In 2008, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert presented a proposal to Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas that he believed could have been the foundation for lasting peace in the Middle East. Urging Abbas to sign the deal, Olmert stressed its significance. "In the next 50 years, you will not find one Israeli leader that will propose to you what I propose to you now. Sign it! Sign it and let's change history!"  

 

 

The proposal outlined a two-state solution, a vision that seems increasingly unattainable today. Under Olmert’s plan, a Palestinian state would have been established on more than 94% of the occupied West Bank. He had drawn up a map, which has since taken on near-mythical status, with various interpretations circulating over the years. Until now, Olmert had never shared this map with the media. In "Israel and the Palestinians: The Road to 7th October", a new documentary series by Norma Percy, Olmert finally reveals the map he claims he showed Abbas during their meeting in Jerusalem on September 16, 2008.  

 

"This is the first time that I expose this map to the media," Olmert says in the film.  

 

The map detailed the 4.9% of the West Bank that Olmert proposed to annex to Israel, which included major Jewish settlement blocs—similar to past proposals dating back to the late 1990s. In return, Israel would have ceded an equal amount of Israeli territory along the borders of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The two Palestinian territories would have been connected via a tunnel or highway, an idea that had been previously discussed.  

According to Olmert, Abbas took the proposal seriously. "He said: 'Prime minister, this is very serious. It is very, very, very serious.'"  

 

The plan also sought to address one of the most contentious issues of the conflict: Jerusalem. Under Olmert’s proposal, both Israelis and Palestinians could claim parts of the city as their capital. Administration of the "holy basin," including the Old City with its significant religious sites, would be entrusted to a committee comprising Israel, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the United States.  

 

The implications of Olmert’s plan for Jewish settlements were enormous. It would have required the evacuation of dozens of communities scattered throughout the West Bank and Jordan Valley. The Israeli right had already seen the 2005 forced evacuation of Jewish settlers from Gaza under Prime Minister Ariel Sharon as a traumatic event. Evacuating most of the West Bank would have been an even greater challenge, with the potential for violence.  

 

However, the plan was never tested.  

 

At the end of their meeting, Olmert refused to give Abbas a copy of the map unless he agreed to sign it on the spot. Abbas declined, explaining that he needed to consult his experts to fully understand what was being offered. Olmert and Abbas agreed to reconvene with their respective map experts the following day, with both men believing they were on the verge of a historic breakthrough.  

That meeting never took place.  

 

As Abbas and his team left Jerusalem that night, his chief of staff, Rafiq Husseini, recalled the mood in the car. "Of course, we laughed," he said in the documentary. The Palestinians believed the plan was doomed. Olmert, facing an unrelated corruption scandal, had already announced his resignation. "It is unfortunate that Olmert, regardless of how nice he was… was a lame duck," Husseini said, "and therefore, we will go nowhere with this."  

 

Complicating matters further, tensions in Gaza escalated. After months of rocket attacks from the Hamas-controlled territory, Olmert ordered a large-scale Israeli offensive, Operation Cast Lead, in late December, leading to three weeks of intense fighting.  

 

Looking back, Olmert maintains that Abbas should have signed the deal. "It would have been very smart," he said. "Then, if a future Israeli prime minister tried to cancel it, he could have said to the world that the failure was Israel's fault."  

 

Just a few months later, Israeli elections brought Benjamin Netanyahu to power. A staunch opponent of Palestinian statehood, Netanyahu’s leadership marked the end of any discussion of Olmert’s plan. The map, along with the proposal, faded into obscurity.

 

Olmert still waits for Abbas’s reply, but his plan is now just another in a long list of missed opportunities to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  

In 1973, Israeli diplomat Abba Eban remarked that Palestinians "never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity," a phrase that has been echoed by Israeli officials ever since. But the reality is more complex. Since the historic 1993 Oslo Accords, moments of hope have repeatedly been overshadowed by tragedy and political shifts.  

 

The pattern of near-agreements followed by failure is not unique to Olmert’s proposal. In January 2001, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators meeting in Taba, Egypt, believed they had outlined the foundation of a Palestinian state. A Palestinian delegate even sketched a rough map on a napkin, signaling the progress they had made. But violence on the ground, particularly the Second Intifada that erupted months earlier, rendered the talks meaningless. Political transition in Israel also played a role—Prime Minister Ehud Barak had already resigned, and Ariel Sharon won the upcoming election decisively.  

 

Just like Olmert’s map, the napkin from Taba became a symbol of what might have been.

 

Based on a report by BBC  2025-02-25

 

 

He missed the point that Palestinians want Israel wiped from the map.