As Germany heads toward a crucial general election, political leaders are avoiding difficult conversations about defence spending, the impact of Russia’s war in Ukraine, and the future of European security. Instead, they have shifted the focus to the struggling economy and migration, a move that has bolstered support for the far-right Alternative für Deutschland while keeping voters in the dark about the country’s looming financial and security challenges.

 

Friedrich Merz, the leader of the conservative CDU/CSU, has sidestepped the issue of massive borrowing for defence, as many of his supporters oppose increasing national debt. Meanwhile, Social Democratic (SPD) Chancellor Olaf Scholz has avoided discussing the possibility of sending German troops to Ukraine as part of a European security force, should a ceasefire be reached. With segments of his political base being anti-militarist or sympathetic to Russia, Scholz has been reluctant to address the topic. Following an emergency European summit on Ukraine in Paris, Scholz dismissed speculation about deploying troops as “highly inappropriate.”

 

Neither of these key contenders for leadership is willing to confront voters with the stark reality of Germany’s security vulnerabilities, especially as Donald Trump pushes for a rapid deal with Vladimir Putin—one that seems to favour Moscow’s interests. A deal of this nature could lead to a significant reduction in the U.S. military presence in Europe, leaving Germany dangerously exposed.

 

“Nobody wants to get caught speaking the truth before the election,” says Jan Techau, a former defence ministry speechwriter and director of Europe at the Eurasia Group. “In the worst-case scenario, if Trump pulls off this deal with Putin and carves up Europe into spheres of influence, Germany is very exposed.”

 

Unlike France and the UK, Germany lacks its own nuclear deterrent. Its military has been significantly weakened over the past three decades due to underfunding, making it difficult even to equip a brigade of 5,000 troops for NATO’s deterrence force in Lithuania. Scholz initially responded to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 by announcing a Zeitenwende, or turning point, and creating a €100 billion fund for defence. However, he has not effectively convinced the German public that the country must abandon its postwar reluctance toward military engagement.

 

Military and intelligence officials warn that Russia could be ready to attack a NATO country by 2030. However, at the current pace of military rebuilding, experts predict it could take decades for Germany to restore its armed forces to a capable state. Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff of the German Council on Foreign Relations observes, “Even the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine has not created a sense of urgency in Germany – a sense that time to rebuild the military is not infinite.” The Kiel Institute for the World Economy has estimated that, at the current rate of procurement, it would take nearly a century to restore the army’s artillery howitzer numbers to their 2004 levels.

 

Once the €100 billion special fund is depleted at the end of 2027, Germany will face an annual €30 billion shortfall just to maintain NATO’s current target of 2% of GDP for defence spending. Achieving the likely new target of 3% or more—expected to be set by allied leaders in June—would require almost double that amount. If Trump withdraws U.S. forces from Europe, the financial burden will rise even further.

 

Merz has pledged that if elected, he will begin by cutting inefficient welfare spending and implementing tax cuts to stimulate economic growth before considering additional borrowing. He has hinted at the possibility of reforming Germany’s strict constitutional “debt brake” to allow for greater fiscal flexibility, including potential joint borrowing with European partners for defence investments. He has also criticized Scholz’s lack of leadership in the EU and committed to mending strained relations with France and Poland, collaborating more closely with the UK, and taking a stronger role in supporting Ukraine. Unlike Scholz, he has backed supplying Ukraine with Taurus medium-range missiles capable of striking targets inside Russia, provided there is consensus among European allies.

 

A close parliamentary colleague describes Merz as a committed pro-European and Atlanticist who understands that Germany will need to act swiftly to bolster its defences. However, significant hurdles remain. It is uncertain whether he will have the political capital to secure the extensive borrowing required for defence investment while also addressing Germany’s crumbling infrastructure. Reforming the debt brake would require a parliamentary super-majority, and his potential SPD coalition partners may resist aggressive cuts to welfare spending in favor of military investment.

 

By failing to prepare the public for the difficult financial choices ahead, Merz risks setting himself up for major political struggles in the near future. When the time comes to make tough decisions on public spending and borrowing, he may find that the real battle has only just begun.

 

Based on a report by The Guardian  2025-02-22

 

 

Bankrupting the country to build up its weapons stockpiles seems extreme. Help other European nations develop their technology for defensive capabilities perhaps?

Russians moving forwards to attack central Europe isn't really on anybody's radar. Nuclear deterrents  aren't much use as they aren't made to be actually used, that would be utter destruction for both sides, they are expensive 'nice to have' toys.

8 hours ago, Social Media said:

 

As Germany heads toward a crucial general election, political leaders are avoiding difficult conversations about defence spending, the impact of Russia’s war in Ukraine, and the future of European security. Instead, they have shifted the focus to the struggling economy and migration, a move that has bolstered support for the far-right Alternative für Deutschland while keeping voters in the dark about the country’s looming financial and security challenges.

 

Friedrich Merz, the leader of the conservative CDU/CSU, has sidestepped the issue of massive borrowing for defence, as many of his supporters oppose increasing national debt. Meanwhile, Social Democratic (SPD) Chancellor Olaf Scholz has avoided discussing the possibility of sending German troops to Ukraine as part of a European security force, should a ceasefire be reached. With segments of his political base being anti-militarist or sympathetic to Russia, Scholz has been reluctant to address the topic. Following an emergency European summit on Ukraine in Paris, Scholz dismissed speculation about deploying troops as “highly inappropriate.”

 

 

Neither of these key contenders for leadership is willing to confront voters with the stark reality of Germany’s security vulnerabilities, especially as Donald Trump pushes for a rapid deal with Vladimir Putin—one that seems to favour Moscow’s interests. A deal of this nature could lead to a significant reduction in the U.S. military presence in Europe, leaving Germany dangerously exposed.

 

“Nobody wants to get caught speaking the truth before the election,” says Jan Techau, a former defence ministry speechwriter and director of Europe at the Eurasia Group. “In the worst-case scenario, if Trump pulls off this deal with Putin and carves up Europe into spheres of influence, Germany is very exposed.”

 

Unlike France and the UK, Germany lacks its own nuclear deterrent. Its military has been significantly weakened over the past three decades due to underfunding, making it difficult even to equip a brigade of 5,000 troops for NATO’s deterrence force in Lithuania. Scholz initially responded to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 by announcing a Zeitenwende, or turning point, and creating a €100 billion fund for defence. However, he has not effectively convinced the German public that the country must abandon its postwar reluctance toward military engagement.

 

Military and intelligence officials warn that Russia could be ready to attack a NATO country by 2030. However, at the current pace of military rebuilding, experts predict it could take decades for Germany to restore its armed forces to a capable state. Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff of the German Council on Foreign Relations observes, “Even the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine has not created a sense of urgency in Germany – a sense that time to rebuild the military is not infinite.” The Kiel Institute for the World Economy has estimated that, at the current rate of procurement, it would take nearly a century to restore the army’s artillery howitzer numbers to their 2004 levels.

 

Once the €100 billion special fund is depleted at the end of 2027, Germany will face an annual €30 billion shortfall just to maintain NATO’s current target of 2% of GDP for defence spending. Achieving the likely new target of 3% or more—expected to be set by allied leaders in June—would require almost double that amount. If Trump withdraws U.S. forces from Europe, the financial burden will rise even further.

 

Merz has pledged that if elected, he will begin by cutting inefficient welfare spending and implementing tax cuts to stimulate economic growth before considering additional borrowing. He has hinted at the possibility of reforming Germany’s strict constitutional “debt brake” to allow for greater fiscal flexibility, including potential joint borrowing with European partners for defence investments. He has also criticized Scholz’s lack of leadership in the EU and committed to mending strained relations with France and Poland, collaborating more closely with the UK, and taking a stronger role in supporting Ukraine. Unlike Scholz, he has backed supplying Ukraine with Taurus medium-range missiles capable of striking targets inside Russia, provided there is consensus among European allies.

 

A close parliamentary colleague describes Merz as a committed pro-European and Atlanticist who understands that Germany will need to act swiftly to bolster its defences. However, significant hurdles remain. It is uncertain whether he will have the political capital to secure the extensive borrowing required for defence investment while also addressing Germany’s crumbling infrastructure. Reforming the debt brake would require a parliamentary super-majority, and his potential SPD coalition partners may resist aggressive cuts to welfare spending in favor of military investment.

 

By failing to prepare the public for the difficult financial choices ahead, Merz risks setting himself up for major political struggles in the near future. When the time comes to make tough decisions on public spending and borrowing, he may find that the real battle has only just begun.

 

Based on a report by The Guardian  2025-02-22

 

 

As in any other European country, even UK or France.

 

1: There is no way that Germany will ever 'go nuclear'. There's not even a nuclear power station running any more.

 

2: Playing down or avoiding talk of defense spending is the same type of thing Starmer did with taxation. Pols who don't stand on a real platform have no mandate once they're elected and that is half the problem these days.

 

3: Merz will not be allowed to wreck and destroy public services and health care the way UK politicians were allowed to destroy the very social fabric of their own country. 

On 2/21/2025 at 2:03 PM, Social Media said:

“Nobody wants to get caught speaking the truth before the election,” says Jan Techau, a former defence ministry speechwriter and director of Europe at the Eurasia Group. “In the worst-case scenario, if Trump pulls off this deal with Putin and carves up Europe into spheres of influence, Germany is very exposed.”

 

Statehood anyone?