Thai Grassroots Movements Can Work Without Politicisation

[webfact]

Grassroots movements can work without politicisation

By Malee Traisawasdichai Lang

Special to The Nation

The political invention of a Thai class war between the poor and the rich effectively injected power into the red-shirt movement, but it has also dangerously accelerated the creation of precarious social divisions in Thailand.

In the current political conflict, academics and peace activists' resounding support of the red shirts' class politics is due partly to a pro-poor view as an antidote to inequality, and partly to resentment of the military's role in politics and the royalist connections of the government.

But there is danger in this class politics that errs on the side of the poor, making it difficult to keep the political complexity in sight. Painting the red-shirt uproar as a simplistic dichotomy of the rich and the poor, democracy against dictatorship, is to misunderstand the power struggle among the political elites that underpins the whole conflict.

When pro-red sympathisers depicted the conflict as a dead end, because of their preoccupation with the poor - who felt that the military's ousting of former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra was unjust - more productive discussion on other fundamental issues became peripheral.

During the red-shirt protest, academics came out to redefine "non-violence" to justify the hardcore red shirts' violent actions, turning a blind eye to the fact that armed militia groups were operating alongside the ordinary red-shirt supporters. The very concept of non-violence was torn apart when this alliance with the armed militia was not taken seriously by academics. None of Thailand's peaceful, pro-democracy student demonstrations in the past were armed.

Many academics have given the impression that the only issue was the oppressed poor versus an illegitimate government, but the red-shirt movement was a result of complex political manipulation.

Though many of the poor are Thaksin supporters, mobilisation has involved a well-coordinated network of Pheu Thai politicians and canvassers in villages, districts and provinces, and an efficient political propaganda machine.

There was recruitment, incitement and outsource financing to foster a climate of political violence. There were red-shirt schools, radios, magazines, phone-ins, video-links, militia training, and a stockpile of weapons. The conditions have been geared towards cultivating extremism, which the masterminds can manipulate to suit their specific interest and defeat their political enemies.

Yet, these fundamental issues of political manipulation and mass radicalisation are not being addressed. In fact, they have been covered up and countered by a set of representations: Thaksin has won the hearts and minds of the poor; the protesters were willing to die for democracy; the poor can think for themselves; nothing was wrong in paying the red shirts to join the protest; the middle class has double standards in ignoring the state's killing of red shirts; the yellow shirts' court case on the airport seizure did not proceed; the government censored and closed down red-shirt media, but not those of the yellow shirts. The list is long. What complicates the matter further is that all these arguments are right, however partially.

Another important issue that has been shied away from in discussions is the paradoxical union of strange bedfellows - the wedding of an ultra neo-liberalist tycoon and leftist extremists, young and old. The strength of the red-shirt movement has been this synthesis that succeeded in tapping each other's expertise. The extremists have skill in membership organisation and a powerful propaganda campaign based on the language of liberation and class inequality. Thaksin has funds, a party and canvassing network, a mass support base and, last but not least, an armed militia - which became evident as the one behind much of the violence during the deadly clashes. The late renegade Major General Kattiya Swasdiphol, who worked for Thaksin as militant leader before his assassination, disclosed publicly Thaksin's success in setting up an armed force as part of the movement's "three crystals", which also include the party and the masses.

How capitalism and communism joined hands in the campaign has never been scrutinised by academics. The lese majeste law conveniently becomes a culprit and justification for outbursts of dissastisfaction with the monarchy expressed by radical intellectuals and red-shirt campaigners. If the intention is truly about constructive and rational discussion on the monarchy in a changing world, the method would be to seek public dialogue to set rules about mutually acceptable standards for debate on this highly sensitive issue. The symbolic use of words - a class war between "prai" and "ammat", literally "surf" and "feudal elites", and the creation of a new Thai state suggested otherwise. The irony was that a large section of the red shirts, mainly royalist rural folk, had no idea about the extent to which this symbolic language went. Indeed, in the academic arena, there was more about blame on the state, less about red-shirt demagogues' duty to respect others' rights, and a weakness in rational discussion on the true agenda of the unrest. The possibility to work out alternatives was lost.

The problem lies in thinking that only the state, which is allied with the military, is repressive. When the abstract term "democracy" becomes a fort from which we wage war, the implicit rationale is that the red-shirt movement can do no wrong. If the recent violence in the name of the "pro-democracy" red-shirt uprising and the coup in 2006 can be seen and compared in review, the result would be a paradox. The coup, a crime against democracy that ousted a democratically-elected billionaire prime minister, was totally bloodless.

Conversely, the pro-democracy battle - with its own armed force - was the cruellest of its kind in the modern history of Thai politics. Apart from the visible damage to Bangkok, the injuries and loss of lives, the masterminds of this mini war took not only the Bangkok public and downtown businesses hostage, but also the red-shirt masses themselves. Innocent people became the tools and victims of the political elites' power struggle. In addition, human rights abuses under the Thaksin regime are still vivid in the memory today. The massacres of Thai Muslims in the Krue Se and Tak Bai incidents in 2004 left 32 and 85 people dead respectively; each incident lasted only a few hours. The case of 2,500 extrajudicial killings in Thaksin's "war on drugs" remains his legacy.

Many academics suggest that the government should move beyond Thaksin and redress social inequality. Conversely, there is also a need for Thaksin himself, and academics, to get over the notion of the 2006 coup as the cause of the political conflict, and to let the country move on. It is unproductive to keep rewinding the political clock to before the coup, to justify Thaksin's struggle to return to power. The easy narrative of Thailand's Robin Hood - that Thaksin is the protector of the poor, a symbol of democracy and a victim of the coup - needs to be abandoned.

In the aftermath of the clashes in Bangkok, there is an emerging consensus to move towards rehabilitation and reconciliation. This must begin with an apology to all victims of violence - the wounded, families of the dead, and those who have lost their livelihood. The red-shirt leaders cannot deny responsibility for starting the unrest and provoking violence in the full knowledge of imminent danger and damage. The government and the Army must also apologise for the losses that the military operation caused, even in self-defence and the necessity of restoring normalcy.

Opinion continues: Grassroots movements can work without politicisation

-- The Nation 2010-06-11

[chainarong]

POLITICISATION, nice word.

[givenall]

POLITICISATION, nice word.

What I don’t understand is that, we talk about the Red Shirt and northern people. What about the southern Thais, where do they all fit in these discussions. They are Thai too

[plachon]

POLITICISATION, nice word.

What I don’t understand is that, we talk about the Red Shirt and northern people. What about the southern Thais, where do they all fit in these discussions. They are Thai too

This is an execellent article by Malee - one of the best Opinion pieces I've seen in a long time that hits the nail on the head over several issues, especially the lost, floundering, ideologically strait-jacketed positions of many "academics", both domestic and foreign who have supported the Redshirts lock,stock and smoking M-79 launcher barrel(and usually can be found involved in mutual masturbation over on New Mandala).

Yes, the issue of Southern Thai's loyalties and support for non-Red alternatives to the struggle at the top is an interesting question, as is the position of an untold number of ordinary Isaan villagers who are relatively politically aware, but are frightened to speak out against the Redshirts in their home villages for fear of ridicule at best, or worse, intimidation and ostracisation. So they stay largely quiet and withdrawn in village social life, as the Redshirt supporters gain more overt power and confidence, after two or more years of constant radical propaganda has brainwashed them into thinking the sun shines out of Mr T and his henchmens' posterior, while the Democrats are the devil incarnate. This is not the type of "democracy" that will lead to peace and reconciliation in Thailand, but the type of radicalisation seen in neo-facist groups (which was the type of society that Thaksin dreamed of all along, if anyone can recall his rally of the adoring faithful in Muang Thong Thani during the latter part of his regime, which was as close to a Nazi rally as anything I've seen until the Redshirts' rallies at Phanfa Bridge began and the footclappers and thuggish guards were brought out in force).

A Wall (a la Pink Floyd) has been built and it is mostly of Thaksin's making. Thaksin got Pinky-syndrome I'm afraid.

[chainarong]

POLITICISATION, nice word.

What I don't understand is that, we talk about the Red Shirt and northern people. What about the southern Thais, where do they all fit in these discussions. They are Thai too

Two very seperate issues, one is religion the other is or supposed to be poor v rich, or though it started out as Thaskin for Thaskinland, the Sth issue is massive , its been going on since the Sultan annexed the land to Thailand ,so much water under the bridge now, so where do you start, neither side will relent , both sides are proud, pig headed, unreasonable, so the silent war continues.

[mazeltov]

an ultra neo-liberalist tycoon and leftist extremists and an armed force as part of the movement's "three crystals"

the article has some funny moments^, unintended by the writer, but is mostly very boring.

still another good example of different education.

Edited June 11, 2010 by mazeltov

[elkangorito]

There is only one problem in Thailand, which is the total denial that 'cultural' change is needed.

Many Thais I speak to often complain about things that directly relate to Thai Culture. As soon as I mention things like 'pride', they immediately go back to 'the program' (Thai Culture).

The first thing that needs to happen is that the Ministry of Culture be relegated to doing exactly what it should be doing...'preserving' Thai culture as something to be well remembered & enjoyed by all. They should not have any power whatsoever, to steer the course of this country.

In Thailand, 'culture' is a rule & not an enjoyed memory. It is drummed into the heads of many a Thai student every morning of their school life.

Thai Culture may have worked & been beneficial a long time ago but it is no longer beneficial (generally speaking) in a modern & globalised world. Many aspects of Thai Culture are wonderful & these aspects may be remembered & celebrated accordingly without the need for any indoctrination.

[chainarong]

There is only one problem in Thailand, which is the total denial that 'cultural' change is needed.

Many Thais I speak to often complain about things that directly relate to Thai Culture. As soon as I mention things like 'pride', they immediately go back to 'the program' (Thai Culture).

The first thing that needs to happen is that the Ministry of Culture be relegated to doing exactly what it should be doing...'preserving' Thai culture as something to be well remembered & enjoyed by all. They should not have any power whatsoever, to steer the course of this country.

In Thailand, 'culture' is a rule & not an enjoyed memory. It is drummed into the heads of many a Thai student every morning of their school life.

Thai Culture may have worked & been beneficial a long time ago but it is no longer beneficial (generally speaking) in a modern & globalised world. Many aspects of Thai Culture are wonderful & these aspects may be remembered & celebrated accordingly without the need for any indoctrination.

There's that much to change that the mission is imposible, Thailand has manufactured it's own rut.

[souvenirdeparis]

Malee 's attempt at drawing a full fresco of the social situation is laudable ; I found the

part about the use of vocabulary with historical connotations (sErf , not .. sUrf though) most interesting , and the situation of the silent majority in the villages needed being told.

I don't agree with the 'soldiers must apologize " line ; soldiers will rightly think it's a bit much.

I agree with the South being left out of this picture , it has nothing to do with social divide (it's creating poverty actually, not fighting it ).

Malee, do me a favour, could you reduce it to 2/3 format next time ?

" Dichotomy will sound grand in any text " (My teacher of philosophy )

Edited June 12, 2010 by souvenirdeparis