pay, the don't have expansive hinterlands to maintain (edit: and culturally they are homogenous).

The US and Cuba etc don't compare - they were settled territories.

 

We're talking here about irredentism - local indigenous pockets on the edge of bigger nations that find themselves part of an alien culture. Such groups are found on the edge of pretty much any country. Point is that there are surely criteria for them to merit independence, and having a unique language is surely a big one. There are other things that would also help, such as having historical sites of cultural significance (such as Angkor or Ayutthaya) - I'm not aware of anything like that in the south.

Edited September 14, 2016 by ddavidovsky

[DeepInTheForest]

2 minutes ago, ddavidovsky said:

 

Let's only draw reasonable comparisons. Tiny islands don't count. They are independent because they are tiny islands - they can pay their way because there's nothing much to pay, the don't have expansive hinterlands to maintain.

The US and Cuba etc don't compare - they were settled territories.

 

We're talking here about irredentism - local indigenous pockets on the edge of bigger nations that find themselves part of an alien culture. Such groups are found on the edge of pretty much any country. Point is that there are surely criteria for them to merit independence, and having a unique language is surely a big one. There are other things that would also help, such as having historical sites of cultural significance (such as Angkor or Ayutthaya) - I'm not aware of anything like that in the south.

Ok, this is my last post.

The arguments still seem weak. And I'm not advocating for independence for Pattani.

Irredentist? Unique language? Tell that to Eritrea, South Sudan, Bangladesh, or even the Scots.

 

... "there are surely criteria for them to merit independence..." And who decides these criteria? Sounds paternalistic, even colonialist in tone.

... "historical sites of cultural significance..." -- Who decides what is culturally significant?

And so on. If we talked to the residents of the Deep South, I don't think they are thinking along terms dictated by our 'common sense'.

I'm done. All the best.

 

[Srikcir]

1 hour ago, ddavidovsky said:

historical sites of cultural significance

Research. For example:

Pattani still maintains the ruins of an ancient town in Yarang District that once served as an important port and center of administration, trade, and culture for many centuries.

http://thailand.sawadee.com/pattani/

[ddavidovsky]

8 minutes ago, Srikcir said:

Research. For example:

Pattani still maintains the ruins of an ancient town in Yarang District that once served as an important port and center of administration, trade, and culture for many centuries.

http://thailand.sawadee.com/pattani/

 

Hardly Angkor though, is it.

It has to be something impressive enough to make the rest of the world feel that the country has a world-class cultural identity of its own.

Anyway, the discussion is academic - independence is not going to happen. I just hope that wall doesn't either.