You may have read recently that General Prem Tinsulanonda was in the South last week reactivating the connections he put in place in the 80s that kept separatism in check, and which were dismantled by Thaksin in 2002 for political reasons.

Here's an interesting article on what the current options are.

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http://www.upi.com/SecurityTerrorism/view....02-030705-8022r

Security & Terrorism

Outside View: Winning Thailand's war

By JOERG ESCHENFELDER

UPI Outside View Commentator

MUNICH, Germany, Jan. 2 (UPI) -- There are four combinations which result

in four possible outcomes in the current guerrilla conflict with Islamist

guerrillas in southern Thailand.

If Thailand's Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra prefers confrontation and

the insurgents chose confrontation the situation will evolve with growing

violence on the brink to a civil war; if the insurgents opt for

co-operation and Thaksin sticks to his conflict-strategy the result will

be the (fragile) status quo ante with Muslim provinces being frustrated

and feeling neglected, but keeping quiet and staying within Thailand. And

it is very likely that the conflict will erupt once again.

If Thaksin switches to cooperation and the insurgents remain with their

confrontation, the end could be the separation of the provinces; if the

insurgents also turn to co-operation, then a Thai-solution could evolve

with a special status within the existing borders.

Thaksin -- given his character and recent politics as a hard-liner --

clearly wishes to get back to the status quo ante, this is his best

outcome, and he clearly prefers the actual situation to a co-operative

approach. He does not want to negotiate with the insurgents, he does not

want to give in. The insurgents on the other side prefer this situation of

an existing conflict too otherwise they would not fight. Given their aim

of a separation their best outcome would be autonomy and a Thai solution

the second best.

So, Thaksin clearly prefers a conflict-strategy to restore the status quo

ante. Even the current situation of continuing conflict is his second best

outcome. Therefore the separatists know they have to chose this strategy

which grants them their best outcome.

The insurgents will always opt for confrontation, because this is also

their dominant strategy. Therefore, the current situation is an

equilibrium which will only change if one of the players is exhausted and

forced to change his strategy. If the insurgents need a break they will

stop their violence and take up arms again when they have enough strength.

What would happen if there was a prime minister in Bangkok who was more

concerned about a peaceful resolution, who preferred to negotiate rather

than fight, like the members of Thailand's National Reconciliation

Commission (NRC), the king and foreign countries. They believe that there

can only be a lasting settlement if the majority Buddhist Thais can reach

an agreement with the Muslims in the south that is not enforced by

violence but by conviction and trust. I call this attitude "statesman".

For the statesman, a Thai-solution is the best outcome, the existing

situation is the second worst. The worst would be a separation. And a

fragile peaceful status-quo would be better than the current conflict

status quo. But the insurgents still have their dominant strategy of

conflict and the statesman has also to chose conflict to avoid a

separation and secure to optimize his outcome. Again they end with the

current, existing, violent status quo.

Classical game theory leaves the statesman in a trap. If he chooses his

preferred strategy, he ends with his second worst outcome. But this is

based on the assumption that the strategy once chosen cannot be changed.

If you take a more dynamic view, the statesman can get a better outcome.

The statesman can switch to co-operation and declare that he wants to

negotiate a solution. If the insurgents refuse to start negotiations he

threatens to move back to confrontation. So the insurgents can chose

between their second best or their second worst outcome -- and would

clearly prefer a settlement to the status quo of current conflict. This

threat would be credible because everybody knows the statesman wants to

make a success of the negotiations.

This does not mean to give in to violence but to treat it as what it is:

an act of crime. Each bombing is a criminal act which should be prosecuted

by the police. Each beheading is a murder. This means additional forces

for law enforcement in individual cases but not additional soldiers as it

is now the case. A better prosecution does not demand to stop talking with

the people.

The conflict in Southern Thailand can be solved. And the solution can be a

special autonomy status within Thailand's constitution. But this requires

a Thai government that clearly and credibly prefers a co-operative

solution over violence. This can be achieved in three ways: [a] Thaksin

changes his politics; Thaksin gives in to pressure from outside; and

[c] a substitution of the players, namely of Thaksin.

Scenario [a] is very unlikely in the light of the recent developments.

Thaksin does not change his course. Scenario could work, but it would

be a very fragile situation. Because if Thaksin does not really change his

mind, this would be just reflect the exhaustion of the government and any

deal would be nothing more than a temporary cease-fire and reprieve.

Thaksin would just wait for the right moment to turn back to conflict.

Anything else would be a defeat in his eyes.

The best way is [c]. A new prime minister might be able to convince the

insurgents that he has a new approach. Together with other steps to reform

the governance of Southern Thailand, this could lead to a peaceful

resolution of the conflict. These were the preconditions for the

resolution of the Aceh conflict was possible. Indonesia's President Susilo

Bambang Yudhoyono was new in the office, he proved that he was willing to

reform the Indonesian governance (military, corruption) against all

resistance. The tsunami disaster a year ago just accelerated this process.

This gives scope for some hope but also for despair. It lies in the hands

and mind of Thaksin which strategy and course he chooses. If he remains

the hard-liner, then there is just hope for exhausting the separatists,

with the danger of a renewed uprising some time later and a growing haven

for international, Muslim extremists. This would be just a cease-fire

solution.

But Thaksin can become a statesman who rethinks his preferences and acts

accordingly, although the probability at the moment seems to be very low.

Then there would be the possibility to reach a sustainable solution

without changing Thailand's borders and giving the Muslims in the Buddhist

nation a new perspective -- and this is what they are looking for.

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Hen duay 100%.