Thai protest will end with a whimper

THAILAND is facing its cruellest and most ironic internal crisis since a group of officers ended the absolute monarchy in 1932. All three players today are direct descendants of those in that earlier crucible.

First, the monarchy. From 1932 to about 1963, 17 years after the present king's accession, the throne was a faint glimmer of past glory. A junta that seized power in 1957 began to use Bhumipol but he proved cannier in using them, sending the last of them into exile in 1974 after the first great democratic uprising. Since then, he has gone ever upwards, even permitting the restoration of crawling obeisance in "the presence", something his grandfather, the great Chulalongkorn, had abolished. He is now 80 and frail but intends to stick around until he's won this recent and, for him, final round.

Secondly, there emerged from the "promoters" who made the 1932 coup a group of Mussolini-like semi-fascists, adhering around Field Marshal Phibunsongram who ruled off and on until a counter-move by a more compelling army group in 1957. His direct descendant is not the army but Thaksin Shinawatra, a manipulative and clever police officer, who made a fortune in Information Technology and turned it into electoral magic in the countryside.

From 1948, a third group of Thais emerged around a progressive promoter named Pridi Panomyong, who founded a great university and inspired young democrats but who wasn't able to maintain power against the better armed Phibun group, who restored themselves to power. But students abroad encouraged democratic roots in the kingdom, they demanded reforms and elections in country-wide demonstrations late in 1973, forcing the king's hand to prevent chaos. We must always remember that these people are Thais, too, for whom democratic values of tolerance and competition are not wholly natural. They have matured -- if we can call it that -- into the People's Alliance for Democracy, the PAD, which now occupies airports, government buildings, and has brought businesses virtually to a standstill.

There was always, though, a "permanent government" of foreign educated princes, ever expanding their ranks but never ceasing to rule, even today, through great-grandsons of kings keeping a tight hold on day-to-day power, and always holding direct lines to the palace.

But there seems to be a huge contradiction. Thaksin overwhelmingly won the elections he contested. Why are the "democrats" in such opposition to him? It would be tempting to say, with Lenin, that he is the "principal enemy", and the needs of democracy require them to defeat him at all costs. They suspect not without reason that if left to his own devices he would rule eternally, with the iron hand that Phibun exercised in the 1930s. Tolerance has never been Thaksin's virtue.

But in Thailand things are never so simple. For one thing, Thaksin was the first Thai ruler to elicit the animosity of the throne. In a variety of public and less-public ways he made known that the national adoration of the monarch was old-fashioned, and certainly a nuisance to his consolidation of rule. King Bhumipol is a gentle man but has never countenanced opposition gently. It was he who signalled the army to move in September 2006 to depose Thaksin. But the government all but placed in power by him failed to move in the way desired. Even direct encouragement by the palace to the ministers to get on with their mission seemed to fail. In their failure lies the immediate precedent to the present crisis.

Secondly, the "democrats" were never quite so pure. Of course there is a spectrum of views in the PAD, including some very virtuous professed democrats. But there are also unscrupulous party hacks that make the organisation work. And most of the professedly "democratic" opposition haven't flinched at such trivial details as military coups, martial law, and whatever else needed to rid the country of Thaksin or his allies forever. They intend to continue ruling, as they have done more or less continuously since 1974, through their allies in the ministries and delegates in the Parliament. Thaksin was seen as an illegitimate upstart; "he is not one of us", a famous prince said to me. In their amor proprio, they came to believe that any means was legitimate to rid Thailand of this bromide, but it hid badly their underlying determination to rule themselves. Thaksin just happened to be in the way.

Why and how have they been able to show such amazing determination? It's simple. The army is divided, though not very much. It is taking its cue from the palace, as it has done since 1980, not from the government that rules in Thaksin's name. So it all but openly permits the chaos that has for the present ruined the travel industry and slowed the economy.

And the demonstrators know that if not God, the king is plainly on their side. In the past, all he had to do -- in 1974 as in 1992 -- was wait until the balance of forces was apparent, until his side could win. Then he openly intervened and used the vast powers of his persona to compel compliance. In both previous instances this favoured avowed democrats.

This time it would be trivial to say that democracy is the issue. It's whether or not those others, "unworthy to bear the dust under his shoes", as the royal inflection goes, can finally be worn out. Just wait -- the king will wave his magic wand and the crisis will be over. The army -- or some other appropriate delegate -- will take power, and the country will find the patience to wear out the endurance of an expiring Thaksin, who in exile loses wealth and legitimacy by the day. Mai pen rai, things will quiet down and everyone will be wondering what all the fuss was about. It will end not with bang but a whimper.

Source: Editorial Opinion from The New Straits Times - 29 November 2008

In posting this subject I am not advocating discussing the undiscussable... it's just an opinion that I found interesting and thought others might like to read it too.

As per Forum Rules however, please stay within those guidelines if responding.

In posting this subject I am not advocating discussing the undiscussable... it's just an opinion that I found interesting and thought others might like to read it too.

As per Forum Rules however, please stay within those guidelines if responding.

Thank you for this one.

Made me understand things a little bit better.

Confirmed my suspicions however that this was orchestrated behind the scenes by powerful forces.

Thanks again

onzestan

I've been (trying to) mention all along to those that simply don't understand why the army/police haven't cracked down on this protest.

I even went so far as to allude to Someone having said he didn't want to see any violence. Some still don't get it.

I get the impression there are a lot of people commenting in some of those threads that have no idea about real Thai culture, and how the actions (or inactions) of just one person could have a dramatic effect on the whole situation.

Why hasn't it ended yet (with a whimper or otherwise) ? If someone had of wanted a coup, the golden opportunity was ripe a couple days ago. An incohesive government, with it's leader out of the country, meeting in a military controlled area ? What could be better ?

I suspect events and discussions are happening at levels most of us will never get near.

It's kind of like a game that is tied in the dying minutes of regulation time. Both sides are holding firm, no one wanting to make the costly error that could lose them the game. Some think PAD's decision to occupy the airports was such an error, but it has put enormous pressure on the government.

Much like a team that pulls it's goalie for an extra attacker. Dangerous strategy, but if it works you look brilliant. If it doesn't, you can claim credit for being brave and daring, doing your best and never giving up.

Will this strategy work for PAD ? The eyes of the world are watching (regardless of Mumbai, anything happens in Thailand and the focus will be back in a flash).

I think certain groups are reluctant to use force. Some may sympathize with the protesters. Some probably have family amongst them (and we know how important family is).

Some probably (rightly) fear the potential backlash that could come from any use of (excessive) force, especially if women and children start getting injured or killed.

I know Thais that still harbour resentment over previous violent crack-downs. I suspect that, while on the sidelines now, it wouldn't take much of a push to have them up in arms as well.

I don't know if that sentiment is wide spread around the country, but the people I know that seem (to me) to feel that way, are from around the country.

I hope it does end with a whimper. Hurt feelings are easier to mend than broken bones and dead relatives.

Thailand's frail democracy

The recent closure of an international airport by anti-government protesters in Bangkok, Thailand, has damaged the nation's reputation as one of the main tourist destinations in Southeast Asia.

Through massive and sometimes violent rallies, the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) wants to punish the Thai government under the leadership of Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat.

It remains to be seen whether or not the suggestion of Thai Army Chief Gen. Anupong Paohinda, to have an early election, will be agreed upon by all parties and lead to an eventual solution of the political crisis.

If the proposal is rejected, the possibility of a military takeover cannot be ruled out, especially if the political conflict escalates beyond control.

What can we learn from Thailand's disheartening experience?

In order to answer this question, we need to understand what has actually gone wrong with the dynamics of democratization in Thailand. We should note that there are some similarities between Thailand and Indonesia, as far as the quality of democratization is concerned.

First, the democratic experiment in the two countries is a relatively new phenomenon, and they have both experienced the ups and downs along the way. It seems that Thailand and Indonesia are both in a process of consolidating their democracies before they can find a relatively sustainable form of democratic government.

Second, a tough contest between political parties -- which requires the mobilization of a large amount of financial resources -- has opened the way for businessmen in Thailand and Indonesia to build almost absolute control over decision-making processes within parties and even government bureaucracies.

Unfortunately, in many cases, business interests and public aspirations are not compatible. Grassroots communities in both countries have seen their respective governments defend business interests and ignore the people's basic needs.

Third, the two countries have not found a convincing answer to the question of how to create a kind of politics that supports the promotion of economic growth. As it turns out, the last few years of contestation of power among the political elite in Thailand has become a serious obstacle to its economic development.

According to media reports, some segments of Thai society have begun to feel frustrated due to the endless political conflicts among the elite. The same sorry state of affairs also exists in Indonesia. Political conflicts related to disagreements over the final count of popular votes in elections (in various areas) have cost the concerned regions the opportunity to focus on their respective social and economic development.

The credibility of democratic political institutions like political parties and elections is very much at stake.

The current political crisis in Thailand is the continuation of what happened to the government of former prime minister Thaksin Sinawatra. In September 2006, PAD organized a massive anti-government protest which led to a military coup and eventually to Thaksin's downfall. This was followed by one year of military rule, and Thaksin himself left the country for 17 months of self-imposed exile.

The political situation became even more complicated in December 2007, when The People Power Party (PPP), led by Thaksin's allies, won the election and established a coalition government.

The anger of Thaksin's foes in the PAD reached its climax on Sept. 17, 2008, when the current prime minister, Somchai Wongsawat (who is also Thaksin's brother-in-law) was elected after his predecessor Samak Sundaravej was found guilty in a graft scandal.

There is an important lesson we can learn from Thaksin's survival strategy in politics. What Thaksin has been doing, in defending the dominant position of his political party, sounds familiar when we reflect on the behavior of political parties in Indonesia.

A post-modernist way of understanding politics in new democracies tells us that regardless of their moral credentials, party leaders have claimed their organizations as the sole mode of subjectivity and representation in politics. It is as if the existence of political parties is all we need to have a sound democracy.

What makes grassroots communities angry is the fact that political parties have used different strategies to stabilize the notion of their primacy in politics.

In Thaksin's case, he distributed money to his supporters, especially in rural areas.

In Indonesia, the political parties have stabilized their privileged position through the manipulation of the content of the election bill for their own interests.

No wonder grassroots communities get angry and commit various forms of self-damaging violence. The early casualty is democracy itself, for a genuine democracy knows no violence.

Source: The Jakarta Post - 29 November 2008

Very interesting to get some real depth and history to the current situation. Cheers.

Just heard of a grenade attack on PAD supporters near Parliament House.

Another grenade attack on protesters at Government House has wounded at least 46 members of the People's Alliance for Democracy, hospital officials said. Two of the victims were in critical condition.

The blast occurred inside Government House, apparently from a grenade fired from outside.

The PAD, as usual, was holding a rally inside the former prime minister's compound, which they occupied last Aug 25.

THAILAND'S POLITICAL MAZE – A BEGINNERS GUIDE

(From: http://worldblog.msnbc.msn.com/archive/200...6/1689630.aspx)

Posted: Wednesday, November 26, 2008 1:07 PM

Filed Under: Bangkok, Thailand

By Ian Williams, NBC News correspondent

Bangkok's massive multi-million dollar airport terminal tonight resembles a night market. It's teaming with yellow-clad protesters and lined with make-shift stalls selling badges, t-shirts, stickers and jewelry, as well as food and drink. Outside, the passenger drop-off zone is a sea of yellow protesters rattling their plastic "clappers" as they listen to fiery speeches from the top of truck.

The approach road to the terminal is lined with cars that reflect the largely middle-class character of the protesters – the SUV is the vehicle of choice. There are several security checks along the way, where guards wielding metal rods and golf clubs stop and search approaching cars. It feels like the anti-government protesters are settling in for the long-haul.

All flights remain suspended, and the estimated 3,000 passengers – most of them tourists – stranded last night when the airport closed have been moved to city-center hotels.

But who exactly are these protesters clad in yellow – the color associated with Thailand’s king – who risk crippling Thailand's lucrative tourist industry? And what do they want?

Who are the protesters?

They go by the name of the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) and are a loose coalition of Thailand's old elite – businessmen, academics and royalists, drawing support largely from Bangkok's middle class. They have a degree of backing from conservative elements in the army and the royal palace – one reason why the government has been reluctant to move aggressively against them.

They are well-funded and well-organized, and have an ugly militia, armed with iron bars, sling shots, even guns. These "security guards" have frequently resorted to violence – yesterday they opened fire on government supporters on a city highway.

They claim to be fighting corruption and defending the king, and their professed aim is to topple the government which was democratically elected a year ago. Their strategy is to create as much disruption as possible in order to force the hand of the military, which is reluctant to get involved. The last coup, in 2006, caused a lot of damage to the military’s reputation, and ultimately achieved very little.

Seizing the airport is perhaps the most effective disruption they've caused in months of protest, and comes at a time when they seemed to be running out of steam and losing support.

What do they want?

The PAD's leaders want the government replaced by "new politics," effectively doing away with the current democratic system and limiting the electoral power of poorer voters, who they regard as ill-educated.

Instead, they want 70 percent of parliament to be appointed by worthy people – such as themselves. The government would be headed by a powerful king, whose portrait is everywhere at PAD rallies.

One newspaper column this week described their ideology as "a cultish and violent conservatism," combined with a "mangled version of democracy."

Their target, the government of Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat, is hardly a virtuous beast, but it was democratically elected, and enjoys massive support from Thailand's rural poor. If there was an election tomorrow, it would almost certainly be re-elected, which is why the PAD wants to change the system.

Somchai is the brother-in-law of Thaksin Shinawatra, the former prime minister, who was disposed in the 2006 coup. He has been accused of widespread corruption and abuse of power, but his administration redrew Thailand's political landscape, empowering the rural poor, and adopting populist polices, including low cost village loans, and a basic health system.

These reforms came as shock in a system which has for years been, essentially, a competition within the Thai elite – the poor north-east serving as a repository of cheap labor for Bangkok's bars and building sites.

Thaksin's populism also threatened a traditional system of patronage and hierarchy, at the pinnacle which sits the royalist elite, who are the PAD's strongest supporters.

The current government is packed with Thaksin cronies, and the former prime minister, now in self-imposed exile, is accused of calling the government's shots from abroad. He has drawn massive crowds to live stadium phone-ins and remains very popular in the poor north and north-east of Thailand.

The government strategy this week has been, essentially, to "play dead," and not risk violence by confronting the PAD (which is what many of the protest leaders would like), allowing them to roam Bangkok at will. The police offered little resistance when they seized the airport.

For months the PAD has occupied Thailand's Government House, forcing the government to shift cabinet meetings to Bangkok's old airport. In most countries they would have been tossed out weeks ago, but there is another factor at play Thailand – one that is rarely spoken about openly: the future of the monarchy.

What about the king?

King Bhumibol Adulyadej, the world's longest-reigning monarch, will be 81 next week. He is revered by the Thai people. Although he has few formal powers, he wields enormous moral influence. He has frequently intervened at times of crisis, but diplomats fear his advanced years and deteriorating health will limit his ability to calm this crisis.

The king's annual birthday address next week will be carefully watched. His wife, Queen Sirikit, has explicitly backed the PAD. She even attended the funeral of a PAD supporter killed in clashes with the police last month. Her backing has given the protesters a powerful "roof" in its anti-government campaign.

The queen's concern is for the continuation of a strong monarchy after her husband's passing, which will create an enormous vacuum.

The heir to the throne, Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn will not command the reverence enjoyed by his father. He is very unpopular and unacceptable to many Thais, who prefer his sister Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn, though she has never married and has no immediate heir.

None of this is openly discussed by the Thai media, which is shackled by strict lèse-majesté laws which make it a crime to offend the monarchy, but the future of the Chakri Dynasty goes to the heart of the current power struggle.

One seasoned journalist summed it up nicely: "Covering this crisis is like trying to explain the unexplainable, without mentioning the unmentionable."

The post above was in the public forum, then trashed (rightly so) by a moderator, and now I've moved it here for info.

Please remember... this is for info only and much cannot be discussed as per forum rules.

I think that blog pretty well sums it up.

Dangerous stuff in country..................