4 hours ago, NanLaew said:

...

A bit like cars pass trucks on a highway and everyone (mostly) uses signals and manages to keep moving ahead.

...

Even then, there can still be 'near misses' when an inattentive bridge watch on a large tanker or container ship, traveling at up to 20 knots, does not respond in a timely manner to VHF radio requests to change course or speed to avoid collision.

...

Too early to apportion blame as once again

...

I would use the analogy of a vehicle driving at night without its lights on.

 

By not using AIS and not telling even nearby ships their immediate intentions, the USN makes itself responsible of any collision that might happen because of playing that little game.

I'm not convinced that withholding information from nearby ships is even useful in busy international shipping lanes with many friendly ships around during peacetime.

 

It's very sad that once again sailors lost their lives because of such a stupid incident.

 

A review of procedures aboard Navy ships is in order, methinks.

9 minutes ago, dick dasterdly said:

It does sound as if this is the case - the captain and first officer (etc.) asleep at the same time, leaving pretty much nobody in charge?

 

Unfortunately it turns out that none of the remaining, designated crew were paying attention - hence the collision when they didn't even see another ship that had 'right of way' .

There's always someone in charge: the Captain.

 

Captains normally draft standing orders augmented by daily orders that are discussed with the XO's and included in the briefing of the first OOW (Officer on Watch) who in turn ensures these are communicated to his relief OOW at the end of the watch. One of the things the OOW does on assuming the new watch is cross-checking the previous OOW's navigation and course plotting. Since this latest collision appears to have occurred in the middle of the 'morning watch' it doesn't immediately indicate that something was skipped at the 04:00 handover. Similarly, the previous collision involving the USS Fitzgerald offshore Japan occurred at 02:30, mid-way through the 'middle watch'.

 

This applies to both vessels, not just the navy ones but something looks seriously amiss with the actual 'watching' on all four vessels involved in these two collisions.

Just now, Berkshire said:

This is the US Navy culture, that a Captain of a ship is ultimately responsible.  This is why the job is among the most prestigious in the Navy.  Ever seen the movie(s) Star Trek?  They follow the Navy rank system and the buck ends with the Captain.  And in fact, Captains will complete their tours without a collision-at-sea 99.9% of the time.  So it's hard to be sympathetic to the .01% guys (if it's even that high). 

 

But don't worry, these guys aren't going to jail.  Their careers will be over, sure, and some may even get a general discharge.  But the CO will most likely have 20+ years and eligible for retirement, i.e., a big fat pension for the rest of his life.  But the younger guys, well they'll be unemployed after this...for a little while. 

Its also quite possible that the captain agreed to the next highest ranking officer being asleep at the same time?

 

Obviously I don't know - but at the end of the day nobody on that ship noticed the obvious collision course with a far larger vessel that had 'right of way'.

2 minutes ago, NanLaew said:

There's always someone in charge: the Captain.

 

Captains normally draft standing orders augmented by daily orders that are discussed with the XO's and included in the briefing of the first OOW (Officer on Watch) who in turn ensures these are communicated to his relief OOW at the end of the watch. One of the things the OOW does on assuming the new watch is cross-checking the previous OOW's navigation and course plotting. Since this latest collision appears to have occurred in the middle of the 'morning watch' it doesn't immediately indicate that something was skipped at the 04:00 handover. Similarly, the previous collision involving the USS Fitzgerald offshore Japan occurred at 02:30, mid-way through the 'middle watch'.

 

This applies to both vessels, not just the navy ones but something looks seriously amiss with the actual 'watching' on all four vessels involved in these two collisions.

I'd give up on trying to blame it on the other 'boat if' I was you....

 

Even the US has admitted that its 'boat' was at fault.

12 minutes ago, Berkshire said:

This is the US Navy culture, that a Captain of a ship is ultimately responsible.  This is why the job is among the most prestigious in the Navy.  Ever seen the movie(s) Star Trek?  They follow the Navy rank system and the buck ends with the Captain.  And in fact, Captains will complete their tours without a collision-at-sea 99.9% of the time.  So it's hard to be sympathetic to the .01% guys (if it's even that high). 

 

But don't worry, these guys aren't going to jail.  Their careers will be over, sure, and some may even get a general discharge.  But the CO will most likely have 20+ years and eligible for retirement, i.e., a big fat pension for the rest of his life.  But the younger guys, well they'll be unemployed after this...for a little while. 

 

Reading about the McCain tragedy, there's talk of an even broader shake-up, going into the ranks well above the shipboard guys.  Way early in the process, but some are claiming the system is broken.  It'll be interesting to see how that shakes out.

 

8 minutes ago, Berkshire said:

This is the US Navy culture, that a Captain of a ship is ultimately responsible.  This is why the job is among the most prestigious in the Navy.  Ever seen the movie(s) Star Trek?  They follow the Navy rank system and the buck ends with the Captain.  And in fact, Captains will complete their tours without a collision-at-sea 99.9% of the time.  So it's hard to be sympathetic to the .01% guys (if it's even that high). 

 

But don't worry, these guys aren't going to jail.  Their careers will be over, sure, and some may even get a general discharge.  But the CO will most likely have 20+ years and eligible for retirement, i.e., a big fat pension for the rest of his life.  But the younger guys, well they'll be unemployed after this...for a little while. 

Correct. I was recently introduced to the former captain of the USS Guardian that ran aground in PI who was subsequently relieved of any vessel command. He is still a Captain in the USN albeit in a (mainly) office-based, marine support role in SE Asia. Since the Guardian's grounding was mostly attributed to chart error and there was no loss of life (the 26 year-old, wood & fiberglass hulled, mine countermeasures vessel was dismantled and scrapped in-situ), his punishment appears totally reasonable.

Just now, NanLaew said:

Correct. I was recently introduced to the former captain of the USS Guardian that ran aground in PI who was subsequently relieved of any vessel command. He is still a Captain in the USN albeit in a (mainly) office-based, marine support role in SE Asia. Since the Guardian's grounding was mostly attributed to chart error and there was no loss of life (the 26 year-old, wood & fiberglass hulled, mine countermeasures vessel was dismantled and scrapped in-situ), his punishment appears totally reasonable.

But in this case it appears the 'second in command' was also asleep at the time?

9 minutes ago, dick dasterdly said:

Its also quite possible that the captain agreed to the next highest ranking officer being asleep at the same time?

 

Obviously I don't know - but at the end of the day nobody on that ship noticed the obvious collision course with a far larger vessel that had 'right of way'.

Correct. You don't know anything about marine watches and commands. Captains and FO's being on the same shift isn't unusual or illegal.

 

You are correct that any 'watch' that enabled a collision at sea is totally deficient.

 

3 minutes ago, dick dasterdly said:

I'd give up on trying to blame it on the other 'boat if' I was you....

 

Even the US has admitted that its 'boat' was at fault.

I am not blaming anyone. In the first collision off Japan, the investigation is still underway and it is only the USN's pre-emptive disciplining of THEIR crew members that they have deemed responsible for their part of the collision. I am quite sure the Japanese authorities and the cargo vessel owners own findings and actions will be published but won't attract the same international attention. To suggest that one party punishing their guilty automatically absolves the other party and stops other independent investigations isn't the way it works.

 

Not sure which news wires you are following but I haven't read any official admission of blame by anyone from the USN but note they  do say this (my emphasis) :

 

The collision was avoidable and both ships demonstrated poor seamanship. Within Fitzgerald, flawed watch stander teamwork and inadequate leadership contributed to the collision that claimed the lives of seven Fitzgerald Sailors, injured three more, and damaged both ships.

 

But if you have another link where the USN claims total responsibility, that would be good.

1 hour ago, dick dasterdly said:

But in this case it appears the 'second in command' was also asleep at the time?

I am not aware of who was on what shift on that vessel at that time. Either way, it is completely irrelevant.

 

The Captain is the Master of the vessel and if the OOW under his command is incompetent, it is still, ultimately the Captains responsibility.

The commander of a Navy ship is called "Captain" in accordance with maritime custom regardless of rank. No matter who is on watch the ultimate responsibility lies with the Captain. Unfortunately due to 8 years of deliberate subversion by the previous dem administraton much of the US military has become hollowed out, a social program and or dumping ground for people who have few opportunities for advancement other than the military. Not to mention the other questionable social experiments. The US military could be more effective even if much smaller and staffed with true professionals instead of dummies covered with tattoos who should probably be working at K-Mart. Then marrying some other low information person, popping out 5 kids then dragging them around the world as dependents to various deployments at huge cost to the US taxpayer.

 

 

 

 

 

Quote

Dozen U.S. sailors to be punished for June collision - U.S. Navy

 

and dozens more to be punished for August collision.

4 hours ago, NanLaew said:

I am not blaming anyone. In the first collision off Japan, the investigation is still underway and it is only the USN's pre-emptive disciplining of THEIR crew members that they have deemed responsible for their part of the collision. I am quite sure the Japanese authorities and the cargo vessel owners own findings and actions will be published but won't attract the same international attention. To suggest that one party punishing their guilty automatically absolves the other party and stops other independent investigations isn't the way it works.

 

Not sure which news wires you are following but I haven't read any official admission of blame by anyone from the USN but note they  do say this (my emphasis) :

 

The collision was avoidable and both ships demonstrated poor seamanship. Within Fitzgerald, flawed watch stander teamwork and inadequate leadership contributed to the collision that claimed the lives of seven Fitzgerald Sailors, injured three more, and damaged both ships.

 

But if you have another link where the USN claims total responsibility, that would be good.

 

I think you can wait until pigs fly for the results of such investigations as the Japanese one, as the Japanese halted their investigation because the US Navy didn't cooperate.

 

The USN released a report that avoids answering any important question about what caused the collision.

 

Regarding who is at fault, I fail to imagine a credible scenario that would exhonerate the Fitzgerald's crew from being "mainly" responsible for the collision.

"sailing dark", i.e. without AIS, and hiding their intentions from nearby ships makes them already responsible in my eyes - sail dark at your own risk I would say.

I would use the analogy of a vehicle driving at night without its lights on.
 
By not using AIS and not telling even nearby ships their immediate intentions, the USN makes itself responsible of any collision that might happen because of playing that little game.
I'm not convinced that withholding information from nearby ships is even useful in busy international shipping lanes with many friendly ships around during peacetime.
 
It's very sad that once again sailors lost their lives because of such a stupid incident.
 
A review of procedures aboard Navy ships is in order, methinks.

The AIS transponders can be spoofed because they are GPS devices. At least Russia, China and France have the technology and used it before. That's why the ship has an APRA enabled Radar on the bridge and the radars used for navigation are able to automatically identify the targets.
There's a very nice little book called The International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972 (COLREGs) and according to the rules the tanker was obliged to use the radar for collision avoidance even if they had an AIS receiver onboard.

11 hours ago, dick dasterdly said:

Its also quite possible that the captain agreed to the next highest ranking officer being asleep at the same time?

 

Obviously I don't know - but at the end of the day nobody on that ship noticed the obvious collision course with a far larger vessel that had 'right of way'.

No, you don't.   Even between them, the CO/XO cannot be on the bridge 24/7.    They need to eat & sleep just like other human beings, and more importantly have other duties, i.e., running a warship, to perform.   They'd be just as responsible for a fatality in the engineering spaces or during a routine deck evolution or in a magazine or gun mount.  They're supposed to be able to organize, maintain and direct an entire CREW, not just bridge watches, and ALL to a very high standard.  So being the CO means accepting ultimate responsibility for everything that happens, but it doesn't mean they can (or should) be everywhere at once OR on the bridge 24/7.  (In fact, if they felt they DID have to be on the bridge directing ops personally at all times due to lack of faith in their officers & crew, it would mean there was a gap in their performance and effectiveness as leaders.)   A CO SHOULD BE able to trust a qualified OOW underway and his bridge team to safely navigate the ship at night IF he's done his job as CO in meticulously seeing to their training, qualification and continuing fitness & competence.

 

These two collisions in such a short span do raise questions, which go well beyond use or non-use of maritime AIS or any other modern doodad.  They could ultimately reach all the way back to the training in shiphandling junior officers are currently getting before even reporting to their first duty assignments.   It's a matter of basic seamanship ultimately, and suddenly USN surface warfare officers seem to be coming up short, or at least that's the appearance and that's what the world is concluding, and the US Navy definitely and historically cares about appearances and perceptions.   I understand that surface navigation in busy shipping lanes might be trickier than in the past, particularly at night, but as an explanation that doesn't get it.

 

On ‎8‎/‎18‎/‎2017 at 4:50 PM, impulse said:

 

I can tell you that if we spent $$ millions of dollars on training an employee, we wouldn't end his career for something his subordinates did or didn't do while he was sleeping.  That's a waste of those $$$.

 

Accountability is difficult.

21 minutes ago, Ahab said:

On 8/18/2017 at 5:50 PM, impulse said:

 

I can tell you that if we spent $$ millions of dollars on training an employee, we wouldn't end his career for something his subordinates did or didn't do while he was sleeping.  That's a waste of those $$$.

Accountability is difficult.

 

Even more so now that the Navy has announced a one day stand down and "comprehensive review" across the board, apparently conceding that the problem may go much higher and deeper than the shipboard personnel.

 

12 hours ago, manarak said:

 

I think you can wait until pigs fly for the results of such investigations as the Japanese one, as the Japanese halted their investigation because the US Navy didn't cooperate.

 

The USN released a report that avoids answering any important question about what caused the collision.

 

Regarding who is at fault, I fail to imagine a credible scenario that would exhonerate the Fitzgerald's crew from being "mainly" responsible for the collision.

"sailing dark", i.e. without AIS, and hiding their intentions from nearby ships makes them already responsible in my eyes - sail dark at your own risk I would say.

The USN have already admitted to "flawed watch stander teamwork and inadequate leadership" and pretty much sums up what happened and the fact the the executive (leadership) AND entire bridge watch (watch stander team) are 'going down' says enough. If the Japanese want to suspend their investigation due to the fact that a foreign naval vessel was involved and by the laws and regulations of that foreign country's navy, cannot get free and open access to bridge logs and other data, that's entirely their call. I'd like a link to that specific Japanese claim BTW.

 

The USN's preliminary findings already admit to considerable shortcomings onboard and they did that without the need for the Japanese authorities or the vessel owners to grant them access to their logs and preliminary findings. In my experience, government investigations can take months; a fire onboard a vessel I was working with offshore Australia was internally investigated and findings actioned within 3 months and the boat returned to service after 5 months, not bad for US owned and registered vessel on a Norwegian charter. However, the official Australian Transport Department report was published almost 14 months after the incident. It did broadly confirm the vessel owners and charterers own finding but included significantly more detail as to the exact causes. You may need to wait for the Japanese Transport investigation report to get the nuts and bolts of the event.

 

FWIW, lack of AIS or 'sailing dark' as you put it is not the remit of solely the USN. There's plenty of commercial and private vessels that for a variety of reasons, do not have AIS. Globally, naval vessels do not openly broadcast their intent so not using it is not indicative of exclusive USN belligerence, it's a fact. Trained and experienced commercial vessel bridge watches KNOW this and hence the extra diligence required of them to check from radar plotting that a navy vessel is responding to advice.

10 minutes ago, NanLaew said:

The USN have already admitted to "flawed watch stander teamwork and inadequate leadership" and pretty much sums up what happened and the fact the the executive (leadership) AND entire bridge watch (watch stander team) are 'going down' says enough. If the Japanese want to suspend their investigation due to the fact that a foreign naval vessel was involved and by the laws and regulations of that foreign country's navy, cannot get free and open access to bridge logs and other data, that's entirely their call. I'd like a link to that specific Japanese claim BTW.

 

The USN's preliminary findings already admit to considerable shortcomings onboard and they did that without the need for the Japanese authorities or the vessel owners to grant them access to their logs and preliminary findings. In my experience, government investigations can take months; a fire onboard a vessel I was working with offshore Australia was internally investigated and findings actioned within 3 months and the boat returned to service after 5 months, not bad for US registered vessel on a Norwegian charter. However, the official Australian Transport Department report was published almost 14 months after the incident. It did broadly confirm the vessel owners and charterers own finding but included significantly more detail as to the exact causes. You may need to wait for the Japanese Transport investigation report to get the nuts and bolts of the event.

 

FWIW, lack of AIS or 'sailing dark' as you put it is not the remit of solely the USN. There's plenty of commercial and private vessels that for a variety of reasons, do not have AIS. Globally, naval vessels do not openly broadcast their intent so not using it is not indicative of exclusive USN belligerence, it's a fact. Trained and experienced commercial vessel bridge watches KNOW this and hence the extra diligence required of them to check from radar plotting that a navy vessel is responding to advice.

Good to have you and some other experts knowledge here. What is your maritime background if I may ask ?. Myself: 4 years U.S. Coast Guard. Search and Rescue. Capt. of the Port, Long Beach, CA.

U.S. Merchant Mariners Document. ( not really used). Passengers for Hire ( small boats) 

18 hours ago, manarak said:

I would use the analogy of a vehicle driving at night without its lights on.

 

By not using AIS and not telling even nearby ships their immediate intentions, the USN makes itself responsible of any collision that might happen because of playing that little game.

I'm not convinced that withholding information from nearby ships is even useful in busy international shipping lanes with many friendly ships around during peacetime.

 

It's very sad that once again sailors lost their lives because of such a stupid incident.

 

A review of procedures aboard Navy ships is in order, methinks.

But ships at night DO have lights on and these lights are a primary tool in visually determining the course and speed of a vessel.

 

AIS is simply an enabler of vessel identification. All ocean-going vessels have ARPA radar which in conjunction with an experienced and watchful OOW, delivers EXACTLY the same information that AIS does albeit slightly slower and without the vessel's ID. However, bridge watch officers know by rote that they can hail any unmarked vessel by radio armed with the speed, course and distance information relative to their own vessel as calculated via ARPA and conversely the experienced and watchful OOW on that unidentified vessel will know from that speed, course and distance information that it is his vessel that is being contacted. Then vessel names are exchanged and the 'go around' is discussed and agreed.

 

The USN have ordered a fleet-wide, one-day safety stand-down that all vessels are committed to individually complete. A safety stand-down is an indicator of how very, very seriously the USN is taking these events. I think the last one was maybe 17 years ago? I have been onboard a non-navy vessel that was participating in a fleet-wide safety stand-down due to several serious incidents on other vessels in the fleet elsewhere in the world. It is a very serious investigation into a particular vessels navigation and operational procedures and examination of the vessel's safety standards. Maybe Mao's infamous 'self criticism' exercises were more arduous but for both examiner and examinee, it was a very somber and deadly serious 24 hours onboard and in my experience, the in-depth crew and vessel analysis had surprising and significant results.

On ‎8‎/‎18‎/‎2017 at 2:50 AM, impulse said:

 

I can tell you that if we spent $$ millions of dollars on training an employee, we wouldn't end his career for something his subordinates did or didn't do while he was sleeping.  That's a waste of those $$$.

 

And I can tell you that operating a warship at sea is quite a bit different from making toilet paper or designing microchips.  The stakes are far, far higher and the consequences of failure much greater, even life & death, as can easily be seen just from these two collision incidents.  There's definitely a reason for the ultimate accountability of commanding officers, and it's simply not shared in most civilian occupations.  Furthermore, the more closely some particular civilian role actually DOES compare to that of an operational CO, the more closely their accountability actually WILL mirror that of military COs.   For example, I guarantee the FAA makes no bones about suspending or revoking a pilot's license, which in the case of airline pilots will put quite a dent in their employment and future employability as pilots, when a single accident or serious incident, or even just a violation of FARs, is attributed by them to pilot error,   Whether that's a waste of "those $$$" or not in the case of the military depends I guess on what value you place on human life, on international incidents, and even on the peacekeeping as well as the warfighting roles of the military.

Just now, hawker9000 said:

And I can tell you that operating a warship at sea is quite a bit different from making toilet paper or designing microchips.  The stakes are far, far higher and the consequences of failure much greater, even life & death, as can easily be seen just from these two collision incidents.  There's definitely a reason for the ultimate accountability of commanding officers, and it's simply not shared in most civilian occupations.  Furthermore, the more closely some particular civilian role actually DOES compare to that of an operational CO, the more closely their accountability actually WILL mirror that of military COs.   For example, I guarantee the FAA makes no bones about suspending or revoking a pilot's license, which in the case of airline pilots will put quite a dent in their employment and future employability as pilots, when a single accident or serious incident, or even just a violation of FARs, is attributed by them to pilot error,   Whether that's a waste of "those $$$" or not in the case of the military depends I guess on what value you place on human life, on international incidents, and even on the peacekeeping as well as the warfighting roles of the military.

 

The Navy itself has just acknowledged that they may have a systemic problem with training and procedures.  No matter how talented and dedicated the commander, putting them in charge within a deeply flawed system and then blaming them for the results is ludicrous.  Ending a commander's career because the Navy has a problem is a waste of the $$ they spent training the guy, but it is an excellent way to cover up systemic and leadership deficiencies that may bring on all those problems you're pointing to.

 

http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/08/21/did_china_hack_the_seventh_fleet_112102.html

 

Interesting...

Having spent 20 years standing watches on the bridge of a navy warship I find it incredible that this happens so often.

It's reinforced to all bridge watchkeepers that they are to call the CO at any time of the day or night if they are in any doubt whatsoever regarding the ships position, navigation plan, safety, or for any other reason.

In my experience, junior officers were loath to call the CO in the middle of the night for fear of looking incompetent. They'd often just 'wing it' and hope for the best.

99.99% of the time they got away with it after a brief moment of panic or indecision.

I guess this was the 0.01%...


Sent from my iPhone using Thaivisa Connect

12 minutes ago, impulse said:

 

The Navy itself has just acknowledged that they may have a systemic problem with training and procedures.  No matter how talented and dedicated the commander, putting them in charge within a deeply flawed system and then blaming them for the results is ludicrous.  Ending a commander's career because the Navy has a problem is a waste of the $$ they spent training the guy, but it is an excellent way to cover up systemic and leadership deficiencies that may bring on all those problems you're pointing to.

 

You're commenting on things you know nothing about, no matter how many plant managers you've trained.  Media statements by Public Affairs Officers simply don't relieve COs of the responsibilities of command.   Every midshipman early on gains an awareness and an appreciation of the gravity of a command assignment should he aspire to it.   I can assure you, command is forced on no one.   They won't achieve flag rank, but it's certainly possible for officers to complete a naval career never having been detailed to command.  COs simply accept the lofty responsibility of command at sea, as difficult as that might be for those who know absolutely nothing about the process or the culture to understand. 

 

1 hour ago, impulse said:

 

The Navy itself has just acknowledged that they may have a systemic problem with training and procedures.  No matter how talented and dedicated the commander, putting them in charge within a deeply flawed system and then blaming them for the results is ludicrous.  Ending a commander's career because the Navy has a problem is a waste of the $$ they spent training the guy, but it is an excellent way to cover up systemic and leadership deficiencies that may bring on all those problems you're pointing to.

 

RBS had no issues ending the career of Fred 'the Shred' Goodwin after his actions took shareholders and ultimately UK tax payers to the tune of £46 billion. They snatched back his 'golden parachute' and he lost his gong but he still languishes on the £342,000 a year pension while RBS, still state-owned, has lavished an estimated £1 billion (including £100 million in legal fees) of taxpayers money to try and settle the High Court where he is accused that in 2008 he and fellow RBS bosses duped shareholders into investing in a £12 billion ‘rights issue’.

 

Yes, nobody died in the RBS crash but maybe the way that businesses punish their miscreants can learn something from way the armed forces does?

 

"No harm, no foul" does NOT apply here.

8 hours ago, NanLaew said:

The USN have already admitted to "flawed watch stander teamwork and inadequate leadership" and pretty much sums up what happened and the fact the the executive (leadership) AND entire bridge watch (watch stander team) are 'going down' says enough. If the Japanese want to suspend their investigation due to the fact that a foreign naval vessel was involved and by the laws and regulations of that foreign country's navy, cannot get free and open access to bridge logs and other data, that's entirely their call. I'd like a link to that specific Japanese claim BTW.

 

The USN's preliminary findings already admit to considerable shortcomings onboard and they did that without the need for the Japanese authorities or the vessel owners to grant them access to their logs and preliminary findings. In my experience, government investigations can take months; a fire onboard a vessel I was working with offshore Australia was internally investigated and findings actioned within 3 months and the boat returned to service after 5 months, not bad for US owned and registered vessel on a Norwegian charter. However, the official Australian Transport Department report was published almost 14 months after the incident. It did broadly confirm the vessel owners and charterers own finding but included significantly more detail as to the exact causes. You may need to wait for the Japanese Transport investigation report to get the nuts and bolts of the event.

 

FWIW, lack of AIS or 'sailing dark' as you put it is not the remit of solely the USN. There's plenty of commercial and private vessels that for a variety of reasons, do not have AIS. Globally, naval vessels do not openly broadcast their intent so not using it is not indicative of exclusive USN belligerence, it's a fact. Trained and experienced commercial vessel bridge watches KNOW this and hence the extra diligence required of them to check from radar plotting that a navy vessel is responding to advice.

you brought independent investigations on the table, now dismiss their importance...

 

about Japan suspending its probe:

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-24/japan-ends-probe-of-us-navy-ship-collision-no-input-from-us

https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/07/24/national/japan-ready-close-probe-u-s-warships-collision-no-input-americans

https://www.defensenews.com/flashpoints/2017/07/24/japan-almost-finished-with-probe-into-us-navy-ship-collision

 

this is not about "free and open access to bridge logs and other data" - I suspect the wanted to interview bridge crew and obtain official information from the USN about the Fitzgerald's GPS data, speeds and bearings in the moments before the collision.

But what they got from the USN is: 0.

 

And you write:

Quote

You may need to wait for the Japanese Transport investigation report to get the nuts and bolts of the event.

The Japanese say:

Quote

Katsunori Takahashi, a spokesman for the safety board, has said officials may have to compile a report of what caused the accident only with what information they have. There have been past cases in which the U.S. never cooperated, he said.

 

It's peculiar that these news have not been widely shared by major US media agencies.

2 hours ago, manarak said:

you brought independent investigations on the table, now dismiss their importance...

 

about Japan suspending its probe:

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-24/japan-ends-probe-of-us-navy-ship-collision-no-input-from-us

https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/07/24/national/japan-ready-close-probe-u-s-warships-collision-no-input-americans

https://www.defensenews.com/flashpoints/2017/07/24/japan-almost-finished-with-probe-into-us-navy-ship-collision

 

this is not about "free and open access to bridge logs and other data" - I suspect the wanted to interview bridge crew and obtain official information from the USN about the Fitzgerald's GPS data, speeds and bearings in the moments before the collision.

But what they got from the USN is: 0.

 

And you write:

The Japanese say:

 

It's peculiar that these news have not been widely shared by major US media agencies.

It's par for the course when any naval ship is involved.

 

Don't get me started on the time we hit a Peruvian submarine's snorkel.

20 hours ago, impulse said:

 

Even more so now that the Navy has announced a one day stand down and "comprehensive review" across the board, apparently conceding that the problem may go much higher and deeper than the shipboard personnel.

 

Maybe, just maybe it could be hours of required transgender acceptance training, or sexual harassment and sexual assault training, or any of the other many required annual training topics that have absolutely zero to do with how to fight the ship or safely navigate the ship. The US Navy has been used as a social experiment for too long in my opinion. Two ship collisions with deaths within a couple of months could point to larger issues with core training and watch standing procedures with the bridge teams.

 

For the record I retired from the US Navy submarine service in 2006, and worked for the US Navy as a civilian from 2006-2017.

18 hours ago, impulse said:

 

The Navy itself has just acknowledged that they may have a systemic problem with training and procedures.  No matter how talented and dedicated the commander, putting them in charge within a deeply flawed system and then blaming them for the results is ludicrous.  Ending a commander's career because the Navy has a problem is a waste of the $$ they spent training the guy, but it is an excellent way to cover up systemic and leadership deficiencies that may bring on all those problems you're pointing to.

 

It is nice there are people in this world, that have never served a day of their life in military service, that can tell the military how it is best to operate. Just think how valuable this advice would be if they had in-depth knowledge of the topic?

 

The investigations into these collisions will be thorough and lessons learned will be incorporated into TTP's (Training, Tactics, and Procedures), that are used by all US Naval vessels.

"this isn't supposed to happen"..... but the military, and not just ours, also has in it's care thousands of thermonuclear weapons. to be viable some of them must be in certain state of readiness and there are many risks of one part detonation for instance, even without a launch occurring. it's never happened yet, but this does bring it to mind.