Utter waste of my <deleted> time responding if you can't be arsed to read the response. There is no <deleted> new Empire that is going to put a diplomatic cosh on Americans (mis)adventures. 1956 meets your superficial definition of "Dying empires in their last throws learn they can no longer enforce their will by means of military adventure", but its not that is a number of ways. The reason to stop Nasser nationalising the Suez Canal was a real concern. The respnse was a calculated strategic response. Not an emotional response of dying empires thrashing. Suez was a turning point not a final gasp. After Suez, France developed its own nuclear capability, becoming the 4th nclear power after the US, USSR and UK. Both countries remained significant global powers for decades after, when measured by force projection. The reason for the crisis was not decline but alliance politics. They failed not because "they were weak" but because "we cannot act against the will of our stronger ally". It was a transition from independant imperial power to constrained Cold War alignment. Suez never had a danger of becoming a regional war' Egypt in 1956 had no serious capability to extend its reach beyond its borders. in 2026, Iran can and has regionalised the conflict. The legal framing is completely different. In 1956, there was genuine legal conflict over the ownership of the canal. In 2026, United Nations Conventions firmly enforces the right of transit passage through the Strait. The reported $2 million toll that Iran is exacting per vessal is illegal, so this is not a quasi-colonial dispute. The US might have been the cause, through its other actions, of causing the Iranians to atttempt to close the Strait, but you cannot compare the rights of Iran to the rights of Gemal Nasser, who you clearly admire, in his quasi-imperial dispute. One of the reasons the US opposed France/UK over Suez was because the world economy was not dependant on Suez; there were alternative trading routes. Hormuz is very different, because it is impacting the global economy, and there are no viable alternative means of getting oil out and goods in. What will constrain the US is not the influence of allies, but systemic costs. Suez was an example of where you can’t use force if the system won’t tolerate it. Hormuz is an example of whether even the most powerful state can use force without breaking the system it depends on. We will find out. You have nothing to say with respects to the Gallipoli comparison.
