Your assumption that the Gulf states can simply build pipelines and bypass the Strait of Hormuz overlooks a number of realities. Replacing Iranian leverage with dependence on Saudi transit infrastructure merely concentrates power in the hands of another authoritarian regime whose interests will not always align with those of its neighbours. Saudi Arabia has faced for a long time the same sort of opposition the Shah faced in 1978. The difference is the Islamic opposition in Iran was actually very sophisticated, having been exiled in France, and adopting a constitution based on the French constitution which itself was based on the US one. By contrast, the opposition in Saudi Arabia, blooded on the streets of Syria and Northern Iraq, very working class and unsophisticated, and who literally want to turn the clock back to the days of slavery. The West desperately needs lower oil prices or a complete pivot away from oil. The Saudi government only exists because of oil. Like the Gulf Monarchies, it exists not through wise governance, but through bribery. Bribery of the population gives them non-jobs, free houses, wedding money etc. When the oil price falls, like in 2016, the Saudis are all over the place. Yes, Saudi Arabia seems to weather the storms because of their foreign reserves. Provided they can actually access them. Moreover, Gulf exports routed westward remain dependent upon two alternative choke points: the Suez Canal, whose capacity is substantially lower than the volume that can transit Hormuz and which has been blocked before, and the Bab al-Mandab, whose security ultimately depends upon Yemen and Somalia, two states with long histories of instability. Pipelines can't solve every problem. Qatar's globally important exports of helium and urea require shipping, as do refined petroleum products such as aviation fuel, while the Gulf itself depends heavily upon maritime imports of food, manufactured goods and industrial inputs because of its limited agricultural productivity. Supplying the GCC states by fleets of refrigerated trucks (what they are doing now) crossing the Saudi desert would be environmentally, economically and logistically difficult to sustain on the scale required. Plus, in the era of suicide and ambush drones, even more prone to interdiction. A more durable approach may be to recognise that Iran is not a transient problem to be managed until the next American administration, but a large, populous and historically significant regional power that will remain in the Gulf long after outside powers have reduced their presence. Iran will always be the more populous, the most sophisticated power in the Gulf, compared the the Arab camel herders. The Arabs will need to learn where the true power in the region lies, and, ultimately, will have to kiss the ring. The Gulf monarchies and Iran ultimately inhabit the same space and have a shared interest in stability, trade and economic diversification. As the world moves gradually towards lower hydrocarbon consumption, the assumption that oil and gas exports will forever provide effortless prosperity is rather optimistic. Rather than organising regional policy around the premise of permanently containing Iran, there is a strong argument for encouraging an accommodation that accepts Iran's natural pre-eminence while binding it into a cooperative regional framework that reduces incentives for confrontation and prepares all Gulf states for a post-oil future.
